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ABSTRACT 
Tim Cupery: Government Involvement in Religion: Causes and Effects of Open Religious Markets 
(Under the direction of Kenneth A. Bollen) 
 
 This dissertation examines measurement of government policies toward religion, country-level 
predictors of those policies, and the impact of policies on religiosity. I use the term Government 
Involvement in Religion (abbreviated GIR) to denote multiple dimensions by which government policies 
may impact the religious market. 
 The first chapter builds measures for multiple dimensions of GIR. I improve on prior 
measurement strategies by combining the best available data with theoretical definitions distinguishing 
between dimensions, and testing multi-dimensional measurement models. I test confirmatory factor 
analysis models and present difference tests showing that dimensions are empirically distinct. 
 The second chapter analyzes which sorts of countries are most likely to be involved in the 
religious market, and in what ways. The data show an unsurprising strong inverse relationship between 
Liberal Democracy and GIR, vetted against concerns of endogeneity. However, over-time changes in 
democracy do not predict over-time changes in GIR. Financial Favoritism appears to be empirically 
compatible with Democracy, but Legislative Favoritism does not. Most interestingly, multivariate 
analyses show a significant positive relationship between GDP and GIR, in both between-country 
differences and over-time changes. While simple correlations show that more-developed countries tend 
to have less GIR, when controlling for other factors – particularly Liberal Democracy – GDP tends to 
predict more government involvement in the religious market. 
 The third chapter addresses Religious Economies theory by examining the relationship between 
GIR and institutional religiosity. I use multiple dimensions of GIR to better address the question of which 
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dimension(s) drive the oft-observed negative relationship with religiosity. The analyses find no 
significant predictors of over-time change in religiosity, partly because of a limited sample of countries 
and time. However, countries with more religious restrictions tend to have significantly lower rates of 
religious service attendance. These analyses give no evidence that government favoritism (toward a 
particular religion) has any detrimental impact on religiosity, undercutting the “lazy monopoly” 
hypothesis that drove much of the early Religious Economies research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The past two and a half years have been eventful for those interested the relationship between 
religion and state. The events of the Arab Spring have collapsed regimes, initiated civil wars, and more 
generally seen a number of countries publicly wrestling with the role that religion should play in politics 
– and the role that government should have to protect or regulate religion. This dissertation is not about 
the Arab Spring or the role of religion in democratic transitions, but my topic is relevant to these 
questions. My focus is on the other side of this issue: government policy toward religion. 
 The relationship between religion and the state plays an important role in national and 
international politics, and has been increasingly recognized as such by social scientists (Smith and 
Woodberry 2001; Wald and Wilcox 2006). Government policy toward religion is relevant to 
understanding a wide range of outcomes, including democratization (Woodberry 2012), group-on-group 
persecution and civil conflict (Grim and Finke 2007, 2011), and levels of religious activity (Iannaccone 
1991; Chaves and Cann 1992; Gill 1998; Stark and Finke 2000; Froese 2001, 2004). Social science 
historically ignored the relationship between religion and state, presuming religion would decline as a 
casualty of modernity (Fox 2008; Stark and Finke 2000). While it is possible that this prediction may 
prove correct, religion has not gone quietly. Events such as the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the 
Religious Right in the United States captured public opinion, and religion has remained a focus of 
government policies across the world. 
 Beginning with Religious Economies research since the late 1980’s, scholars became interested 
in cross-national analysis of government policies toward religion, assessing the “openness” of religious 
markets. The Religious Economies perspective views religion as analogous to an economic marketplace, 
 2 
 
where consumers choose between a range of religious and ideological options offered by various 
suppliers (Iannaccone 1991, 1992; Stark and Finke 2000). Government favoritism may create religious 
monopolies, and governments can also restrict some or all religions. Due to the substantial range of 
government policies toward religion, I use the term Government Involvement in Religion (abbreviated 
GIR) to denote multiple dimensions by which government policies may impact the religious market. 
 What sorts of countries are most likely to restrict religious practice within their borders? How do 
various government policies affect religious vitality in a country? The three chapters composing this 
dissertation examine grouping and measurement of the dimensions of GIR, country-level predictors of 
government policies, and the impact of GIR policies on religiosity. 
 The first chapter of the dissertation deals with measurement of GIR; I improve on prior 
measurement strategies by combining the best available raw data with careful theoretical definitions 
distinguishing between dimensions, and testing model fit and statistical differentiability of dimensions. 
There are numerous specific government policies, such as laws against blasphemy, restrictions on the 
ability of minority religions to purchase property, or government subsidies to pay the salaries of clerical 
personnel for a certain religion. In order to effectively study government regulation of religion, it is 
important to define and measure distinct sub-dimensions of GIR, aggregating groups of policies to 
create indices. To this end, I review theoretical and empirical research on GIR, define sub-dimensions, 
assess available data, test measurement models, and finally present difference tests showing that 
dimensions are statistically differentiable. 
 The second chapter considers predictors of GIR – which sorts of countries are most likely to be 
involved in the religious market, and in what ways. Previous research has shown level of democracy to 
be the strongest predictor of GIR, and particularly of religious restrictions. However, there is significant 
potential endogeneity in this relationship, as some restrictive policies toward religion may also count as 
restriction on political liberties or civic freedoms that are commonly-included in indices measuring 
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democracy. As a result, prior findings may overestimate the strength of any causal relationship between 
democracy and GIR, which may also bias other coefficients in multivariate analysis. I assess which 
indicators of GIR have potential overlap as measures of democracy, and exclude those indicators from 
indices of GIR used in this chapter. Among other variables of interest, the chapter highlights the positive 
association between GDP and GIR, and theorizes the mechanism by which this occurs. 
 The third chapter examines the relationship between GIR and institutional religiosity. An open 
religious market allows the conditions for competition between religions, and subsequent increased 
incentive to recruit members, and increased recruitment activity should result in higher rates of religious 
practice. While most prior research evidences this negative relationship (higher GIR leads to lower 
religiosity), findings have not always been consistent, and prior studies have rarely used quality data 
with a large sample of countries. As such, research in this field has rarely distinguished between the 
impacts of different dimensions of GIR. I use multiple dimensions of GIR (as defined and measured in the 
previous chapter) to better address the question of which dimension(s) drive the frequently-observed 
negative relationship. While the analysis finds no significant predictors of over-time change in religiosity 
– partly because of a limited sample of countries and time – cross-sectional analysis shows that 
countries with more religious restrictions tend to have significantly lower rates of religious service 
attendance. However, these analyses give no evidence that government favoritism (toward a particular 
religion) has any detrimental impact on religiosity. 
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CHAPTER 1 – MEASURING GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGION 
 
 Relationships between religion and state are increasingly recognized as important to national 
and international politics. There are many reasons to pursue cross-national study of religion-state 
relations. In addition to the many people who care about religious freedom (whether for its own sake, 
or more frequently for the sake of their own religious group), the relationship between different social 
and civic freedoms is important to scholarship on democracy (e.g., Sen 1999; Woodberry 2004). 
Tensions between religious groups often play a role in civil conflicts, throughout history and continuing 
today. Scholars studying governmental policies toward religion find that countries where religion is 
more regulated tend to have lower levels of religious participation and attendance (e.g., Chaves and 
Cann 1992; Chaves, Schraeder, and Sprindys 1994; North and Gwin 2004; Fox and Tabory 2008), as well 
as more religious persecution and conflict (Grim and Finke 2007, 2011). While the United Nations 
supports freedom of religious belief and practice, and most countries have constitutional statements 
with some respect for religious freedom, actual governmental regulation of religion varies widely 
between countries (Grim and Finke 2007) and is not strongly-predicted by constitutional content (Fox 
2011b). 
 Cross-national data on religion-state relations is a relatively recent development, and while data 
sources have improved significantly in the past decade, the dimensions being measured still differ across 
research. While cross-national quantitative data on democratic governance and freedoms has been 
collected used by social scientists since the 1950s (Bollen 1980), and Democracy rankings from the Polity 
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project are coded back to 1800, little quality data on religion-state relations exists prior to 1990.1 With 
the recent development of quality datasets on government policies toward religion, there is a need for 
standardization of measures. Two quality datasets have been assembled within the past decade: 
Jonathan Fox’s Religion and State data (see Fox and Sandler 2003; Fox 2008, 2011a) and Grim and 
Finke’s International Religious Freedom data (see Grim and Finke 2006) both offer indices multiple 
dimensions of governmental policies and action toward religion, and are coded for the majority of 
countries in the world. 
 I examine these data sources and use the raw data to build optimized measures. This paper adds 
to existing literature by distinguishing, theoretically and empirically, between multiple dimensions of 
government policies and actions toward religion. First, I review relevant concepts and theories. Second, I 
review past and present measures. Third, I define dimensions to measure. Fourth, I test measurement 
models based on these theoretical definitions. And fifth, I test whether these dimensions are statistically 
differentiable. 
 
Review of Concepts and Theories 
 Governmental regulation of religion became a focal point of social-scientific research with the 
advent of the Religious Economies approach to religion. Sometimes referred to as the Supply Side 
perspective or the New Paradigm (Warner 1993), this perspective views religion as a market where 
religious consumers choose between a range of religious and ideological options offered by various 
suppliers (Iannaccone 1991, 1992; Stark and Finke 2000). While this perspective developed in attempt to 
                                                          
1 At least within social science, this dearth part of a general lack of study of religion for much of the 20th Century, 
partly due to the now-frequently-discussed expectation of secularization. If religion was destined to die out or at 
least lose influence and relevance in the modern world, why put much effort into studying it? Despite Stark’s 
(1999) article, “Secularization, R.I.P.”, the secularization-modernization thesis is still actively debated, and is 
conceptualized and measured in a variety of ways. Some recent scholarship friendly to the thesis acknowledges 
that religiosity on the world scale is growing, because population growth is concentrated in less-developed 
countries and cultures (Norris and Inglehart 2004). See Chapter 2 of Fox (2008) for a recent and balanced overview 
of the secularization-modernization debate. 
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explain religious activity in the United States (Finke and Stark 1989, 1992; Finke 1990), it has been 
applied in cross-national research on religion, as well as case studies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Japan,  (Froese 2001, 2004; Gill 1998; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). 
 Finke and Stark (1989, 1992; also see Finke 1990) first discussed the relevance of regulation 
versus an open religious market. Their historical-sociological focus on the U.S. case details how the lack 
of an established, state- supported religion and resulting deregulation of the religious market allowed 
for entrepreneurial-driven religious activity and growth, as well as religious toleration and religious 
freedom. While social pressures on individuals still existed, the state did not actively limit the religious 
market, either by restricting individual choice of religious affiliation or by restricting the operation of 
some religious brands. 
 There are multiple mechanisms by which governmental regulation is theorized to impact 
religious activity. An open religious market creates the conditions for competition between religions, 
and subsequent increased incentive to recruit members. Conversely, Governmental policies that give 
preferential status to a given religion or establish an official state religion decrease this competition, so 
that monopolistic religions have less incentive to be responsive to the demands and preferences of the 
population. Restrictions on minority religions result in greater costs of entry and operation in the 
religious market. As a result, individuals have less choice of religion, whether directly (by restrictions 
against converting or adhering to certain religions) or indirectly (because the market is suppressed). 
Additionally, state-supported religions may be viewed in a negative light because of its preferential 
treatment or enforced status. Government enforcement of religious laws and norms can lead to 
resentment against state religion (Iannaccone 1995), and state-supported religion may become 
identified with elites so membership in a different religious group (Tabory 1991) or identifying as secular 
(Chaves and Cann 1992) can be a form of symbolic opposition. Lifting of religious regulations has been 
shown to increase supply and religious activity in Europe, the United States, Latin America, and Muslim 
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Countries (Chaves et al. 1994; Finke and Stark 1992; Finke 1997; Froese 2001; Iannaccone et al. 1997; 
North and Gwin 2004; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Yang 2006). 
 Supply-side mechanisms do not always link decreased regulation with increased religious 
activity. Froese and Pfaff (2001), for example, argue that new freedom in post-communist Poland and 
East Germany allowed for more competition from secular options, which in a sense are also players in 
the religious marketplace. Similarly, Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004:424) note that less governmental 
involvement in religion, "individuals are correspondingly more free to not only express belief in a 
minority religion, but non-belief as well." 
 More recent research shows a connection between governmental regulation of religion and 
religious persecution, a link that is also expected within the Religious Economies perspective. Stark and 
colleagues (Stark and Finke 2000:199–202; Stark and Iannaccone 1994:232) note that religious 
monopolies depend on the coercive force of the state in order to maintain their privileged status. A 
religion having monopolistic status does not require that other (typically minority) groups be 
persecuted, but it does imply the political ability to do so, and the gap between giving one’s group 
political advantage through law, and directly persecuting other groups, is not large. Grim and Finke 
(2007, 2011) explore this link empirically, and find that governmental regulation of religion is positively 
linked to religious persecution. These processes can provide a baseline for civil conflict, as religious 
groups who are shut out of the political process are more likely to radicalize. For example, Moaddel 
(2005:342) links the rise of militant fundamentalism in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and Syria to state suppression 
of the social functions of religion. 
 
Prior Measures of Government Involvement in Religion 
 This paper is focused on defining and measuring multiple dimensions of governmental policies 
toward religion. Following Fox (2008), I use the term Government Involvement in Religion (hereafter 
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abbreviated GIR) to denote multiple dimensions by which governmental policies may impact the 
religious market. The term "religion-state relations" is too vague, and "governmental regulation of 
religion" is too specific, as certain governmental interventions in the religious market (e.g., financial 
subsidies toward a favored religion) do not qualify as regulation. 
 Data on GIR is more useful to the extent that it measures specific practices or multiple 
dimensions, and most data used by scholars meets at least one of these criteria. As a contrary example, 
Freedom House offers a single scale of religious freedom (Marshall 2008) where each country is 
assigned a single value ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), similar to Freedom House’s rankings 
of political rights and civil liberties. The most recent edition of these data includes 100 countries, but is 
of limited usefulness because it does not distinguish different factors contributing to religious freedom. 
 Most GIR-related research prior to the past decade used measures based on the reports in 
Barret et al’s World Christian Encyclopedia (most recently published in 2001). While assembled to aid 
Christian missionary efforts, the WCE is generally well-regarded by scholars and is considered a credible 
resource about religion across countries (Grim and Finke 2006). The WCE includes cross-national data on 
religious affiliation and activity for all major religions, with some measures available back to the 1970’s. 
While the specific measures coded by the WCE are problematic, the reports and data have been used in 
conjunction with other sources to code multiple items measuring GIR. 
 The WCE contains multiple measures of governmental treatment of religion, which have been 
analyzed in scholarly studies (e.g., Barro and McCleary 2003; McCleary and Barro 2006). The coded 
measures are of some use, but are theoretically problematic. The WCE includes a Religious Liberty Index 
with 10 categories: four on state support or subsidizing of religion, five on political restrictions and 
interference in religion, and one for discrimination against minority religions. While these categories are 
clearly not mutually exclusive, each country is assigned only one value. There is limited ability to re-code 
because the underlying data used for coding are not available (Gill 1999; Grim and Finke 2006; Fox 
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2008). The WCE also includes a dichotomous measure for the existence of a state religion (specifically, 
whether a state has a “religious philosophy”) but the meaning is unclear and there is no evidence of 
degree. While this measure has been used in a number of scholarly studies, there are clearly significant 
gradations (as well as multiple dimensions) to having a “state religion.” 
 Chaves and Cann (1992; also used in Chaves et al. 1994) coded 6 dichotomous items measuring 
various aspects of governmental policies toward religion in 18 European countries.2 The items were 
chosen to reflect "a direct financial subsidy or benefit to a religious institution, exactly the kind of 
‘public’ support that should produce monopolistic laziness, according to the economic theory” (Chaves 
and Cann 1992:280), but the range of measured behaviors include state control of religion (appointing 
or approving church leaders) as well as preferential treatment and subsidies. This index was later 
expanded to 20 items and also used in later studies with different country samples (Gill 1999; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). However, this wider range of items was again used to construct a single index instead of 
separating out multiple dimensions of GIR, and some of the individual items are themselves 
multidimensional. For example, “The state appoints or approves church leaders, church leaders appoint 
or approve government officials, and/or church leaders have specific positions in the government” is 
coded based on both directions of influence and control between religion and state. Moreover, each 
coded item is dichotomous, and so do not capture variation degree of specific practices. 
 Recent better-quality data have come at least in part from coding of the U.S. State Department’s 
International Religious Freedom Reports. Grim and Finke (2006, 2007) defend the reports as a data 
source, noting that the reports appear to be “honest fact-finding” independent of diplomatic 
considerations – for example, despite the generally friendly relationship between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia, reports for that country note that “religious freedom does not exist.” Similarly, Fox (2011a:18) 
notes that in coding the Religion and State dataset, which relied on multiple sources, the International 
                                                          
2 These items, and the items for other measures of GIR discussed here, are presented in the Appendix at the end of 
this dissertation. 
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Religious Freedom Reports were found to be extremely reliable, although sometimes incomplete. 
However, Fox notes the value of relying on multiple sources because of significant (unwarranted) 
skepticism within the academic community that “any branch of the U.S. government can produce an 
unbiased report.” Multiple researchers have coded these data for scholarly use. 
 North and Gwin (2004) coded 9 dichotomous items using the State Department reports, for a 
sample of 59 countries. They used two of these items as predictor variables, but also built a simple 
summed index and did not present any tests for validity, and the dichotomous variables do not give any 
measure of degree of each form of regulation. The 9 items measure a range governmental actions and 
policies, including restrictions on conversion and missionaries, governmental oversight or censorship of 
religious groups, and funding of certain groups. 
 The measures discussed thus far coded dichotomous items measuring a range of GIR behaviors. 
However, they were used in single scales, treating GIR as a single dimension. More recently-coded data 
has organized items into indices measuring multiple dimensions of GIR. 
 The first clear distinction of GIR dimensions is between restrictions and favoritism. Following 
Durham (1996), Stark and Finke (2000) distinguish between suppression and subsidies, noting that 
suppression represses innovation in the religious market, whereas subsidies simply remove some 
incentive for the majority religion to be attuned to religious preferences of the public by making 
majority religious institutions less dependent on their adherents. Gill (2008) similarly distinguishes 
between two main ways that governments can be involved with religion and limit the existence of an 
open religious market. The government can place negative restrictions on religious liberty, from barriers 
on the entry of missionaries and limitations of specific practices to requirements that religious groups 
must register, and barriers to the purchase or rental of property for religious groups to meet. 
Governments can also positively endorse specific religious groups, such that the favored religious group 
faces lower higher costs to entry or practice. 
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 It is worth noting that restrictions and favoritism are not necessarily opposites. Both constitute 
GIR and would not exist in a free religious market. Often, the two methods are combined, such that the 
preferred religious group faces fewer negative restrictions. Additionally, supportive policies can 
sometimes serve as indirect instruments of government control. Government support of a dominant 
majority religion doesn't always mean freedom for that religion; support usually comes with strings 
attached, with some degree of state control over the religion being supported. A "state religion" can 
mean that religion has power over the government, or that government keeps control over religions and 
uses support-with-strings to keep the majority-religion in-line. For example, Shia Islam is the official 
religion of Iran, and the Iranian regime has repeatedly used force to stifle theological debate that is 
normal within the religion's history (Kurzman 2001). 
 In their substantial coding of the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom 
Reports, Grim and Finke (2006, 2007) follow this typology by separately measuring restrictions and 
favoritism. They define these dimensions as follows: 
 Government Regulation: “the restrictions placed on practice, profession or selection of religion 
by official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state.” They note that restrictions are 
not limited to formal laws or constitutional statements (Grim and Finke 2006:7). 
 Religious Favoritism: “subsidies, privileges, support, or favorable sanctions provided by the state 
to a select religion or small group of religions.” This includes official support as well as de facto 
support, from direct financial subsidies to the teaching of religion in state-run schools (2006:8).3 
 
Each is treated as a single dimension; Grim and Finke do not differentiate between different sorts of 
restrictions or between different sorts of favoritism. The items composing their Government Regulation 
Index (GRI) and Government Favoritism Index (GFI) are shown in the appendix. These items appear to be 
                                                          
3 Additionally, Grim and Finke define and measure religious restrictions coming from non-governmental sources, 
which they call Social Regulation: "restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by other 
religious groups, associations, or the culture at large." These may be tolerated or even encouraged by the state, 
but do not count as non-governmental regulation if they are implemented by the state (2006:8). While I am 
focused on governmental policies toward religion, non-governmental restrictions and pressures on religion are an 
important piece of the overall story, including the interplay between governmental policies with the preferences 
and biases of a country’s populace. 
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reasonable measures of their specified dimensions. However, the items tend to be somewhat vague and 
are not always measuring a distinct or specific practice, and therefore leave more room for subjective 
judgment by the coder. While “Missionary work is restricted or prohibited” (mssnry) is specific, 
“Government interferes with individual’s ability to worship” (gvintf) and “to what extent is there a 
favored or established religious brand” (estrel) could cover a wide range of governmental practices. 
 Since Grim and Finke’s data is based only on the State Department reports, it does not include 
countries to which the U.S. has limited access (e.g., North Korea, Libya) or the U.S. itself or U.S.-
controlled territories. These data were initially coded for 2003, and are now also available for 2001, 
2005, and 2008. 
 The most ambitious data-collection on governmental regulation of religion is the Religion and 
State project, headed by Fox (2008, 2011a). These data are currently coded for each year from 1990-
2002, for 175 countries. Unlike Grim and Finke’s data, the RAS data are coded from a variety of available 
sources, including the World Christian Encyclopedia, various journalistic and country-specific academic 
sources, as well as the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports. Reports were 
written for each country and then coded. About 25%, selected for even representation across region, 
majority religion, coder, and country size) were double-coded to ensure reliability. 
 Fox (2008, 2011a) builds indices measuring three dimensions of GIR. Like Grim and Finke, he 
builds separate indices measuring restrictions and favoritism, but also separates two types of 
restrictions: those that apply to the majority religion or all religions in a country, and restrictions that 
apply specifically to minority religions. These dimensions are defined as follows (Fox 2011a:13–15): 
 Religious Discrimination: limitations that are placed on the religious practices or religious 
institutions of minority religions but not those of the majority religion. 
 Religious Regulation: restrictions that are placed on all religions or the majority religion. 
 Religious Legislation: the extent to which the government supports religion. This includes 
legislating and enforcing religious precepts as law, financially supporting religion, or otherwise 
giving preference or support to the majority religion 
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Fox’s two measures of restrictions (Religious Discrimination and Religious Regulation) are effectively 
sub-dimensions of Grim and Finke’s Governmental Regulation, and distinguish regulations that apply 
only to minority religions from regulations that apply to all religions. Restrictions that are specifically 
applied to minority religions can, in conjunction with favoritism, be part of an overall position of state-
supported religion. Scholars studying civil conflict and democracy are frequently interested in the 
treatment of minority groups4 for reasons that also hold true regarding religious discrimination. 
Restrictions on minority religions are an easy political way to curry favor of the majority population in a 
country that does not place a high value on freedom.5 However, not all restrictions on religion single out 
minority groups. Many countries have regulations on religion that apply to all religions, including any 
majority religion(s). These approaches to regulating religion are conceptually differentiable: while either 
type of restriction limits the religious market, they do so in different ways, and for potentially different 
motives. Consider the ideal-type cases of Saudi Arabia and China. Saudi Arabia has a single privileged 
religion, and all other (minority) religions are basically illegal. China places heavy restrictions on all 
religions. It could be argued that these motives are very different (e.g., Saudi Arabia protects the status 
of Wahabbi Islam, while China considers all religions a danger) or that they are similar (e.g., both China 
and Saudi Arabia want to protect the authority and ideology of the State). 
 It is possible that restrictions on minority religions do not differ much in motive or impact from 
restrictions on majority religions or all religions. As Froese’s work on former communist countries 
highlights, non-religious ideological positions can effectively be players in the religious marketplace 
(Froese and Pfaff 2001; Froese 2004). From this view, restrictions applied to all religions may effectively 
be part of a monopolistic strategy, giving a privileged position to secularism. Monsma and Soper (2009) 
note that in some democratic countries (e.g., the United States), secularism is considered a “neutral 
                                                          
4 For example, see work based on the Minorities At Risk data (e.g., Fukuda-Parr et al. 2008; Melander 2009; Öberg, 
Möller, and Wallensteen 2009; Sorens 2011). 
 
5 Or in a country that does, considering the recent popular opposition to Muslim places of worship in U.S. 
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space” between religions, while in others (e.g., The Netherlands) secularism is considered another 
ideology.6 Nevertheless, it is worth separately measuring these dimensions of restrictions, and 
empirically testing whether they cluster separately from each other, and have different effects or 
associations. 
 While Fox’s definition of Religious Legislation is very similar to Grim and Finke’s definition of 
Religious Favoritism, the indicators used to construct their measures imply multiple sub-dimensions of 
favoritism. Grim and Finke define Governmental Favoritism to include a wide variety of preferential 
policies and actions from the government, four of the five items in their index are specifically about 
funding or in-kind subsidies, while the other item (estrel) does not specify the nature of favors or 
establishment of religious brand. As a result, Grim and Finke’s Governmental Favoritism Index is mainly 
measuring preferential treatment via funding or other subsidies. Fox defines Religious Legislation 
similarly to Grim and Finke’s definition of Religious Favoritism, intending to measure non-suppressive 
favoritism. However, the items composing the index cover ties in either direction between government 
and religion, not all of which are necessarily favoritism or giving advantage to one religion over another. 
The items clearly measuring favoritism are legislatively-focused, where a favored religion has influence 
and control within the government (including legislating and enforcing religious precepts as law). 
 The differences between these two indexes point toward two distinct sub-dimensions of 
governmental favoritism toward religion. These two forms of favoritism – positive financial support and 
subsidies, and legislative control or advantage – may or may not be undertaken for similar motives, but 
in more-democratic countries, legislation of religious laws is less likely to take place than inequitable 
subsidies toward religious groups. As noted by Driessen (2010), financial favoritism and subsidies do not 
necessarily infringe on the autonomy of religion and state institutions necessary to democracy, but 
legislative control or advantage does. 
                                                          
6 See Kuru (2007) for greater discussion of types of secularism and treatment of religion by the state. 
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 There is one more potentially important dimensional distinction. Religious choice is specifically 
important to conceptions of religious freedom – Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations 1948) specifically mentions that freedom of religion includes the freedom to change 
religion. Choice of religion is also central to the idea of an open religious market. Competition in the 
religious marketplace includes the ability to proselytize, the value of which is predicated on the ability to 
change one’s religion. While governments obviously cannot directly regulate beliefs and conscience as 
these exist in people’s minds, proselytizing or changes in affiliation can be regulated (e.g., sanctions 
against people who convert away from the majority religion, or restrictions on proselytizing by citizens 
or missionaries). While some forced-secularism regimes such as Soviet Russia have restricted 
proselytizing, in most cases restrictions on proselytizing or conversion are used to disadvantage minority 
religions. However, because of the importance of religious choice to religious market theory, it is worth 
testing whether they cluster separately from other restrictions on religion. 
 
Defining Dimensions of GIR 
 In order to best study religion-state relations and governmental policies toward religion, it is 
important to define and measure clear and distinct dimensions of GIR. This is a balancing act between 
breadth and parsimony. There are numerous specific governmental actions and policies that can affect 
religion: for example, the state may directly pay the salaries of personnel for certain religious groups, or 
restrict the ability of some or all religious groups to publically proselytize. While certain specific practices 
may be of special interest to researchers, data on GIR will generally be most useful when aggregated 
into distinct, theoretically-defined dimensions. Future research can show which dimensions are most 
important in their impacts and associations. 
 Building on the discussion of prior measures, I define Government Involvement in Religion as 
actions of the state which limit choice of religion or the free practice of some or all religions, or give 
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funding and subsidies or legislative advantage to some religions over others. This distinguishes five sub-
dimensions – three types of restrictions and two types of favoritism. 
 Restriction sub-dimensions: 
o Proselytizing Restrictions: restrictions on conversion or proselytizing, including 
restrictions on missionaries 
o Minority Restrictions: restrictions applied specifically to minority religions, including 
restrictions against worship, organization, assembly, and teaching, or holding property 
for these purposes 
o Majority Restrictions: restrictions on the majority religion or all religions, including 
restrictions against worship, organization, assembly, teaching, and holding property for 
these purposes 
 Favoritism sub-dimensions: 
o Legislative Favoritism, where the religious laws of a specific religion are legislated as the 
national-civic laws, or the favored religion is given specific forms of governmental 
control 
o Financial Favoritism, where the state gives preferential treatment (via special tax 
breaks, funding or other subsidies) to one or some religions that are not given to others 
 
These dimensions are best measured based on what states actually do. As noted above, most countries 
have statements about freedom of religion in their constitutions, but such shows have little power in 
predicting actual enforced policies. In some cases, governments justify restriction of religious speech (or 
speech about religion) for the purpose of protecting religion. For example, India – under the justification 
of protecting religion and maintaining peace – prohibits any expression of views which someone might 
consider insulting to his or her religion. Because of examples like these, it is important to use data 
measuring actual governmental behaviors and enforcement, rather than official constitutional 
statements or stances. 
 
Building Measures of Specified Dimensions 
 To build measures of the five dimensions of GIR, I use items from Grim and Finke’s International 
Religious Freedom data and Fox’s Religion and State data. Both datasets cover the majority of countries 
in the world, and are coded for multiple years. Fox’s items are generally preferable to Grim and Finke’s 
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items, for three reasons: First, each of Fox’s items measures a specific governmental practice or policy 
toward religion, whereas some of Grim and Finke’s items are more abstract and therefore leave more 
room for coder judgment. Secondly, Fox’s coding distinguishes between restrictions applied to minority 
religions and restrictions applied to all religions or the majority religion. Third, Fox’s data are available 
for a wider range of years. Grim and Finke have coded the U.S. State Department’s International 
Religious Freedom Reports for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008, while Fox’s data are currently available for 
1990-2002 and will soon be available through 2008. However, I Grim and Finke’s favoritism index to 
measure Financial Favoritism, as Fox’s data do not include any such items measuring subsidies to 
religion. 
 Indices measuring a dimension should be composed of items that empirically cluster together. 
This is a more specific criterion than summing all items that could be categorized under a given concept, 
because some of those items might be negatively related to each other or even mutually exclusive. 
Many researchers present a Cronbach's alpha to defend the coherence of indices, but this statistic is 
problematic for use in defense of the co-variation of a group of items.7 I use Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis to test how well a group of items measure the same empirical dimension.8 If a group of items 
measures the same empirical dimension, then the practices or policies measured by the group tend to 
cluster together, or co-occur. Since the measurement scale of items in Fox’s data is ordinal and not 
continuous, the items were treated as ordinal categorical variables using Weighted Least Squares 
                                                          
7 Cronbach's alpha is sensitive to the number of items, with more items producing a larger alpha for a given quality 
of fit. Additionally, alpha makes a variety of implausible assumptions: equal loadings on items, uncorrelated errors 
between items, and equal error variances, and the existence of only one dimension. 
 
8 Structural Equation modeling offers multiple advantages beyond the Confirmatory Factor Analysis used here. 
First, using latent variables with multiple indicators gives the ability to control for measurement error in the model. 
Secondly, simultaneous estimation allows for more effective modeling of multi-stage or recursive processes, 
compared to typical regression approaches. Finally, it is possible to treat variables as categorical, thereby not 
constraining the steps between categories to be equal. 
 18 
 
estimation. This technique uses a covariance matrix based on polychoric relationship between the items 
(Muthén 1984; Bollen 1989).9 
 I use Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test how closely a group of indicators measure the same 
empirical dimension. This assumes two things. First, it treats the indicators as effects of the state's 
underlying propensity, rather than causes of the state's propensity. For example, it makes little sense to 
say that government restrictions on the purchase of property by minority religions cause the 
government's general posture toward restricting minority religions. Secondly, my use of Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis assumes that the indicators are measuring a continuous underlying latent variable, as 
opposed to a typology or classification based on different groups. Although Political Economies are often 
classified in categories, this approach has the downside of reifying the categories when the real world is 
messy and mixed, usually with gradations. For example, Political Science research often uses 
dichotomous measures of democracy, but indices of democracy do not show a bimodal distribution, and 
dichotomizing such a measure throws away useful variation in the data. Government Involvement in 
Religion does not appear to be composed of ideal types as might be initially assumed. It is easy to 
consider extreme cases or “tails” of a distribution to establish ideal types, but this does not imply an 
actual bimodal distribution of traits, propensities or effects. While we may discuss “the Swedish model” 
or “the Iranian model” of religion-state relations, actual GIR policies are the result of negotiations and 
compromises built up over time within each country. Even within “Western Democracies” there is 
substantial gradation and diversity in treatment of religion (Monsma and Soper 2009). Theoretically, the 
underlying propensity of a country to regulate religion may be expressed in a variety of ways. Combining 
multiple indicators, each measuring the degree of a specific practice or policy, produces measures of GIR 
dimensions with rich gradation. 
                                                          
9 Polychoric correlations are a measure of the correlation between normally distributed continuous variables 
thought to underlie crudely measured ordinal or dichotomous variables. 
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 I use two main criteria for choosing and excluding items to measure a given dimension. First, 
items should validly measure the theoretically specified dimension, both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, the item should have face validity as a measure of the specified dimension. Empirically, 
the item should co-vary with other items measuring the same dimension. Secondly, I exclude items that 
have little variation between categories. For example, mk (forced conversions) has 169 of 175 countries 
coded as 0. Such items may measure the intended concept, but are better excluded for practical 
reasons. In a simple additive scale, such items add little variation into the scale, and excluding them has 
little effect on empirical relationships.10 More importantly, items with little variation across categories 
limit our ability to test how well they fit or cluster with other items (effectively a sample size problem). 
In Structural Equation Modeling context, items with very small populations in one or more categories 
can cause problems with estimation, particularly when treating items as ordinal categorical variables. 
Such items can cause problems with estimation because they increase the chance of encountering zero 
cells or empty cells in the bivariate table between two items, resulting in an extreme fitting as the 
correlation between those two variables is most easily estimated as 1 or -1. Even without a zero cell, 
Weighted Least Squares estimation is sensitive to small cell populations, which can cause artifactual 
improvement or degradation of model fit.11 
 
Restrictions on Minority Religions 
 Fox’s definition and measurement of Religious Discrimination is consistent with my definition of 
Minority Restrictions, except that I argue for measuring restrictions on proselytizing or conversion as a 
separate dimension. Above, I define Minority Restrictions as “restrictions applied specifically to minority 
                                                          
10 This is not to say that such items are not useful. If one is interested in forced conversions, Fox's measure tells 
where this is practiced. 
 
11 For example, while njj and ndd measure similar things, and are both similarly-skewed toward the “0” category, 
njj’s inclusion notably improves fit statistics, while ndd’s inclusion hurts fit statistics despite ndd having a stronger 
polyserial correlation with the scale composed of the remaining items (not including ndd or njj). 
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religions, including restrictions against worship, organization, assembly, and teaching, or holding 
property for these purposes.” Fox’s items measuring Religious Discrimination contains items about 
restrictions on proselytizing or conversion. I test the fit of this index with and without those items. 
However, I exclude two of Fox’s items: 
 mk (forced conversions) is highly-skewed, with 169 of 175 countries coded as 0 
 mll (minority religions must register to be legal or to receive special tax status) does not 
necessarily imply restriction, and loads poorly on the latent variable.12 
 
This leaves 12 items measuring restrictions on minority religions other than proselytizing or conversion: 
ma, mb, mbb, mc, md, me, mee, mf, mg, mh, mi, and mm. The two items measuring restrictions on 
proselytizing and conversion are mj and ml. Fit statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analysis models are 
show in Table 1. The first set of models includes the two proselytizing items; the second set of models 
excludes these items. With or without items measuring restrictions on proselytizing, items measuring 
Minority Restrictions fit very well together. Fit statistics are very similar between these two sets of 
models, and while the fit statistics are slightly better for the second set of models (excluding measures 
of proselytizing restrictions), the differences in fit statistics are marginal. Difference tests presented 
below show that restrictions on proselytizing or conversion are statistically differentiable from other 
restrictions on minority religions. 
 
                                                          
12 For 2002, mll loads significantly (test statistic = 4.1) on the latent variable in WLSMV confirmatory factor analysis, 
but both the test statistic and standardized coefficient are far lower than for any other item. The standardized 
coefficient of 0.30 is less than half the next-smallest standardized coefficient. 
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Table 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Restrictions on Minority Religions
Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA ≤ .05) BIC CFI TLI
1999 175 56 153.228 77 0 0.075 0.011 -244.5 0.977 0.973
2000 175 55 152.42 77 0 0.075 0.012 -245.3 0.978 0.974
2001 175 55 156.207 77 0 0.077 0.007 -241.5 0.976 0.972
2002 175 55 166.511 77 0 0.082 0.002 -231.2 0.973 0.968
1999 175 48 96.025 54 0.0004 0.067 0.103 -182.9 0.981 0.976
2000 175 47 93.797 54 0.0006 0.065 0.13 -185.1 0.982 0.979
2001 175 47 89.746 54 0.0016 0.062 0.192 -189.2 0.984 0.981
2002 175 47 93.283 54 0.0007 0.064 0.137 -185.6 0.982 0.979  
There are a variety of ways to evaluate the fit of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis model, all of which show 
that these models fits well. Since the items are supposed to measure the same underlying concept, each 
item should load strongly on the latent variable, which is borne out here: each item loads on the latent 
variable with a standardized coefficient of at least 0.6. CFI (Comparative Fit Index) and TLI (Tucker-Lewis 
Index) effectively compare the model chi-square statistic to the chi-square statistic of a 
null/independence model (Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen 2008). Values above 0.95 are commonly 
considered to indicate a good-fitting model (Schreiber et al. 2006), and the values are nearly all above 
0.97. The BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) compares the estimated model to the saturated model, 
and negative values indicate a good model fit, and BIC is strongly negative for each model.13 
 
Restrictions on Proselytizing and Conversion 
 I argue for treating Proselytizing Restrictions – defined above as “restrictions on conversion or 
proselytizing, including restrictions on missionaries” – as a separate dimension. After excluding mk 
because it has 169 or 175 countries coded as 0, there are two remaining items measuring restrictions on 
proselytizing or conversion: 
 mj (restrictions on conversion to minority religions) 
                                                          
13 While I report the commonly-used RMSEA statistic in tables, the supposed “universal cutoff” of 0.05 for RMSEA 
does not appear trustworthy, particularly for small sample sizes (Chen et al. 2008). 
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 ml (restrictions on proselytizing) 
 
With only two items, it is not possible to estimate measurement model fit. However, these items both 
clearly measure the specified dimension, and are correlated (polychoric) at 0.90 to 0.91 for each year 
1998-2002. Additionally, difference testing (presented below) shows that these two items cluster 
distinctly from other dimensions of GIR measured here. 
 
Restrictions on Majority Religion or All Religions 
 Fox’s definition and measurement of Religious Regulation is consistent with my definition of 
Majority Restrictions, which I defined above as “restrictions on the majority religion or all religions, 
including restrictions against worship, organization, assembly, teaching, and holding property for these 
purposes.” I exclude the following four items from Fox’s list: 
 ndd (restrictions on public observance of religious practices) has 167 or 168 of 175 countries 
coded as 0, depending on year 
 nii (restrictions on religious public gatherings) has 170 of 175 countries coded as 0 
 njj (restrictions on public display of religious symbols by private persons or organizations) has 
169 of 175 countries coded as 0 
 nzz (other restrictions specified by coder) loads poorly on the latent variable,14 which is 
unsurprising as it is an “other” catch-all category. 
 
I test the fit of the remaining 7 items from Fox’s list: naa, nbb, ncc, nee, nff, ngg and nhh. 
 
Table 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Restrictions on Majority/All Religions
Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA ≤ .05) BIC CFI TLI
1999 175 24 17.465 14 0.2322 0.038 0.605 -54.8 0.995 0.993
2000 175 24 16.949 14 0.259 0.035 0.635 -55.4 0.996 0.994
2001 175 24 18.623 14 0.18 0.043 0.539 -53.7 0.993 0.99
2002 175 24 18.784 14 0.173 0.044 0.529 -53.5 0.993 0.99  
                                                          
14 For 2002, nzz loads significantly (test statistic = ~4.1, depending on other items included) on the latent variable 
in WLSMV confirmatory factor analysis, but both the test statistic and standardized coefficient are far lower than 
any other item. The standardized coefficient of 0.40, and the next-smallest coefficient is 0.65. In general, items 
defined as “other” types of x load less well on the latent variable than items measuring specific practices. 
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Fit statistics for confirmatory factor analysis models are shown in Table 2. Measurement models 
estimated using Maximum Likelihood, treating each item as a continuous variable, don’t fit consistently 
well. Model fit is notably better when treating the items as ordinal categorical variables. Each item loads 
above 0.65, CFI and TLI hover just above 0.99 for each year, and BIC is strongly negative. 
 
Legislative Favoritism 
 I use selected items from Fox’s Religious Legislation index to measure Legislative Favoritism. 
Fox’s index is intended as a general measure of non-suppressive governmental favoritism toward 
religion, but the items composing the index are multi-dimensional, not all of the items measure 
favoritism, and the items measuring favoritism are all of the legislative variety.15 Empirically, three of the 
33 items in Fox’s index are negatively correlated with the index as a whole.16 Theoretically, these items 
do not only measure legislation of laws from a favored religion. Rather, the included items measure 
various forms of integration between religion and state at a legal and practical level, sometimes having 
little to do with whether the state treats religions equally. There is some measurement of favoritism or 
state-church status, but also indicators of general ties between religion and state (whether for control or 
support) that are not necessarily inequitable between various religious groups. For example, collection 
of taxes on behalf of religious organizations (lfn) may take place for all (approved) religions, and is not 
necessarily designed to favor particular religions. Countries may limit which religions are approved to 
                                                          
15 Fox’s index is built by summing 33 dichotomous items. Fox (2008) presents a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87 for the 
index, but this is not an ideal statistic because its value is sensitive to the number of items, with more items 
producing a larger alpha. Additionally, Cronbach’s alpha makes a variety of implausible assumptions: equal 
loadings on items, uncorrelated errors between items, and equal error variances, and the existence of only one 
dimension. 
 
16 The three negatively-related items are lei (religious education is standard in public schools, but it is possible to 
opt out), lnw (religious organizations must register with the government to obtain official status), and loo 
(presence of an official government body which monitors "sects" or minority religions). The first two items are 
significantly negative. The negative relationship between these items and the rest of the index shows up when 
using confirmatory factor analysis (where each item is negatively correlated with the latent variable) and when 
testing the polyserial correlation between each item and the summed Religious Legislation index built without the 
item in question. 
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practice, but collection of church taxes in and of itself does not qualify as favoritism. Although most 
religious organizations in Germany rely on the government to collect a portion of church members' 
income, the German system allows for religious organizations to collect taxes directly, even providing 
income data on church members. Also included are indicators for whether the state makes use of 
religious groups to do work of the state, whether social welfare functions by religious charities or setting 
the conditions of marriage. For example, Lebanon has no auspices for secular marriage. The state 
sanctions marriage rites from each of the 18 approved religious organizations in the country, but for 
people from different religious groups to marry each other, they must travel abroad. Rather than 
favoring specific religious groups, this policy inhibits the mixing of people from different religious 
groups. There are multiple indicators for religious education, in ways that do not necessarily connote 
favoritism.  
 To review, Governmental Favoritism is governmental support or preferential treatment of one 
or some religions over others, such that non-preferred groups suffer relatively higher costs of entry or 
practice. This includes financial subsidies to favored religion(s), and legislative or governmental control 
for the favored religion.17 Fox’s data includes items measuring some types of government funding of 
religion, but none that necessarily qualify as favoritism.18 Therefore, using my criteria for choosing and 
excluding items to measure a given dimension, I use Fox’s data to construct a measure of Legislative 
Favoritism. I use 13 of the 33 items composing Fox’s Religious Legislation index. 
 In addition to items which do not measure favoritism, I exclude a few other items from Fox’s 
data. As noted above, I exclude items which have little variation between categories and thus have 
relatively empty cells, adding little variation while causing difficulties for Weighted Least Squares 
                                                          
17 While the wording of this definition is mine, it is consistent with the definitions presented by Grim and Finke 
(2006), Gill (2008), and Fox (2008, 2011a) 
 
18 Difference tests (not presented here) indicate that four government-support-but-not-favoritism items (lfk, lfm, 
lfn, and lgo) cluster distinctly from the items measuring Legislative Favoritism. 
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estimation.19 One item was excluded for poor fit relative to the other items.20 One item was excluded 
from the estimation for technical reasons.21 
 One excluded item warrants more discussion: llt, measuring prohibitive restrictions on abortion, 
should not be used as a measure of religious favoritism or religious legislation. In the U.S., abortion has 
been politicized along the right/left political spectrum, and largely motivated by religious ideals. But 
worldwide, legal restrictions on abortion are more strongly tied to development and demographic-
transition status than to religion or laws about religion. I tested this by regressing llt on logged, per-
capita GDP and the index built from the remaining Religious Legislation items. GDP – an indicator of 
development status – is a stronger and more significant predictor of abortion restrictions. This is in 
contrast to lxx (restrictions on women – education, jobs, freedom to go out in public alone) which might 
be expected to behave similarly but is much more strongly related to Liberal Democracy and the index 
of Fox’s remaining Religious Legislation items (built without lxx) than to logged per-capita GDP. 
 
Table 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Legislative Favoritism
Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA ≤ .05) BIC CFI TLI
1999 175 26 69.444 65 0.3302 0.02 0.948 -266.3 0.999 0.999
2000 175 26 64.409 65 0.4974 0 0.979 -271.3 1 1
2001 175 26 67.985 65 0.3759 0.016 0.959 -267.7 1 0.999
2002 175 26 71.768 65 0.2636 0.024 0.927 -263.9 0.999 0.999  
 The remaining 13 items22 each measure some form of legislative or governmental control for the 
favored religion, forming a quality measure of Legislative Favoritism. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
                                                          
19 Depending on the year, ldi has 170 of 175 countries coded as 0, ljk has 166-168 items coded as 0, and ljj has 165-
166 items coded as 0. 
 
20 lyy (other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory) is by definition an “other” category, to classify 
practices or policies that didn’t fit into items already defined. As such, it is no surprise that its standardized loading 
on the latent variable (slightly over 0.4) is much lower than other indicators. 
 
21 laa (dietary law restrictions) and lad (laws of inheritance defined by religion) cleanly overlap: all 20 countries 
coded as 1 on laa are among the 32 countries coded as 1 on lad. While these two items are conceptually distinct 
and justifiable to keep both in a simple summed index, the zero cell in their bivariate table is a problem for 
confirmatory factor analysis with categorical items, so I excluded laa from the estimation. 
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indicates that these items fit extremely well together, with CFI/TLI at 0.999 or 1 and BIC strongly 
negative for each year 1999-2002. These results are presented in Table 3. Only two items load less-
strongly on the latent variable: llu (presence of religious symbols in the state flag) and ldh (mandatory 
closing of businesses for religious holidays or the Sabbath or equivalent) load at ~0.55 and ~0.50, 
respectively, with slight variation depending on year. However, these items have face validity as 
indicators of religious favoritism, and do not warrant being excluded ex post facto. 
 
Financial Favoritism 
 As noted above, Grim and Finke’s data contain items measuring Financial Favoritism, while Fox’s 
do not. I define Financial Favoritism as the degree to which “the state gives preferential treatment (via 
special tax breaks, funding or other subsidies) to one or some religions that are not given to others.” The 
majority of items composing Grim and Finke’s Government Favoritism Index measure inequitable 
funding or subsidies of religion. Fox’s data contain four items measuring forms of governmental support 
for religion, but as noted above, none of these items necessarily measure favoritism. Therefore I use 
Grim and Finke’s items to build this measure. Grim and Finke (2006) present a good-fitting confirmatory 
factor analysis results for this measure, using 2003 data. I was able to replicate their fit statistics for 
2003, and the measurement model also fit well for other available years of data (2001, 2005, and 2008). 
 
Defending Dimensions as Distinct 
 In this chapter, I argue for the measurement of multiple theoretically-distinct dimensions of GIR. 
Here, I show that these dimensions are empirically distinct from each other. Empirically, there are two 
components to this question: descriptive and predictive clustering. This paper focuses on descriptive 
clustering: do countries that do X (e.g., place restrictions on minority religions) cluster somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 lab, lac, lad, lbe, lbf, lcg, lch, ldh, lej, ljl, lkr, llu, lxx 
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separately from countries that do Y (e.g., place restrictions on all religions, including the majority 
religion).23  
 I conducted difference tests that compare the fit of a model with two latent variables, to a 
model where the indicators of two dimensions are combined to load on one latent variable. For 
example, if Minority Restrictions and Majority Restrictions are meaningfully different, then a model with 
two latent variables should fit better than a model that combines the indicators from these dimensions 
to load on one latent variable. If a model where the indicators load onto a single latent variable fits as 
well as a model with two latent variables, we can conclude that the two dimensions are not 
meaningfully different in these data. 
 These tests were handled using difference testing of nested measurement models. To form a 
pair of nested models, the two latent variables were constrained to be perfectly correlated in one model 
(so they are effectively the same dimension), and allowed to vary independently in the other 
(unconstrained) model. 24 A Chi-square statistic is generated, corresponding to the degree of confidence 
that the model fits are not equal, indicating whether the two latent variables are statistically 
differentiable.25 Although a correlation of 1 might seem an easy-to-reject null hypothesis, difference 
tests of the null hypothesis r=1 control for random variation in sample composition, so an arbitrary 
sorting of items into two groups does not produce a significant difference test. 
 
                                                          
23 In my third chapter, I test whether these GIR dimensions have different effects on religiosity. 
 
24 To ensure that the two models were nested, the variance for each latent variable was constrained to 1, so that 
when the constrained model specified the two latent variables are correlated at 1, this is a meaningful equality. 
Additionally, since the variance of each latent was constrained, the coefficient of each item loading on the latent 
was allowed to be free (whereas by default in Mplus, the first item loading on each latent variable is set to 1). 
 
25 Treating the items as categorical required use of the DIFFTEST command in MPlus, since the chi-square statistic 
for Weighted Least Squares estimation cannot be used for difference-testing in the normal way. Each constrained 
model (where the two dimensions are forced to be correlated at 1, effectively saying they are part of the same 
dimension) gave an automated warning that PSI is not positive definite. However, this warning is not problematic, 
as this occurs precisely because the two latent variables are intentionally constrained to be correlated at 1. 
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Minority Restrictions vs. Majority Restrictions 
 While Fox defines and codes separate sets of items measuring restrictions against minority 
religions and against all religions or the majority religion, it is possible that these co-vary such that they 
are not empirically distinguishable as separate dimensions of governmental behavior. Fox does not 
present statistical defense of these dimensions as distinct from each other. Some items are effectively 
shared between the two indices, though obviously coded differently (depending on whether they apply 
particularly to minority religions vs. applying to all religions including the majority). For example, ngg 
measures restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material applied to 
majority or all religions, and mg measures the same restrictions applied specifically to minority religions. 
Latent variables constructed from these “shared” items do not correlate more strongly between 
minority and majority restrictions, than do latent variables constructed from the “unshared” items. This 
is further evidence that the groups of indicators measuring Minority Restrictions and Majority 
Restrictions differ from each other. 
 Difference testing results are presented in Table 4. While the items are best treated as 
categorical, difference testing is presented treating the items as continuous as well as categorical, to 
show that these groups of items are distinct under either form of estimation. One item (nff, restrictions 
on access to places of worship for majority or all religions) was excluded from these models because it 
caused a zero-cell conflict with two of the minority-restriction items (the item was not excluded for the 
continuously-estimated nested models). Table 4 shows that the two latent variables are correlated at 
approximately 0.7 in the unconstrained model, and the Chi2 statistic differentiating between the nested 
models is large and significant: approximately 40 (DF = 1) for each year 1999-2002, This pattern holds 
whether I include or exclude proselytizing items as measures of Minority Restrictions. So while Minority 
Restrictions and Majority Restrictions are moderately highly-correlated (the correlation of 0.7 indicates 
around 50% shared variance), they are also clearly statistically differentiable. 
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Note: Tables 4 and 5 exclude items measuring restrictions on proselytizing and conversion (mj and ml) from the estimation of Restrictions on 
Minority Religions. However, models estimated including these items show very similar statistics. 
 
 
Table 4: Difference Testing between Restrictions on Minority Religions  and Restrictions on Majority/All Religions
Dimensions Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA <= .05) BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST Corr S.E. Test stat
separate 1999 175 70 206.816 134 0.0001 0.056 0.256 -485.3 0.971 0.967 0.673 0.054 12.46
correlated @1 1999 175 69 285.752 135 0 0.08 0 -411.5 0.939 0.931 39.984
separate 2000 175 69 201.381 134 0.0001 0.054 0.337 -490.7 0.974 0.971 0.676 0.054 12.52
correlated @1 2000 175 68 285.828 135 0 0.08 0 -411.4 0.942 0.935 40.972
separate 2001 175 69 191.798 134 0.0008 0.05 0.5 -500.3 0.978 0.975 0.7 0.051 13.73
correlated @1 2001 175 68 263.117 135 0 0.074 0.002 -434.1 0.952 0.945 39.76
separate 2002 175 69 191.038 134 0.0009 0.049 0.514 -501.0 0.979 0.976 0.69 0.053 13.02
correlated @1 2002 175 68 270.021 135 0 0.076 0.001 -427.2 0.949 0.942 40.729
Table 5: Difference Testing between Legislative Favoritism  and Restrictions on Minority Religions
Dimensions Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA <= .05) BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST Corr S.E. Test stat
separate 1999 175 75 354.545 274 0.0007 0.041 0.893 -1060.6 0.987 0.986 0.704 0.059 11.89
correlated @1 1999 175 74 536.636 275 0 0.074 0 -883.7 0.959 0.955 28.937
separate 2000 175 74 354.692 274 0.0007 0.041 0.892 -1060.5 0.988 0.987 0.692 0.06 11.61
correlated @1 2000 175 73 555.353 275 0 0.076 0 -865.0 0.958 0.954 31.146
separate 2001 175 74 356.541 274 0.0006 0.041 0.88 -1058.6 0.987 0.986 0.677 0.061 11.16
correlated @1 2001 175 73 565.331 275 0 0.078 0 -855.0 0.954 0.95 32.979
separate 2002 175 74 352.032 274 0.001 0.04 0.908 -1063.1 0.989 0.987 0.672 0.061 11.02
correlated @1 2002 175 73 565.862 275 0 0.078 0 -854.5 0.957 0.954 32.775
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Minority Restrictions vs. Legislative Favoritism 
 Legislative advantage given to a favored religion can, unlike subsidies, sometimes exact costs on 
other religions. Legislative Favoritism and Minority Restrictions might be highly-correlated, or even co-
occur to the extent that they are not differentiable dimensions. First, countries that give favored status 
to one religion are more likely to restrict other religions. Secondly, some actions of states could be 
classified in either dimension (e.g., laws against blasphemy help to enshrine the status of a favored 
religion, but also may restrict the speech of minority religions). Table 5 presents difference-test results 
showing that Legislative Favoritism is empirically distinct from Minority Restrictions. 
 The dimensions are highly-correlated, yet are statistically differentiable. The Chi2 test statistic is 
consistently in the low 30s (which is very significant). The correlation between the dimensions is 
stronger (0.77 to 0.79) when including restrictions on proselytizing or conversion as part of Minority 
Restrictions, compared to when excluding items measuring restrictions on proselytizing (0.67 to 0.70). 
This implies that restrictions on proselytizing or conversion may be strongly-related to Legislative 
Favoritism. 
 
Excursus: Is Difference Testing Trustworthy? 
 With the high correlation observed between latent variables for different dimensions of GIR, 
one may wonder whether the significant Chi2 statistics obtained from difference testing are simply a 
result of the happenstance variation between the groups of items being tested. As noted previously, 
difference testing controls for variation in sample composition, so arbitrary sorting of indicators into two 
groups does not produce a significant difference test. Here, I present empirical results showing that 
arbitrarily dividing indicators into two groups produces latent variables that correlate at about 1. These 
results help to illustrate the trustworthiness of my difference testing approach. 
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 I estimated multiple variations of the difference tests presented in Tables 4 and 5, dividing the 
indicators proportionally between two latent variables of equal size to the original model. Minority 
Restrictions is measured by 14 indicators, while Majority Restrictions is measured by 6 indicators. I 
generated three "randomized" groupings of these 20 indicators into groups of 14 and 6, using two 
indicators of Majority Restrictions in the group of 6 and randomly choosing 4 indicators of Minority 
Restrictions to complete the group of 6. Results of difference tests between the one-latent model and 
the three two-latent models are presented in Table 6. I similarly divided the indicators from Minority 
Restrictions and Legislative Favoritism into three randomized groups of two. Results of these difference 
tests are presented in Table 7. In both cases, I estimated difference tests for 1999 and 2002 data. 
 These “randomized difference test” models show that happenstance distribution of items 
between two latent variables cannot be responsible for significant difference observed in difference 
tests. The randomized two-latent models mostly show correlations greater than 1. Correlations or 
standardized coefficients over 1 are not uncommon with Structural Equation Models (Jöreskog 1999), 
and simply mean that the two latent variables cannot be statistically differentiated. In these cases, 
significant Chi2 statistic from the difference tests is a result of the correlation being greater than 1, and is 
not evidence of any statistical differentiability between the latent variables. 
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Table 6: Difference Testing with randomized (mixed) components for Minority Restrictions  vs. Majority Restrictions
Dimensions Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA <= .05) BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST Corr S.E. Test stat
min/maj cor @1 1999 175 77 338.682 170 0 0.075 0 -539.3 0.953 0.948
min/maj separate 1999 175 78 263.42 169 0 0.057 0.205 -609.4 0.974 0.97 41.283 0.694 0.049 14.16
separate random1 1999 175 78 336.344 169 0 0.075 0 -536.5 0.953 0.948 5.831 1.045 0.022 48.12
separate random2 1999 175 78 333.219 169 0 0.075 0 -539.6 0.954 0.949 14.723 1.074 0.022 49.58
separate random3 1999 175 78 337.96 169 0 0.076 0 -534.9 0.953 0.947 0.3 0.991 0.017 59.79
min/maj cor @1 2002 175 76 333.194 170 0 0.074 0.001 -544.8 0.956 0.951
min/maj separate 2002 175 77 258.898 169 0 0.055 0.257 -614.0 0.976 0.973 47.788 0.712 0.045 15.82
separate random1 2002 175 77 331.08 169 0 0.074 0.001 -541.8 0.957 0.951 5.377 1.043 0.022 47.093
separate random2 2002 175 77 327.645 169 0 0.073 0.001 -545.2 0.957 0.952 16.231 1.068 0.019 57.476
separate random3 2002 175 77 332.388 169 0 0.074 0.001 -540.5 0.956 0.951 0.482 1.012 0.018 57.418
Table 7: Difference Testing with randomized (mixed) components for Minority Restrictions  vs. Legislative Favoritism
Dimensions Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA P(RMSEA <= .05) BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST Corr S.E. Test stat
correlated @1 2000 175 81 624.168 324 0 0.073 0 -1049.2 0.961 0.958
separate 2000 175 82 479.857 323 0 0.053 0.321 -1188.4 0.98 0.978 32.54 0.78 0.043 18.27
separate random1 2000 175 82 622.982 323 0 0.073 0 -1045.2 0.961 0.957 2.583 1.01 0.009 118.79
separate random2 2000 175 82 622.975 323 0 0.073 0 -1045.3 0.961 0.957 0.775 1.005 0.006 160.56
separate random3 2000 175 82 622.547 323 0 0.073 0 -1045.7 0.961 0.958 5.487 1.016 0.008 131.15
correlated @1 2002 175 81 642.114 324 0 0.075 0 -1031.3 0.959 0.956
separate 2002 175 82 492.209 323 0 0.055 0.209 -1176.0 0.978 0.977 34.345 0.77 0.043 17.90
separate random1 2002 175 82 638.742 323 0 0.075 0 -1029.5 0.96 0.956 10.374 1.029 0.01 101.58
separate random2 2002 175 82 640.639 323 0 0.075 0 -1027.6 0.959 0.956 4.288 1.013 0.007 137.06
separate random3 2002 175 82 639.32 323 0 0.075 0 -1028.9 0.96 0.956 9.934 1.027 0.01 107.16
 33 
 
Restrictions on Proselytizing or Conversion 
 As noted above, Fox’s data includes three items which measure restrictions related to 
proselytizing or conversion: 
 mk (forced conversions) 
 ml (restrictions on proselytizing) 
 mj (restrictions on conversion to minority religions) 
 
However, forced conversions are not common, and mk has all but 6 countries coded as zero so is 
therefore excluded from these tests. While a Confirmatory Factor Analysis measurement model with a 
single factor must have at least three separate items to be identified, difference testing needs a 
minimum of two items in each group. Hence it is possible to test whether Restrictions on Proselytizing or 
Conversion (as measured by ml and mj) are empirically distinct from other dimensions of GIR, 
particularly Restrictions on Minority Religions. Difference Tests presented in Table 8 show that 
Restrictions on Proselytizing or Conversion is clearly differentiable from each of the three dimensions 
described and defended previously in this paper. While the two items measuring Proselytizing 
Restrictions were taken from the items measuring Restrictions on Minority Religions, the dimensions are 
correlated at 0.82 to 0.84 (depending on year), and the Chi2 statistic is very significant, ranging from 15 
to 20. Proselytizing Restrictions is less-strongly correlated with Restrictions on Majority/All Religions 
(from 0.70 to 0.72, depending on year), with the Chi2 statistic ranging from 19 to 22.5. Interestingly, 
Proselytizing Restrictions is most strongly-correlated to Legislative Favoritism (0.88 or 0.89, depending 
on year), though the Chi2 statistic is still significant in these models, ranging from 11.3 to 12.9. 
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Table 8: Difference Testing between Proselytizing Restrictions , and other dimensions of GIR
Dimensions Year N Free paramChi2 DF P(Chi2) BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST P(Chi2) Corr S.E. Test stat
Minority-restrict separate 1999 175 57 122.997 76 0.0005 -269.5 0.986 0.983 0.844 0.041 20.581
vs. Pros items correlated @1 1999 175 56 153.228 77 0 -244.5 0.977 0.973 15.091 0.0001
separate 2000 175 56 121.873 76 0.0007 -270.7 0.987 0.984 0.845 0.041 20.738
correlated @1 2000 175 55 152.42 77 0 -245.3 0.978 0.974 15.048 0.0001
separate 2001 175 56 120.461 76 0.0009 -272.1 0.987 0.984 0.83 0.042 19.726
correlated @1 2001 175 55 156.207 77 0 -241.5 0.976 0.972 18.118 0
separate 2002 175 56 126.201 76 0.0003 -266.3 0.985 0.982 0.819 0.042 19.347
correlated @1 2002 175 55 166.511 77 0 -231.2 0.973 0.968 20.553 0
Majority Restrict separate 1999 175 33 26.991 26 0.4098 -107.3 0.999 0.999 0.707 0.069 10.219
vs. Pros items correlated @1 1999 175 32 71.846 27 0 -67.6 0.973 0.964 18.884 0
separate 2000 175 33 27.365 26 0.3904 -106.9 0.999 0.999 0.704 0.069 10.197
correlated @1 2000 175 32 72.011 27 0 -67.4 0.971 0.961 19.449 0
separate 2001 175 33 29.065 26 0.3081 -105.2 0.998 0.997 0.724 0.065 11.079
correlated @1 2001 175 32 69.806 27 0 -69.6 0.974 0.965 19.075 0
separate 2002 175 33 29.618 26 0.2837 -104.7 0.998 0.997 0.72 0.062 11.644
correlated @1 2002 175 32 74.008 27 0 -65.4 0.971 0.962 22.477 0
Legislative Favor separate 1999 175 35 106.776 89 0.0965 -352.9 0.998 0.997 0.886 0.034 25.778
vs. Pros items correlated @1 1999 175 34 135.538 90 0.0014 -329.3 0.994 0.993 12.905 0.0003
separate 2000 175 35 105.622 89 0.1103 -354.0 0.998 0.997 0.886 0.035 25.256
correlated @1 2000 175 34 133.431 90 0.002 -331.4 0.994 0.993 12.231 0.0005
separate 2001 175 35 109.593 89 0.0684 -350.1 0.997 0.997 0.887 0.035
correlated @1 2001 175 34 136.602 90 0.0011 -328.2 0.994 0.993 11.321 0.0008
separate 2002 175 35 113.604 89 0.0404 -346.1 0.997 0.996 0.882 0.035 25.278
correlated @1 2002 175 34 142.134 90 0.0004 -322.7 0.994 0.993 12.212 0.0005
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Legislative and Financial Favoritism 
 I use items from Fox’s Religion and State dataset to measure Legislative Favoritism, and items 
from Grim and Finke’s International Religions Freedom dataset to measure Financial Favoritism. 
Currently there is only one year of overlap for these data: Fox’s data cover 1990-2002 while Grim and 
Finke’s data are coded for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008. I estimated difference-test models, to see if 
legislative and financial favoritism are statistically differentiable, for two years. 2001 is included in both 
datasets, and I pooled Fox’s 2002 measures with Grim and Finke’s 2003 measures to test the data for a 
second year. In both cases, the Chi-square difference statistic is very significant and the correlation 
between the latent variables is between 0.58 and 0.68, respectively, so we can confidently state that 
financial and legislative favoritism are not the same dimension. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I build optimized measures for five dimensions of Government Involvement in 
Religion (GIR). Based on review of relevant concepts and theories, I defined multiple dimensions of GIR, 
and specified groups of indicators to measure each dimension. I tested the fit of these dimensions using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis to confirm that the items measuring each dimension fit well together, and 
used difference-testing to show that the dimensions are differentiable from each other. 
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CHAPTER 2 – STATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGION 
 
 Relationships between religion and state are increasingly recognized as important to national 
and international politics. There are many reasons to pursue cross-national study of religion-state 
relations. Beyond the issue of religious freedom, the relationship between various social and civic 
freedoms is important to scholarship on democracy (e.g., Sen 1999; Woodberry 2012). Tensions 
between religious groups often play a role in civil conflicts, throughout history and continuing today. 
Scholars studying governmental policies toward religion find that countries where religion is more 
regulated tend to have lower levels of religious participation and attendance (e.g., Chaves and Cann 
1992; Chaves et al. 1994; North and Gwin 2004; Fox and Tabory 2008), as well as more religious 
persecution and conflict (Grim and Finke 2007, 2011). While the United Nations supports freedom of 
religious belief and practice, and most countries have constitutional statements with some respect for 
religious freedom, actual governmental regulation of religion varies widely between countries (Grim and 
Finke 2007) and it is not strongly-predicted by constitutional content (Fox 2011b). 
 To better understand governmental policies toward religion, this paper examines which sorts of 
countries are most likely to involve themselves in the religious market. There are multiple dimensions to 
governmental policy toward religion, and it is not clear that all are predicted similarly. For example, 
Driessen (2010) shows that favoritism toward religion is much more empirically compatible with 
democracy than are restrictions against religion. Therefore I estimate separate models for different 
groups of government policies, since these may be differently predicted by other national 
characteristics. 
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 This paper assesses a number of factors predictive of governmental involvement and polities 
toward religion. The most important factor established in prior research is the degree of democracy in a 
country; more-democratic countries tend to have fewer restrictions on religion (Grim and Finke 2007; 
Fox 2007, 2008). However, prior studies have not accounted for the potential endogeneity between 
democracy and governmental restrictions on religion, because certain restrictions on religion may also 
count as restrictions on political liberties or civic freedoms included in common measures of democracy. 
As a result, prior findings may overestimate this relationship and introduce artifacts on other factors of 
interest. I assess the degree of measurement-overlap between democracy and religious restrictions, and 
attempt correct for this in statistical analyses. Other predictors include religious diversity, GDP, and 
majority religion. 
 This paper (1) defines Government Involvement in Religion and distinguish multiple dimensions, 
(2) addresses the general question of why governments care to intervene in the religious marketplace, 
(3) presents theory and reviews prior research about country-level predictors of government policy 
towards religion, (4) covers measurement of government policies and the various predictors, (5) 
statistically tests the degree of measurement-overlap between Democracy and government restrictions 
on religion, and (6) analyzes both over-time changes and between-country differences in panel data 
from 1992-2002 for a sample of 170 countries. This analysis provides an overview of which sorts of 
countries are most likely to involve themselves in the religious market. 
 
Theory and Definitions 
Government Involvement in Religion 
 To denote the variety of government policies and actions toward religion, I use the term 
Governmental Involvement in Religion (hereafter abbreviated GIR) to denote multiple dimensions by 
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which governmental policies may impact the religious market.26 There are multiple important 
distinctions to be made between types of GIR. Stark and Finke (2000) distinguish between suppression 
and subsidies, noting that suppression represses innovation in the religious market, whereas subsidies 
simply remove some incentive for the majority religion to be attuned to religious preferences of the 
public by making majority religious institutions less dependent on their adherents. Gill (2008) similarly 
distinguishes between negative restrictions and positive support. Restrictions can be applied to all 
religions or specifically against minority religions (the latter may also be thought of as negative 
favoritism). Positive support or favoritism includes not only subsidies, but legislative control for or by a 
favored religion. I define Governmental Involvement in Religion as actions of the state which limit choice 
of religion or the free practice of some or all religions, or give funding and subsidies or legislative 
advantage to some religions over others. Using this definition, I distinguish multiple dimensions of GIR: 
 Proselytizing Restrictions: restrictions on conversion or proselytizing, including restrictions on 
missionaries 
 Minority Restrictions: restrictions applied specifically to minority religions, including restrictions 
against worship, organization, assembly, and teaching, or holding property for these purposes 
 Majority Restrictions: restrictions on the majority religion or all religions, including restrictions 
against worship, organization, assembly, teaching, and holding property for these purposes 
 Legislative Favoritism, where the religious laws of a specific religion are legislated as the 
national-civic laws, or the favored religion is given specific forms of governmental control 
 Financial Favoritism, where the state gives preferential treatment (via special tax breaks, 
funding or in-kind subsidies) to one or some religions that are not given to others 
 
 While these dimensions of GIR are related, they can vary independently from each other and are 
distinguishable as unique dimensions. As such, they may be predicted differently by various state 
characteristics, hence the question, what sorts of states are most likely to engage in which sorts of GIR? 
For example, Driessen (2010) shows that while restrictions on religion are much less common in 
democracies than in non-democracies, subsidies and favoritism toward religion are common and seems 
                                                          
26 This follows Fox’s (2008) use of the term, which is useful because "religion-state relations" is too vague, and 
"governmental regulation of religion" is too specific, as certain governmental interventions in the religious market 
(e.g., financial subsidies toward a favored religion) do not qualify as regulation. 
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to be empirically compatible with democracy. Financial Favoritism, in particular, seems the most benign. 
Driessen also contends that, in principle, government favoritism toward religion need not mean that the 
autonomy of elected leaders from unelected interests or leaders has been breached. 
 
Why do governments engage in GIR? 
 While this paper does not seek to answer the particular question of government motives, it is 
worth discussing why governments involve themselves in the religious market. There may be motives 
particularly about religion – particularly in Communist or officially religious regimes, but the most 
common motives are not particular to religion. Governments want to stay in power, which typically 
involves preserving regime stability, controlling or mitigating political opposition, and pleasing the 
populace (or at least a large enough bloc of the populace). Governments attempt to restrict, support or 
control religion – sometimes restricting some and supporting others – toward one or more of these 
goals. 
 Religion can play an important role in social change, group identities and inter-group conflicts. 
Governments are interested in religion, in part, because of these potential impacts on society. Religion 
can be an effective motivator of social and political change, or maintainer of social and political stasis 
(Smith 1996; Emerson, Mirola, and Monahan 2011; Marx 1844). Religion can also play a large role in 
formation and reinforcement of group identities and boundary markers (Durkheim 1912; Smith 1998; 
Lamont and Molnár 2002). Religious group boundary lines often coincide with other divisions, such as 
class or particularly ethnicity, and can play an important role in tensions and conflicts within and 
between societies (Fox 2003, 2004; Dawkins 2006). 
 Government involvement in religion also occurs to please the populace, or at least portions of 
the populace. Governments can curry favor by supporting the majority religion (often with strings 
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attached to help maintain control) or by restricting minority religions (which may be popular amongst 
adherents of the majority religion). 
 Some countries are particularly interested in regulating religion, because of government or 
popular ideology. France’s tradition of Republicanism and laicite dictate a secular public sphere with 
little religious influence, while Saudi Arabia places severe restrictions on (other) religions in order to 
protect the official religion of Wahabbi Islam. North Korea and other Communist countries’ restrictions 
on religion stem, in part, from Marxism’s negative view of religion. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that 
ideology is the major motivation for these countries’ regulations on religion. Standard governmental 
motivations, described above, are still in play. North Korea generally wants to control discourse and 
ideology amongst its citizens, and Saudi Arabia wants to protect the governing regime’s status from 
outside critique. 
 While government action and policies are not always driven by popular preferences, 
governments are constrained by these preferences in more and less-democratic countries. Politicians in 
more-democratic countries will tend to be more responsive to their populace, because they do not want 
to get voted out of office. But even in authoritarian states without formal mechanisms for popular 
feedback, governments prefer economic stability and want to avoid major protests, and therefore have 
incentive to not diverge too far from popular preferences. Future research should examine the role of 
popular preferences in shaping government policy toward religion, using measures such as Grim and 
Finke’s Social Regulation Index (Grim and Finke 2006), the World Values Survey, and other measures 
discussed by Grim and Wike (2010). 
 
Democracy 
 Degree of democratic governance is the most obvious factor predicting country-level GIR, 
particularly restrictions. In the first major study of country-by-country religious freedom, Bates (1945) 
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contends that religious freedom can be guaranteed only where democracy is “taken seriously.” Similarly, 
Grim and Finke (2007) note that “democracy, at least in the Western understanding of the term, implies 
deregulation [of religion].” Recent research (e.g., Grim and Finke 2007; Grim 2008) confirms this general 
link between democracy and lower levels of GIR, and shows that on a by-country basis, religious 
freedom is strongly and significantly correlated with the existence of other freedoms, although the 
relationship is not necessarily linear (Fox 2007, 2008). 
 For the purposes of this paper, I consider democracy to be a property of the political system and 
the relationship between the state and citizens, not the culture and attitudes of the population. Bollen 
(1993, 2009) defines Liberal Democracy as the extent to which a political system allows for political 
liberties (freedom of individuals and media to express political opinions, and freedom to form or 
participate in any political group) and democratic rule (the national government is accountable to the 
general population, and individuals can participate in the government directly or through 
representatives).  Elected leaders must also have sufficient autonomy to make decisions which cannot 
be reversed or overruled by non-elected leaders (Stepan 2001). 
 More-democratic states tend to offer a wider range and greater degree of freedoms, including 
religious freedom. As noted by Sen (1999), countries with greater political freedoms tend to have more 
civic freedoms as well, and to some degree these freedoms develop as a package that depend on and 
reinforce each other. This conception implies a potential endogeneity problem – not dealt with in prior 
research – between democracy and GIR, which is discussed at length later in this paper. Political liberties 
such as freedom of speech, press, assembly and association are likely to extend to the religious sphere 
in addition to the political sphere. 
 However, according to Monsma and Soper (2009), Gill (2008), and Finke (1990), religious liberty 
is not simply a default property of freer societies, but is at least in part a product of contingent and 
specific social and legal processes, such that otherwise similar states may vary significantly on how 
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much, or how equally, they regulate religion. Monsma and Soper compare five Western democracies 
and how they legally and practically structure church-state relations, noting the wide variety both 
officially and practically. For example, The United States treats secularism as a “neutral” space between 
ideologies, while the Netherlands sees secularism as another player in the ideological market, and will 
fund secular schools as well as various religious schools. These matters are complex, and cross-national 
quantitative analysis is a blunt instrument which cannot capture the full range of differential practices 
between countries. 
 Some of the observed and theorized relationship between democracy and GIR may be due to 
conceptual overlap. That is, some freedoms integral to democracy, such as freedom of minority groups 
organize and assemble, may also count as religious freedoms. Indices measuring democracy may include 
specific items that are also used in construction of indices measuring GIR. Because of this, the strength 
of any causal relationship between Democracy and GIR may be weaker than has been indicated in prior 
studies. This worry is particularly strong for studies using the Freedom House measure of democracy to 
predict religious restrictions, since Freedom House’s measure considers religious freedom as part of its 
civil liberties component. 
 Empirically, democracy has been shown as a strong predictor of some forms of GIR, with more-
democratic countries being less likely to restrict religion. In Grim and Finke’s (2007) analysis linking 
social and governmental regulation of religion to religious persecution, longevity of democracy is 
negatively and highly significantly related to their measure of Government Regulation of religion. Grim 
and Finke argue that longevity of democracy is particularly important because social and legal 
transformations take place over time, but they don’t present models with typical degree-of-democracy 
measures for comparison. Grim (2008) expands on this with simple correlative analyses, finding lower 
governmental regulation of religion correlated with presence of other freedoms not directly related to 
religion (political rights, press and economic freedom) and with longevity of democracy, the U.N. Human 
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Development index, and the well-being of women (rights, education, representation in government). 
While Grim does not directly make a causal argument, he notes that religious freedom tends to come 
with the other “good things” that are commonly associated with liberal democracy. 
 The most thorough examination of the relationship between democracy and governmental 
regulation of religion comes from Fox (2007, 2008). While Fox finds that while very few democracies 
have full separation between religion and state – only the United States meets these criteria – 
democracy is associated with lower levels of GIR. Fox frames his work in terms of whether countries 
have separation of religion and state, but his data measure various forms of GIR, and separation of 
religion and state is simply a cut-point on those (effectively continuous) indices. While Fox finds that 
official government stances toward religion are not strongly predicted by level of democracy (partly 
because of the formally preferential position of established or historic churches in many European 
democracies), each dimension of GIR is strongly and significantly negatively predicted by democracy, 
using the Freedom House and Polity measures. Restrictions against Minority Religions and Restrictions 
against Majority or All Religions are both strongly-predicted by measures of democracy,27 although there 
is significant confounding between religious restrictions and the Freedom House measure of Democracy, 
as mentioned above. Fox’s Religious Legislation measure has a more complex relationship with 
democracy; in multivariate analysis this variable is still predicted by degree of democracy with high 
statistical significance, but Fox says that this statistical relationship is mostly driven by fact that 
democratic states unlikely to be in the highest (most legislation) category, whereas beneath this level 
there is little relationship with measures of democracy. However, Fox’s Religious Legislation measure is 
multi-factorial; while intended as a measure of favoritism it covers a variety of connections between 
                                                          
27 Restrictions against Majority or All Religions is the only GIR outcome measured by Fox for which the majority of 
democratic countries (as classified by both Polity and Freedom House measures) have full separation of religion 
and state. Which is to say, while many democracies place some restrictive regulatory burden on at least some 
religions, few democracies will do so to the majority religion or all religions. 
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religion and state. My use of optimized measures (mostly built from Fox’s data) offer more clarity as to 
the relationship between these practices and democracy. 
 Fox notes that many of the states with the lowest levels of GIR are not particularly democratic 
or autocratic, falling in the center of the democracy-autocracy continuum. In explanation, he notes a 
somewhat U-shaped relationship between democracy and economic development. While there is an 
overall positive relationship between democracy and various indicators of development, more highly-
developed states tend to be either more autocratic or more democratic, while states in the middle of 
democracy-autocracy continuum tend to be less-developed, “with less ability to enforce laws generally” 
(Fox 2008:348), and therefore less ability to regulate religion within their countries. This raises the issue 
of the relationship between GIR and GDP, and the mechanisms by which they are related. 
 
GDP and Development 
 Gross Domestic Product measures the overall wealth of a country, but is also a proxy for 
development and associated cultural or governmental characteristics which may be responsible for 
associations in cross-national research. For study of governmental policies, per-capita GDP represents 
two particularly plausible mechanisms. Citizens of wealthier, more-developed countries may tend to 
have somewhat different cultural attitudes and preferences, and governments in wealthier countries 
will tend to have more resources and capacity for oversight and policy implementation. 
 Population preferences that are reflected in government policy towards religion – which 
happens to some degree in both democratic and non-democratic countries – may vary depending on the 
wealth or development of a country. Wealthier, more-developed tend to have higher literacy and 
education rates, as well as higher median incomes. Both wealth and education may be responsible for 
differing attitudes and preferences. Wealthier and better-educated people may feel more entitlement 
and expectation for civic freedoms, including religious freedom. However, expectation-of-freedom is 
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likely more closely related to democracy than to GDP. On the other hand, it is well-established that 
wealthier countries tend to have lover levels of religiosity (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Less-religious populations may be more amenable to government restrictions on 
religion – particularly restrictions that apply to all religions – especially when controlling for democracy. 
 Perhaps more importantly than its association with population attitudes, GDP is a fairly direct 
proxy for the resources available to the state, and subsequent capacity to implement policy. A strong 
state has greater ability to govern, and can better protect religious freedom or restrict religious practice, 
whereas weaker states have less ability to do either. State Capacity is a commonly-used concept in 
political science, economics and public policy, and is most simply defined as the ability of a state to 
govern and implement policy. Higher-capacity states are better-equipped to enforce contracts, provide 
public goods, extract resources, regulate institutions, control their populace, or establish a monopoly of 
violence (Soifer and vom Hau 2008:220). State capacity is related to development of both the state and 
the economy, as countries with a stronger economic base can support a stronger government. 
 The concept of state capacity is fundamentally value-neutral, as a government to be strong and 
capable while pursuing a variety of ends. A politically capable government will achieve their desired 
policy outcomes, which need not be the same policy outcomes as those considered desirable by the 
U.N. or World Bank. State Capacity may be directed towards ensuring population well-being, or 
committing organized genocide. As Organski and Kugler (1980) note, “a highly capable political system 
need not be free, democratic, stable, orderly, representative, [or] participatory.” Similarly, Tilly (2007) 
discusses State Capacity as a factor separate from Democracy, yet important in understanding the 
functioning of democracies. Both low- and high-capacity states may be democratic or non-democratic. 
 Empirically, there has been little research examining the relationship between GDP and 
government policies toward religion. Fox finds that (logged) per-capita GDP is significantly positively 
associated with multiple dimensions of GIR. He notes this as surprising, saying it calls into question the 
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secularization-theory expectation that modernized states will be less involved with and restrictive of 
religion. Although decreased GIR is at best a second-tier prediction of the secularization/modernization 
thesis, it is possible that more-developed, less-religious societies may have higher levels of GIR as 
another component of Weber’s “iron cage” of bureaucratization. But it must be noted that Fox’s results 
were from multivariate analyses that also control for Democracy, and so do not show that more-
developed countries have higher levels of GIR. Rather, net of Democracy, there is a positive association 
between GDP and GIR. GDP was included as a control variable in Fox’s models, and this interesting 
finding warrants further study. 
 
Religious Diversity and Homogeneity 
 Another important factor in predicting governmental treatment of religion is Religious Diversity. 
Also referred to as Religious Pluralism, it is a major factor of interest for religious-economies research. 
Gill (2008) explains why governments would offer more or less religious freedom, by looking at the 
interest of politicians and religious groups. Dominant religious groups will prefer to limit competition 
from other religions, whereas minority religions prefer freedom “for all,” which is necessary to ensure 
freedom for themselves. In more religiously-homogenous countries, dominant groups will prefer more 
regulation of religious minorities and favored status for themselves, and will have more political sway 
over politicians. Conversely, in countries with a more diverse religious marketplace lacking a clearly-
dominant majority religious group, preferences of all groups will tend toward religious liberty in order to 
oppose advantage being given to any other group. Additionally, more-diverse countries face greater 
potential economic disruption as a result of religious unrest or emigration of minority groups, and so 
have more incentive to avoid GIR that may cause such disruption. For these reasons, we would expect 
countries with more religious diversity will tend to have lower GIR, particularly policies which single out 
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minority religions. Fox (2007, 2008) found Religious Diversity to be a significant negative predictor of 
each GIR dimension that he measured. 
 There is some potential for a feedback relationship between religious diversity and GIR. Gill’s 
analysis of governmental interests and incentives implies that religious diversity will have a causal 
impact on governmental policies toward religion. Alternately, Religious Economies theory predicts that 
lower GIR allows for more competition in the religious market, and subsequently more religious 
diversity (Finke and Stark 1992; Finke 1990; Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Finke 2000). But since 
government policy can change more quickly than national religious composition, it is likely that most of 
the between-country differences in the relationship between religious diversity and GIR is in the causal 
direction that Gill discusses: differences in religious diversity cause different GIR policies. 
 
Combining Theorized Factors 
 Here I review major theorized associations, and how these may interact with each other. More-
democratic countries are likely to be less involved in the religious market, particularly for restrictions on 
religion. Democracy might also mediate the association of other factors with GIR. While countries with 
dominant religious majorities should be more likely to restrict minority religions, this effect may be 
muted amongst more-democratic countries. 
 GDP might be expected to predict lower GIR, but showed significant positive association with 
GIR dimensions in Fox’s (2007, 2008) analysis. The association between GDP and GIR may be driven by 
multiple mechanisms. Wealthier, more-developed countries have different citizen preferences to which 
governments respond. The populations of wealthier countries tend to be less religious, so we might 
expect fewer incentives for governments to show religious favoritism, either financially or legislatively. 
(It is not clear whether more-secular populations or governments would different preferences on 
religious restrictions.) Wealthier countries also have governments with more capacity to implement 
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policy. State Capacity, in and of itself, does not predict what policies states will prefer; it merely 
represents the ability to implement policy. When controlling for democracy as a rough proxy for intent, 
higher capacity may simply mean greater ability to regulate. Among less-democratic countries, higher-
capacity states are likely to be more restrictive toward religion. But more-democratic countries might 
use capacity to protect religious freedom. Capacity might also be directed toward different goals 
depending on Communist ideology or the majority religion. Similarly, the impact of religious diversity on 
GIR might depend on the degree of democracy. Less-democratic countries with fewer structural 
protections for civic freedoms may have more “space” for GIR to be affected by the degree of religious 
diversity. 
 While prior research has consistently found a strong relationship between democracy and GIR, 
none of this work has dealt with the potential endogeneity between religious restrictions and 
democracy. Because some indicators of GIR may also be used as indicators of democracy, treating GIR 
and democracy measures as independent may overestimate the statistical relationship, and may 
introduce artifacts on other variables when controlling for democracy. 
 
Measurement 
Government Involvement in Religion 
 Above, I distinguished five sub-dimensions of GIR: Proselytizing Restrictions, Minority 
Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, Legislative Favoritism, and Financial Favoritism. Four of these five 
dimensions are measured using items from Jonathan Fox’s Religion and State project. As detailed in my 
chapter on Measurement, Minority Restrictions and Majority Restrictions are basically optimized 
versions of Fox’s variables. Legislative Favoritism is measured using a subset of the items in Fox’s 
Religious Legislation index, which is intended as a measure of favoritism but actually covers multiple 
dimensions of GIR. Fox’s data does not include any items specifically measuring financial favoritism or 
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inequitable subsidies, so to measure Financial Favoritism I use Grim and Finke’s Government Favoritism 
Index, which is also intended as a general measure of government favoritism but is composed of items 
measuring financial or other subsidies to religion (Grim and Finke 2006). 
 Proselytizing Restrictions may be a subset of Minority Restrictions as defined here. Restrictions 
on proselytizing and conversion tend to single out minority religions in order to protect the majority or 
dominant religion. I have separated Proselytizing Restrictions as its own dimension because of the 
particular importance of proselytizing and conversion to a free religious market, and in my chapter on 
measurement I offer empirical defense of this separation. However, it is possible that the empirical 
predictors of Proselytizing Restrictions will be the same as the predictors of Minority Restrictions. 
 
Democracy and Endogeneity with GIR 
 I use Bollen’s Liberal Democracy measure, using multiple expert-rater indicators to measure two 
dimensions: political liberties and democratic rule. Bollen’s index has been shown to perform better 
than other commonly-used Democracy measures, having higher validity and lower systematic error 
(Bollen 2009). 
 Using Democracy as a predictor of GIR poses a problem, because the concepts are not entirely 
separate and distinct. Since some indicators of GIR may also be indicators for democracy, the actual 
causal relationship between Democracy and GIR may be weaker than has been indicated in prior 
studies. This overestimated relationship may lead to artifactual results of other GIR predictors – 
particularly State Capacity – when controlling for Democracy. Prior research has not addressed this 
problem and has discussed it to only a limited degree. Here I review the problem and explain how I will 
deal with this in my proposed analyses. 
 Some indicators of Democracy are also potential indicators of GIR. Restrictions on speech, 
organization, and meeting of religious groups may qualify as limitations of democratic rule or political 
 50 
 
liberties, particularly the latter.  Some religious restrictions fundamentally overlap with political 
restrictions. Ethnic and religious identities coincide in many countries, and restrictions on the ability of 
minority religious groups to meet may serve a direct political purpose of limiting the organization of 
opposition or political minorities. In other cases, existing measures do not distinguish between religious 
and political restrictions. For example, it is possible to distinguish between restrictions on proselytizing 
and restrictions on political speech, but measures such as Freedom House’s Civil Liberties doesn’t 
distinguish between restrictions on different forms of speech. 
 Favoritism measures can potentially be un-democratic in principle, but their component 
measures do not present the same problem of overlap with measures of democracy. Financial 
Favoritism and subsidies, according to Driessen (2010) and also shown in the analyses in this paper, has 
only weak empirical relationship with Democracy and has no problematic overlap between their 
composing measures. Legislative Favoritism is more-strongly predicted by democracy, and in principle 
the legislation of particular religious laws often means crimping rights of other groups and breaks the 
“autonomy” condition of religion-state relations (Stepan 2001). However, the indicators which compose 
Legislative Favoritism do not overlap with indicators of Democracy. 
 Prior research on Democracy and GIR has not dealt with this problem, and has rarely discussed 
it. Fox (2007, 2008) does not mention the endogeneity issue when using the Polity and Freedom House 
measures of Democracy to predict GIR. Neither do Grim and Finke (2007), who use a measure of 
Longevity of Democracy in their analysis (reasoning that more time gives democratic freedoms more 
chance to take hold). Longevity of Democracy creates a time-aggregation buffer between the measure 
of Democracy and GIR, but does not remove the underlying problem. Driessen (2010) acknowledges the 
problem, but contends that despite some overlap of the concepts and measures, Democracy and GIR 
are sufficiently distinct. He uses two dimensions of GIR (restrictions and favoritism) as predictors of 
democracy to test which dimension is more compatible with democracy. 
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Religious Diversity 
 Religious Diversity is measured using the Herfindahl index for religious groups. I use Barro and 
McCleary’s (2003; McCleary and Barro 2006) coding from the World Christian Encyclopedia, which was 
also used by Fox and Tabory (2008). The Herfindahl index technically measures religious homogeneity, 
as it calculates the probability that two randomly-selected members of the population will be members 
of the same group. I reversed the measure (by subtracting the Herfindahl index value from 1) to form a 
measure of religious diversity used in the analyses presented here. 
 Additionally, I coded dummy variables for countries with a majority religion of at least 60% of 
the population. These variables are coded for Catholic, other Christian (mostly Protestant), Muslim, and 
other religion. Keeping Religious Diversity in the models corrects for the fact that some majority-
religions tend to have a higher proportion of the populace in their countries. 
 
Assessing measurement-overlap between Liberal Democracy and Religious Restrictions 
 As discussed above, indicators of GIR may also be indicators of Liberal Democracy. Restrictions 
on religious speech, organizing, and ability to meet may also restrict political activity. Such endogeneity 
may result in overestimation of the association between religious restrictions and Liberal Democracy. To 
test this, I first flagged the indicators of religious restrictions with face validity to potentially measure 
Liberal Democracy as well. Those indicators are as follows: 
 mj - restrictions on conversion to minority religions (effective limitations on a minority group) 
 ml - restrictions on proselytizing (a form of speech) 
 mg - restrictions on the ability to write, publish, or disseminate religious publications 
 mee - arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, 
and/or members of religious parties 
 nee - restrictions on public religious speech including sermons by clergy 
 nbb - arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, 
and/or members of religious parties 
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 ngg - restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material 
 naa - restrictions on religious political parties 
 
The four indicators starting with “n” denote restrictions that apply to all religions including the majority 
religion, while the four indicators starting with “m” are specifically coded as restrictions on minority 
religions. Note that I have categorized two of the “m” indicators (mj and ml) as measuring a unique 
dimension of restrictions on proselytizing and conversion. 
 I first estimated polychoric correlations for each indicator of Minority Restrictions and Majority 
Restrictions, with both dimensions of Bollen’s (1993, 2009) index of Liberal Democracy, using 2002 data. 
Theoretically, I would expect more overlap of religious restrictions with Political Liberties than with 
Democratic Rule. However, these dimensions of Liberal Democracy are highly-correlated with each 
other, and indicators of religious restrictions were similarly correlated with both dimensions. Notably, 
three of the four indicators from both Minority Restrictions and Majority Restrictions had the highest 
correlations with both dimensions of Liberal Democracy. Indicators about religious political parties (mee 
and naa) were not strongly correlated with either dimension of Liberal Democracy. 
 To better assess the measurement overlap between religious restrictions and Liberal 
Democracy, I estimated Structural Equation models for 1995 and 2002 data. For each year, I estimated a 
model with three latent variables: Minority Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, and Liberal Democracy28. 
I then estimated an otherwise equivalent model that added a second path from Liberal Democracy to 
the indicators in question. The diagram below shows the dual paths to six indicators. For the sake of 
space, only 6 of the 14 indicators of Minority Restrictions are shown. 
                                                          
28 Liberal Democracy was measured by Civil Liberties, Freedom of Group Opposition (Party), Political Rights, 
Competitiveness of Nomination Process, and Legislative Effectiveness, modeled as continuous variables. 
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 The addition of a path from Liberal Democracy to the six religious restriction indicators in 
question results in a highly significant improvement in model fit. The DIFFTEST comparison of models 
produced a Chi2 statistic of 29.8 for 1995 data, and 41.2 for 2002 data, with 6 degrees of freedom. Each 
of the six indicators loads significantly on Liberal Democracy, although nee is marginally significant (p < 
0.1) for 1995 and ngg is marginally significant for 2002. With the addition of the paths from Liberal 
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Democracy, the six indicators load less strongly (though still significantly) on their respective Restriction 
latent variables. 
 Restrictions on proselytizing and conversion appear to be particularly incompatible with 
democracy, whether as a result of endogenous measurement or a strong association between 
independent factors. The indicators of restrictions on conversion (mj) and proselytizing (ml) have larger 
standardized loadings and test statitics on Liberal Democracy than any of the other dual-path indicators. 
For the 2002 data, mj and ml load more strongly on Liberal Democracy than they do on the latent 
variable for Minority Restrictions. 
 I estimated a second set of SEM models excluding mj and ml, since I originally classified 
restrictions on proselytizing and conversion as a unique dimension. The dual-paths model was still an 
improvement in fit, though not nearly as much so as when mj and ml were included in the model. For 
both 1995 and 2002, the DIFFTEST comparison produced a Chi2 statistic of 11.4, with 4 degrees of 
freedom.29 Fit statistics and difference tests for both sets of models are presented in Table 1. 
Correlations between latent variables are also presented. Note that M is Minority Restrictions, and N is 
Majority Restrictions. 
                                                          
29 Since these models used some categorical variables, the Weighted Least Squares (WLSMV) estimator was used. 
This does not allow for typical difference testing by comparing model Chi2 values. Instead, the DIFFTEST command 
in Mplus was used to compare the models. This produces a Chi2 statistic, but it is not the same as a normal 
difference test. 
  
 
5
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Table 1: Fit Statistics and Difference Tests assessing overlap between Liberal Democracy and Restrictions
Dual paths from mg, mj, ml, nbb, nee, ngg to respective restriction dimensions and Liberal Democracy
Latent Correlations
Year Paths N Free param Chi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST DF P-value Dem-M Dem-N M-N
1995 single 173 95 382.04 272 0 0.048 -1019.7 0.963 0.959 29.8 6 0.0000 -0.569 -0.713 0.715
1995 dual 173 101 356.23 266 0 0.044 -1014.5 0.97 0.966 -0.507 -0.575 0.672
2002 single 173 94 401.41 272 0 0.052 -1000.3 0.961 0.957 41.2 6 0.0000 -0.645 -0.706 0.717
2002 dual 173 100 367.05 266 0 0.047 -1003.7 0.97 0.966 -0.595 -0.614 0.663
Dual paths from mg, nbb, nee, ngg to restriction dimensions and Liberal Democracy (mj, ml not in model)
Latent Correlations
Year Paths N Free param Chi2 DF P(Chi2) RMSEA BIC CFI TLI DIFFTEST DF P-value Dem-M Dem-N M-N
1995 single 173 87 310.727 227 0.0002 0.046 -859.1 0.96 0.956 11.4 4 0.0222 -0.531 -0.713 0.699
1995 dual 173 91 302.139 223 0.0003 0.045 -847.0 0.962 0.957 -0.51 -0.586 0.686
2002 single 173 86 318.198 227 0.0001 0.048 -851.6 0.963 0.959 11.4 4 0.0229 -0.606 -0.706 0.698
2002 dual 173 90 310.502 223 0.0001 0.048 -838.7 0.965 0.96 -0.584 -0.612 0.674
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 While there is evidence of some endogeneity between measures of Liberal Democracy and 
Religious Restrictions, the majority of the empirical association does not appear to be due to 
measurement overlap. Correlations between latent variables are displayed on the right-hand side of 
Table 1. While the addition of dual paths to the model does decrease the correlation between Liberal 
Democracy and the dimensions of Religious Restrictions, the decrease is proportionately small. The 
correlation between Liberal Democracy and Minority Restrictions decreases by about 10% with the 
addition of dual paths (and by only 3.5% when the model does not include proselytizing or conversion). 
The correlation between Liberal Democracy and Majority Restrictions is stronger to begin with and sees 
a larger decrease with the addition of dual paths to the model: 18% for 1995 data, and 13% for 2002 
data. Based on these analyses, the bulk of the relationship between Liberal Democracy and Religious 
Restrictions is not a result of endogeneity. To correct for the measurement-overlap, I built indices of 
Minority Restrictions and Majority Restrictions excluding the significant dual-path indicators. I still 
estimate models predicting Proselytizing Restrictions, since proselytizing and conversion are particularly 
important to an open religious market. However, the coefficient on Liberal Democracy in those models 
is questionable. 
 
Panel Analyses predicting GIR Dimensions 
 I estimate two types of models in order to assess which national characteristics predict each GIR 
dimension. Fixed-effect models assess the predictors of over-time change in GIR, while a series of panel 
regression models examines between-country variation for each GIR dimension. Here I present 
hypotheses, describe modeling strategy and present results. 
Hypotheses 
 Democracy: Each of the 5 GIR dimensions should be negatively and significantly predicted by 
degree-of-Democracy. Following Fox’s (2007) observation of a “ceiling” of GIR beyond which 
Democracies are unlikely to venture, I expect there to be more variation in GIR behavior among 
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lower-democracy countries, where degree-of-Democracy should therefore be more predictive 
of GIR. Based on Driessen (2010), I expect these effects to be smaller for Financial Favoritism 
and perhaps for Legislative Favoritism. 
 Religious Diversity: Countries with more religious homogeneity are likely to have more popular 
support for GIR, particularly dimensions which give relative advantage to a dominant majority 
religion. I expect more religiously-diverse countries to have lower rates of Minority Restrictions 
and Proselytizing Restrictions, Legislative Favoritism and Financial Favoritism. A strong 
relationship is not expected for Majority Restrictions. 
 GDP: Following Fox’s (2007, 2008) results, I expect a positive association between GIR and 
absolute measures of state capacity when also controlling for Democracy. I expect the positive 
association between GDP and GIR to be particularly strong among less-democratic countries. 
Among more-democratic countries, it is not clear whether higher-capacity states are more likely 
to protect religious freedom (which would imply lower Restrictions, if not lower favoritism), or 
still likely to have increased regulation as a result of larger state apparatus. 
To the extent that any positive relationship with GIR is driven by more-secular attitudes in more-
developed countries, the positive association would be particularly strong with restrictions that 
apply to all religions including the majority. 
 
Modeling Strategy 
 To assess what sorts of countries are most likely to engage in which types of GIR, I estimated 
two types of statistical models, to assess changes over time and differences between countries. Fixed-
Effect models analyze the relationship between over-time changes in variables of interest. These models 
include a term – the “fixed effect” – that accounts for all stable characteristics within each country, and 
thus time-invariant variables cannot be used in these models. Only time-varying variables can be 
included as predictors in the model, and coefficients express the relationship between the changes in 
these variables and changes in the outcome variable. 
 To assess differences between countries in the relationships of GIR to country characteristics, I 
estimated a series of panel regression models. While these models use panel data, country 
characteristics are fairly stable over time, and most of the statistical variation comes from differences 
between countries. The coefficients may thus be interpreted similarly to cross-sectional regression 
models. These models allow the use of time-invariant predictor variables. Standard errors are clustered 
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on country, so that variability is not underestimated by treating each country-year as an independent 
observation.  Each of the indices constructed from Fox’s data are right-skewed count data, with most 
observations clustered toward zero, so Poisson regression was used for modeling. Financial Favoritism, 
constructed by Grim and Finke, is not limited to integer values and is not notably skewed, so Ordinary 
Least Squares regression was used for this variable. 
 The associations in the panel regression models are not necessarily causal.  GIR policies and 
practices change gradually and are, in a sense, crystallized history and are the result of political 
negotiations and compromises that have taken place over a long period of time. The Fixed-Effect Models 
control for these stable-over-time characteristics, and provide stronger inference about recent causal 
relationships by examining the associations between changes in predictor variables and changes in the 
outcome variable. 
 The panel data includes 170 countries and was constructed for different sets of years, 
depending on the availability of GIR data. Indices measuring Minority Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, 
Proselytizing Restrictions, and Legislative Favoritism were constructed from Jonathan Fox’s Religion and 
State dataset. These data are coded from 1990-2002, and were used from 1992-2002 to avoid the post-
cold-war regime changes and reconfigurations of government. Financial Favoritism was measured using 
Grim and Finke’s Government Favoritism Index, which is coded for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008. While 
Grim and Finke’s data code a larger number of countries, these analyses dropped the countries that are 
not also included in Fox’s data, so the sample would be comparable between models. However, the time 
period has only one year of overlap (2001). 
 In addition to estimating models for the full sample of countries, I also estimated separate 
models for less-democratic and more-democratic countries, since some patterns are hypothesized to 
differ between these groups. I calculated the average Liberal Democracy score for each country from 
1992-2006. I divided the countries at an average Liberal Democracy value of 70; there are 86 countries 
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below (less-democratic) and 84 countries above (more-democratic). The patterns observed were not 
sensitive to the exact cut-point on average level of Democracy; I estimated split-sample models and 
found similar results when dividing the sample at Liberal Democracy values of 65 and 73. 
 There is a wider range of GIR among less-democratic countries than among more-democratic 
countries, because more-democratic countries are more likely to close to zero on GIR indices. This is true 
for all dimensions except Financial Favoritism, as can be seen in Table 2: 
Table 2: distribution of GIR indices
Average Liberal Democracy level
low (<70) high (>70) full sample
Countries 86 84 170
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Proselytizing Restrictions 2.15 2.28 0.31 0.61 1.24 1.92
Minority Restrictions 4.67 6.36 1.20 1.97 2.96 5.04
Majority Restrictions 1.81 2.15 0.56 1.23 1.20 1.86
Legislative Favoritism 3.69 4.61 0.60 1.07 2.16 3.70
Financial Favoritism 5.31 3.12 4.67 2.92 4.99 3.03  
Financial Favoritism has a similar statistics for both high- and low-democracy subsamples. For each of 
the other dimensions, the standard deviation for the lower-democracy countries is about twice that of 
the higher-democracy countries. 
 In addition to the variables already described and discussed, I also included indicator variables 
for currently or formerly Communist. There are 5 currently Communist and 18 post-Communist (all 
former Soviet bloc states) among the countries for which I have GIR data. While post-Communist states 
tend to be more democratic than average, they are also more likely to restrict religion, as a carry-over 
from their past. 
 GIR indices used in these models were constructed by summing the indicators. To correct for the 
measurement-overlap between Liberal Democracy and measures of religious restrictions, I took the 
following steps. I excluded one indicator (mg) from construction of the index measuring Minority 
Restrictions. This did not noticeably change any results, which is unsurprising as there are 11 other 
 60 
 
indicators still constructing the index. Three of the seven indicators of Majority Restrictions were judged 
at risk of overlapping with measurement of Liberal Democracy. The associations of predictor variables 
with the “cropped” version of this index were generally weaker, but with very similar patterns. Finally, 
both indicators used to measure Proselytizing Restrictions (mj and ml) potentially overlap with measures 
of Liberal Democracy. I still estimated models predicting this dimension, but pay particular attention to 
the difference between models 6 (which does not include Liberal Democracy) and 7 (which does). The 
substantive findings on other variables are very similar between Models 6 and 7. 
 
Results of Panel Regression Models 
 Results of statistical analysis are presented in Tables 3-15. Tables 3-7 show results from panel 
regression models predicting each GIR dimension. Tables 8-12 show panel models separately for higher-
democracy and lower-democracy countries, divided at an average Liberal Democracy score of 70. 
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Table 3: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on Proselytizing and Conversion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -2.002*** -3.106*** -2.341*** -3.102*** -2.314*** -1.592** -1.573***
[-5.567] [-6.250] [-5.541] [-6.403] [-5.410] [-2.831] [-3.361]
Liberal Democracy -0.0223*** -0.0218*** -0.0225*** -0.0120***
[-9.195] [-8.270] [-8.553] [-4.268]
Communist 1.779*** 0.771** 1.731*** 0.827*** 1.600*** 1.005**
[6.456] [3.125] [6.557] [3.398] [4.016] [2.665]
Post-Communist 0.251 0.444+ 0.252 0.482+ 0.466+ 0.446+
[0.935] [1.777] [0.953] [1.908] [1.770] [1.701]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.0585 0.120+ 0.218** 0.185***
[-0.568] [1.920] [3.279] [3.593]
Catholic ≥ 60% -1.835*** -1.449**
[-3.851] [-3.167]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -0.271 0.0966
[-0.681] [0.266]
Muslim ≥ 60% 1.352*** 0.943***
[3.915] [3.436]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.785+ 0.767*
[1.888] [2.033]
Constant 2.010*** 1.250*** 1.999*** 1.744* 1.011+ -1.572* -0.611
[16.83] [7.555] [16.02] [2.010] [1.865] [-2.318] [-1.205]
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.162 0.324 0.163 0.331 0.379 0.406
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 4: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on Minority Religions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -0.959* -2.109*** -1.485** -2.105*** -1.391** -0.999 -0.983
[-2.049] [-3.845] [-3.223] [-3.816] [-2.944] [-1.424] [-1.547]
Liberal Democracy -0.0207*** -0.0195*** -0.0211*** -0.0138***
[-7.345] [-6.671] [-7.839] [-3.755]
Communist 2.044*** 1.130** 2.073*** 1.217*** 2.314*** 1.637***
[5.790] [3.197] [5.680] [3.587] [6.295] [3.869]
Post-Communist 0.546* 0.727** 0.547* 0.797*** 0.683** 0.675**
[2.244] [3.002] [2.233] [3.334] [2.684] [2.710]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.0356 0.210** 0.239** 0.220**
[0.352] [2.919] [2.731] [3.038]
Catholic ≥ 60% -1.391*** -0.981*
[-3.416] [-2.576]
Other Christian ≥ 60% 0.102 0.457
[0.310] [1.576]
Muslim ≥ 60% 1.184*** 0.682*
[3.295] [1.996]
Other Relig ≥ 60% -0.0492 -0.0757
[-0.0977] [-0.160]
Constant 2.470*** 1.707*** 2.421*** 1.402 0.679 -1.054 -0.107
[9.838] [6.142] [8.791] [1.640] [1.048] [-1.383] [-0.157]
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.144 0.291 0.145 0.315 0.331 0.37
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 5: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on All Religions, 
including Majority
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious Diversity 0.0053 -0.809 -0.397 -0.933+ -0.486 -0.861 -0.733
[0.0107] [-1.449] [-0.734] [-1.753] [-0.895] [-1.110] [-1.006]
Liberal Democracy -0.0155*** -0.0143*** -0.0131*** -0.00728*
[-5.825] [-5.205] [-3.992] [-1.995]
Communist 1.750*** 1.046*** 1.633*** 1.058*** 1.591*** 1.246***
[6.912] [3.900] [5.846] [3.813] [5.325] [3.799]
Post-Communist 0.574* 0.706** 0.618* 0.701** 0.660** 0.674**
[2.097] [2.928] [2.424] [2.947] [2.832] [2.990]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.240* -0.0942 -0.0893 -0.0609
[-2.548] [-0.985] [-0.960] [-0.682]
Catholic ≥ 60% -1.504* -1.294*
[-2.571] [-2.287]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -0.331 -0.17
[-0.781] [-0.421]
Muslim ≥ 60% 0.293 0.131
[0.695] [0.343]
Other Relig ≥ 60% -0.0897 -0.0644
[-0.258] [-0.190]
Constant 0.983*** 0.311 0.894*** 2.338** 1.648* 1.227 1.33
[4.125] [1.199] [3.601] [2.955] [2.085] [1.332] [1.580]
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.0975 0.0726 0.139 0.0966 0.142 0.165 0.176
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 6: Poisson panel regression models predicting Legislative Favoritism
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -2.744*** -3.013*** -2.297*** -3.034*** -2.272*** -1.723** -1.664***
[-6.152] [-6.120] [-5.526] [-5.923] [-5.296] [-2.958] [-3.419]
Liberal Democracy -0.0203*** -0.0205*** -0.0215*** -0.00760***
[-8.567] [-9.287] [-12.00] [-3.421]
Communist -17.22*** -17.94*** -17.13*** -18.79*** -17.08*** -16.40***
[-33.75] [-35.87] [-33.51] [-37.77] [-34.51] [-32.62]
Post-Communist -1.973*** -1.794*** -1.965*** -1.712*** -1.672*** -1.682***
[-5.617] [-5.453] [-5.578] [-5.266] [-4.918] [-4.941]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.0981 0.231*** 0.343*** 0.306***
[1.078] [4.669] [5.710] [5.452]
Catholic ≥ 60% -2.236*** -1.966***
[-5.123] [-5.079]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -1.136** -0.806*
[-3.068] [-2.476]
Muslim ≥ 60% 1.066** 0.824**
[2.866] [2.687]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.0793 0.102
[0.209] [0.290]
Constant 2.713*** 2.003*** 2.723*** 1.167 0.793+ -1.525** -0.804
[20.18] [12.76] [22.03] [1.492] [1.679] [-3.041] [-1.527]
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.254 0.421 0.259 0.453 0.545 0.558
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 7: OLS panel regression models predicting Financial Favoritism
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -5.726*** -5.888*** -5.738*** -5.591*** -5.088*** -5.268*** -5.029***
[-8.118] [-8.174] [-7.747] [-7.895] [-7.046] [-4.626] [-4.474]
Liberal Democracy -0.00358 -0.00638 -0.0166** -0.0122+
[-0.677] [-1.138] [-3.304] [-1.929]
Communist -0.642 -1.015 -0.436 -1.329 -0.697 -1.326
[-0.631] [-0.946] [-0.438] [-1.299] [-0.661] [-1.209]
Post-Communist 0.928* 0.975* 0.806+ 0.881+ 0.858+ 0.885+
[1.994] [2.059] [1.759] [1.907] [1.831] [1.889]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.429*** 0.592*** 0.556*** 0.621***
[3.418] [4.912] [4.281] [4.935]
Catholic ≥ 60% -0.656 -0.356
[-1.112] [-0.591]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -0.292 -0.06
[-0.483] [-0.0993]
Muslim ≥ 60% 0.652 0.37
[0.873] [0.473]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.713 0.708
[0.853] [0.889]
Constant 7.786*** 7.504*** 7.843*** 3.695** 3.135** 2.468+ 2.541+
[17.18] [21.43] [17.23] [3.106] [2.759] [1.718] [1.771]
Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676 676
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
R-squared 0.201 0.214 0.218 0.247 0.271 0.27 0.279
Robust t-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 8: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on Proselytizing and Conversion
average Liberal Democracy > 70 average Liberal Democracy < 70
5 6 7 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -0.519 -0.0549 -0.0735 -2.641*** -1.667*** -1.668***
[-0.390] [-0.0384] [-0.0516] [-5.599] [-3.331] [-3.366]
Liberal Democracy -0.0199 -0.0113 -0.00929* -0.00275
[-1.515] [-1.152] [-2.137] [-0.619]
Communist 1.105*** 1.149** 1.063**
[3.692] [2.749] [2.610]
Post-Communist 1.065** 1.362*** 1.303*** 0.36 0.222 0.206
[2.761] [3.686] [3.420] [1.302] [0.738] [0.677]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.0644 0.0845 0.142 0.265*** 0.317*** 0.296***
[-0.308] [0.397] [0.617] [3.755] [5.281] [4.187]
Catholic ≥ 60% -0.579 -0.544 -1.666** -1.590*
[-0.710] [-0.668] [-2.591] [-2.382]
Other Christian ≥ 60% 0.456 0.471 0.288 0.358
[0.900] [0.966] [0.702] [0.795]
Muslim ≥ 60% 2.293* 2.145* 0.857** 0.826**
[2.129] [2.013] [3.119] [3.106]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.881+ 0.829 0.773+ 0.781+
[1.723] [1.631] [1.753] [1.793]
Constant 1.036 -2.534 -2.034 -0.312 -1.829*** -1.555*
[0.456] [-1.083] [-0.868] [-0.482] [-3.345] [-2.288]
Observations 917 917 917 941 941 941
Countries 84 84 84 86 86 86
Pseudo R2 0.0841 0.158 0.162 0.266 0.336 0.338
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 9: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on Minority Religions
average Liberal Democracy > 70 average Liberal Democracy < 70
5 6 7 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -0.651 -0.679 -0.679 -1.612** -0.94 -0.92
[-0.807] [-0.671] [-0.674] [-2.710] [-1.182] [-1.179]
Liberal Democracy -0.0122 -0.00511 -0.0138** -0.0091
[-0.926] [-0.514] [-2.759] [-1.585]
Communist 1.350*** 1.833*** 1.598***
[3.369] [4.633] [3.406]
Post-Communist 1.188*** 1.415*** 1.392*** 0.612* 0.325 0.294
[3.492] [4.744] [4.329] [1.986] [1.016] [0.885]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.0845 0.173 0.203 0.281** 0.323*** 0.257**
[0.563] [1.263] [1.335] [2.915] [3.559] [2.631]
Catholic ≥ 60% -0.578 -0.562 -1.964** -1.701**
[-0.967] [-0.943] [-3.090] [-2.612]
Other Christian ≥ 60% 0.552 0.561 0.484 0.721
[1.382] [1.430] [1.090] [1.528]
Muslim ≥ 60% 1.775* 1.711* 0.734* 0.647+
[2.436] [2.335] [2.002] [1.728]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.189 0.164 -0.0751 -0.0826
[0.395] [0.339] [-0.130] [-0.147]
Constant 0.412 -1.616 -1.428 0.0566 -1.257+ -0.435
[0.261] [-0.962] [-0.835] [0.0632] [-1.794] [-0.494]
Observations 917 917 917 941 941 941
Countries 84 84 84 86 86 86
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.204 0.205 0.266 0.31 0.324
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
  
 68 
 
Table 10: Poisson panel regression models predicting Restrictions on All Religions, 
including Majority
average Liberal Democracy > 70 average Liberal Democracy < 70
5 6 7 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -2.042* -2.885* -2.932* -0.253 -0.395 -0.42
[-2.328] [-2.269] [-2.322] [-0.404] [-0.620] [-0.677]
Liberal Democracy -0.00392 -0.00581 -0.00194 0.00515
[-0.345] [-0.577] [-0.415] [0.908]
Communist 1.304*** 1.261*** 1.423***
[4.367] [4.433] [3.940]
Post-Communist 0.699 0.68 0.636 0.986*** 0.991*** 1.006***
[1.289] [1.505] [1.352] [4.378] [4.849] [5.146]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.933*** -0.890*** -0.864*** 0.233* 0.234** 0.266**
[-4.118] [-3.808] [-3.582] [2.538] [2.841] [2.872]
Catholic ≥ 60% -0.75 -0.732 -2.026* -2.158*
[-0.967] [-0.936] [-2.093] [-2.209]
Other Christian ≥ 60% 0.289 0.333 -0.509 -0.627
[0.470] [0.542] [-1.267] [-1.535]
Muslim ≥ 60% 0.000513 -0.0591 -0.0787 -0.0175
[0.000750] [-0.0900] [-0.307] [-0.0656]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.269 0.309 -0.162 -0.173
[0.497] [0.553] [-0.433] [-0.450]
Constant 8.514*** 8.356*** 8.648*** -1.364+ -1.205 -1.645+
[5.402] [4.057] [4.330] [-1.688] [-1.452] [-1.728]
Observations 917 917 917 941 941 941
Countries 84 84 84 86 86 86
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.256 0.257 0.125 0.17 0.174
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 11: Poisson panel regression models predicting Legislative Favoritism
average Liberal Democracy > 70 average Liberal Democracy < 70
5 6 7 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -1.460+ -2.717* -2.674* -2.350*** -1.315** -1.311**
[-1.960] [-2.234] [-2.300] [-4.998] [-2.844] [-2.855]
Liberal Democracy -0.0105 0.0339+ -0.0104** -0.000656
[-0.479] [1.648] [-2.849] [-0.192]
Communist -17.51*** -17.01*** -17.05***
[-34.08] [-33.95] [-33.66]
Post-Communist -0.900* -0.503 -0.369 -2.160*** -2.228*** -2.232***
[-2.010] [-1.088] [-0.780] [-4.250] [-4.672] [-4.679]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.319 0.458** 0.385** 0.327*** 0.351*** 0.345***
[1.132] [2.660] [2.587] [5.085] [6.182] [4.888]
Catholic ≥ 60% -1.564* -1.583* -3.052*** -3.032***
[-2.441] [-2.561] [-3.806] [-3.735]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -0.514 -0.672 -1.131*** -1.114***
[-0.886] [-1.160] [-4.611] [-4.028]
Muslim ≥ 60% 0.812 1.483 0.724** 0.720**
[0.919] [1.577] [2.691] [2.712]
Other Relig ≥ 60% 0.957 1.260* -0.367 -0.361
[1.618] [2.126] [-1.021] [-0.998]
Constant -1.769 -3.062 -5.536* -0.145 -1.277** -1.210+
[-0.813] [-1.446] [-2.317] [-0.236] [-2.656] [-1.863]
Observations 917 917 917 941 941 941
Countries 84 84 84 86 86 86
Pseudo R2 0.0878 0.257 0.27 0.443 0.556 0.556
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 1992-2002
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 12: OLS panel regression models predicting Financial Favoritism
average Liberal Democracy > 70 average Liberal Democracy < 70
5 6 7 5 6 7
Religious Diversity -5.120*** -6.633*** -6.654*** -4.755*** -3.198* -3.219*
[-4.481] [-4.157] [-4.207] [-4.981] [-2.370] [-2.402]
Liberal Democracy 0.0179 0.0155 -0.00638 0.0039
[0.780] [0.658] [-0.706] [0.448]
Communist -1.383 -1.643 -1.534
[-1.296] [-1.470] [-1.326]
Post-Communist 1.483** 1.490** 1.486** -0.0282 -0.252 -0.233
[2.816] [2.763] [2.738] [-0.0323] [-0.260] [-0.238]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.520* 0.548* 0.483+ 0.744*** 0.788*** 0.806***
[2.110] [2.392] [1.916] [4.261] [5.056] [4.820]
Catholic ≥ 60% -0.749 -0.8 -0.668 -0.777
[-0.939] [-1.006] [-0.804] [-0.945]
Other Christian ≥ 60% -0.442 -0.534 0.578 0.5
[-0.596] [-0.708] [0.425] [0.363]
Muslim ≥ 60% -2.489 -2.343 1.208 1.234
[-1.410] [-1.304] [1.595] [1.612]
Other Relig ≥ 60% -0.426 -0.423 1.700+ 1.717+
[-0.345] [-0.346] [1.926] [1.907]
Constant 0.394 2.927 2.179 1.681 -0.0994 -0.378
[0.152] [1.139] [0.785] [0.967] [-0.0609] [-0.201]
Observations 333 333 333 343 343 343
Countries 84 84 84 86 86 86
R-squared 0.27 0.279 0.281 0.297 0.336 0.337
Robust t-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 13: Fixed-Effects regression models predicting GIR dimensions
full sample
Proselytize Minority Majority Leg Favor Financial
Liberal Democracy -0.000198 -0.00176 0.00142 0.000384 0.000625
[-0.573] [-0.980] [1.319] [0.814] [0.0772]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.0255 0.546*** 0.622*** 0.0432 -1.103*
[-0.859] [3.525] [6.722] [1.065] [-2.045]
Constant 1.470*** -1.538 -4.133*** 1.775*** 14.43**
[5.876] [-1.180] [-5.309] [5.197] [3.124]
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858 676
Countries 170 170 170 170 170
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.028 0.001 0.008
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
 
Table 14: Fixed-Effects regression models predicting GIR dimensions
less-democratic countries: average Liberal Democracy < 70
Proselytize Minority Majority Leg Favor Financial
Liberal Democracy 0.000292 -0.00104 0.00181 0.000118 -0.00632
[0.857] [-0.422] [1.150] [0.185] [-0.669]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.0166 1.028*** 0.965*** 0.127* -1.092
[-0.481] [4.120] [6.086] [1.969] [-1.501]
Constant 2.272*** -3.311+ -5.776*** 2.690*** 14.23*
[8.478] [-1.704] [-4.679] [5.347] [2.465]
Observations 941 941 941 941 343
Countries 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.001 0.02 0.044 0.005 0.011
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10   
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Table 15: Fixed-Effects regression models predicting GIR dimensions
more-democratic countries: average Liberal Democracy > 70
Proselytize Minority Majority Leg Favor Financial
Liberal Democracy -0.00282** -0.00603* -0.00094 0.00173* 0.0465*
[-2.999] [-2.157] [-0.883] [2.233] [2.325]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.033 -0.201 0.0875 -0.0925* -1.192
[-0.637] [-1.313] [1.495] [-2.171] [-1.463]
Constant 0.859+ 3.566* -0.146 1.286*** 11.48
[1.826] [2.554] [-0.275] [3.319] [1.511]
Observations 917 917 917 917 333
Countries 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.012 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.028
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
 
 Countries with more religious diversity tend to have significantly lower levels of each GIR 
dimension, except Majority Restrictions as expected. Religious Diversity is significantly negatively 
associated with each GIR dimension except Majority Restrictions in Model 5. This association is muted 
when majority-religion-above-60% indicator variables are added in Models 6 and 7, which is 
unsurprising since these measure a similar concept. Religious Diversity is most strongly a predictor of 
both dimensions of favoritism, where it is highly significant even in models 6 and 7, and is significant in 
both high- and low-democracy subsamples. Also, Religious Diversity significantly predicts more 
Proselytizing Restrictions in lower-democracy countries, but is unrelated (coefficient near zero) in 
higher-democracy countries.  
 More-democratic countries are significantly less likely to engage in any form of GIR. Liberal 
Democracy is only a marginally-significant predictor of Financial Favoritism and the de-democratized 
Majority Restrictions measure, but is a highly-significant predictor (p < 0.001) of Proselytizing 
Restrictions, Minority Restrictions, and Legislative Favoritism. Liberal Democracy is not a significant 
predictor of any GIR dimension in either the high- or low-democracy subsamples once controlling for 
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majority-religion-over-60%, which is a function not only of decreased sample size but of diminished 
range of the variable in lower- and higher-democracy samples. 
 GDP is highly significant at predicting more GIR, except for Majority Restrictions. This result in 
the full sample is driven by lower-democracy countries, which see increases in all dimensions of GIR, as 
GDP increases. Amongst higher-democracy countries, there is still a significant positive association 
between GIR and favoritism (though much weaker than in lower-democracy countries), but there is no 
significant association between GDP and Proselytizing Restrictions or Minority Restrictions. The most 
interesting finding is that increased GDP predicts significantly lower Majority Restrictions (both the full 
and cropped versions of the index). Comparing the high-democracy and low-democracy subsamples is 
striking for this association, as it is significantly negative for high-democracy countries and significantly 
positive for low-democracy countries (both at p < 0.01 level). This is consistent with the understanding 
that lower-democracy countries will use more resources to restrict religion, while higher-democracy 
countries will use more resources to protect religious freedom. 
 Communist and post-Communist countries have significantly more religious restrictions and 
significantly less legislation of religious laws. This effect (compared to countries that are neither 
currently nor formerly communist) is unsurprising for Communist countries. However, it is interesting 
that formerly Communist countries in the Eastern Bloc seem to have lingering effects from their political 
history. 
 Compared to countries without any majority religion of at least 60% of the population, Catholic 
and Muslim countries stand out. Majority-Catholic countries are significantly less likely to engage in any 
form of GIR, except Financial Favoritism (which has a negative but not significant coefficient). These 
associations are mostly driven by lower-democracy countries, even amongst higher-democracy 
countries, majority-Catholic predicts significantly less Legislative Favoritism. Majority-Muslim countries 
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have significantly more proselytizing restriction and Legislative Favoritism, but do not have more 
restrictions that apply to the majority religion. 
 These regression models presented here are particularly effective at predicting Proselytizing 
Restrictions and Legislative Favoritism. The R2 value of the full model (Model 7) predicting these 
dimensions are 0.61 and 0.69, respectively. However, it is not clearly legitimate to use Liberal 
Democracy as a predictor of Proselytizing Restrictions, since both indicators used to measure 
Proselytizing Restrictions are also closely related to, and potentially endogenous with, measurement of 
Democracy. But the R2 value of Model 6 predicting Proselytizing Restrictions (which does not include 
Liberal Democracy as a predictor) is still 0.55. The full-model R2 value predicting the other dimensions of 
GIR are 0.4 or below. 
 It should be noted that GIR is better explained amongst less-democratic countries, for each 
dimension except Financial Favoritism. This is unsurprising, and follows from the statistics presented in 
Table 2: each GIR measure except for Financial Favoritism has much more variability amongst less-
democratic countries than amongst more-democratic countries. For high-democracy countries, the R2 
value is between 0.25 and 0.29 for each GIR dimension, except Legislative Favoritism which is better-
explained at 0.42. 
 Results of panel regression analyses appear to be robust to model specification, and not driven 
by a few outlying countries. I initially estimated OLS regression models for each GIR variable. Added-
variable plots showed nothing worrisome, and Residual-vs-Fitted plots showed distributions with fairly 
normal-looking central tendency. I present Poisson regression models for the indices constructed from 
Fox’s data (since these variables are effectively count data, and clustered toward 0) but the coefficients 
were very similar to OLS models.  
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Results of Fixed-Effect models 
 Fixed-Effect model results are presented in Tables 13-15. Since the classic Fixed-Effect models 
cannot include time-invariant variables, only Liberal Democracy and GDP are included as predictors in 
these models. Model 13 shows results for the full sample, while Models 14 and 15 show results for the 
low-democracy and high-democracy subsamples. Over-time changes are assessed for 1992-2002 for the 
first four GIR variables, and for 2001-2008 for Financial Favoritism.30 
 In the full sample of data, changes in GDP are more relevant than changes in Liberal Democracy 
for predicting changes in GIR. Increases in GDP are significantly associated with increases in Minority 
Restrictions and Majority Restrictions, and decrease in Financial Favoritism. However, patterns are 
different for the low-democracy and high-democracy subsamples. Amongst less-democratic countries, 
GDP is a significant positive predictor of Minority Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, and Legislative 
Favoritism. As in the full sample, Liberal Democracy is not significantly associated with any GIR variable. 
The pattern is very different for more-democratic countries, where increases in Liberal Democracy 
predict significantly higher Legislative Favoritism and Financial Favoritism, and significantly lower 
Minority Restrictions and Proselytizing Restrictions.31 It is interesting to note that increases in GDP 
predicted increases in Legislative Favoritism amongst less-democratic countries, but predicted decreases 
in Legislative Favoritism amongst more-democratic countries. 
 There are two cases of significant difference between the Fixed-Effect models and panel 
regression models, but it is important to remember that these models are not assessing exactly the 
same thing. When taking between-country variation into account, the association between GDP and 
Financial Favoritism is significantly positive (Table 7), while the association between over-time changes 
                                                          
30 While Fox’s data is coded for each year of its time-window, Grim and Finke’s data is coded for 2001, 2003, 2005, 
and 2008. 
 
31 The negative association between over-time changes in Liberal Democracy and Proselytizing Restrictions may be 
a result of measurement-overlap between these two measures. 
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is negative (Table 13). While countries with higher GDP practice more Financial Favoritism, increases in 
GDP tended to predict decreases in Financial Favoritism from 2001-2008. Similarly, amongst the 
subsample of more-democratic countries, there is a significant positive association between GDP and 
Legislative Favoritism (Table 11), but the over-time association is negative (Table 15). Coefficients in 
different directions between Fixed-Effect and panel regression models are not fundamentally 
incompatible. Since GIR policies usually develop over long periods of time, their present levels are 
indications of historical negotiations and compromises. The relationships shown when considering 
between-country variation – to the extent that they do not suffer from omitted variable bias – represent 
this cumulative development. Fixed-Effect Models, on the other hand, assess changes in variables over 
the time-frame of the data, which is a much shorter – and more recent – period of time.  
 Finally, while classic Fixed-Effect models cannot assess the impact of time-invariant variables, 
such variables can still have causal effects.32 For example, there is clear theory about government 
incentives which predicts that countries with less religious diversity will tend to engage in more GIR. This 
expectation is borne out in the panel regression models, although these analyses cannot assess over-
time change. Future research in this area should also model time-invariant country characteristics as 
predictors of over-time changes in GIR. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study examines which sorts of countries are most likely to engage in which sorts of 
Government Involvement in Religion. I improve upon prior research by examining predictors of five 
dimensions of GIR, as well as assessing relationships between over-time changes. Fox (2007, 2008) 
                                                          
32 It is possible to include time-invariant variables in a modified form of Fixed-Effect Models. Bollen and Brand 
(2010) show how classic Random-Effects and Fixed-Effects Models can be estimated as Structural Equation 
Models. A modified Fixed-Effect model can allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables if they are assumed 
to be uncorrelated with the latent time-invariant variable. The classic Random-Effects model, by comparison, 
assumes that the latent time-invariant variable is uncorrelated with both time-invariant and time-varying observed 
variables that are included in the model. 
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examined multiple dimensions of GIR, but did not focus on how they were differently predicted. 
Driessen (2010) showed that Favoritism policies are more compatible with Democracy than are 
restriction policies, but the analyses presented here differentiate between multiple dimensions of 
favoritism and restrictions. 
 Legislative Favoritism is strongly-associated with Liberal Democracy, while Financial Favoritism is 
not. Stated differently, subsidies and in-kind benefits given to a particular religion appear to be much 
more compatible with Democracy than the legislation of religious laws into civic legal code. Driessen 
(2010) argues that government favoritism is theoretically and empirically more-compatible with 
democracy than are restrictions on religion. He shows that both Grim and Finke’s Governmental 
Favoritism Index and Fox’s Religious Legislation index are insignificant predictors of democracy, net of 
governmental restrictions. However, Fox’s Religious Legislation measure is multi-factorial. My Legislative 
Favoritism measure, constructed from some of the items used to construct Fox’s measure, is 
theoretically and empirically more cohesive, and this form of favoritism is strongly-related to 
democracy. 
 Similarly, restrictions on religion are not all predicted similarly either. Restrictions on 
proselytizing and conversion are much more strongly-associated with most predictors than are other 
restrictions applied to minority religions, or restrictions applied to all religions including the majority. 
This is consistent with Religious Economies theory, which sees restrictions on proselytizing and 
conversion as particularly important limitations of the religious marketplace, and a more fundamental 
limitation on freedom than most other forms of religious restrictions. Interestingly, the sorts of 
countries which are most likely to restrict minority religions (other than restrictions on proselytizing and 
conversion) do not seem to differ much from the sorts of countries most likely to apply restrictions to all 
religions, including the majority. 
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 Countries that rank highly as democracies are significantly less likely to engage in practices that 
particularly disadvantage minority religions: Proselyting Restrictions, Minority Restrictions, and 
Legislative Favoritism. While Liberal Democracy is still negatively associated with Financial Favoritism 
and Majority Restrictions, it is only a marginally significant predictor of these dimensions. Still, there is a 
consistent negative relationship between Liberal Democracy and all forms of Government Involvement 
in Religion. Also, this association is not mostly due to measurement overlap between Liberal Democracy 
and religious restrictions. The Structural Equation Model presented in this paper shows that the 
correlation between Liberal Democracy and religious restrictions is largely not a function of 
measurement-overlap between the variables. 
 Over-time changes in Liberal Democracy were not significantly predictive of changes in any GIR 
dimension in the full sample of data. However, changes in level of democracy appear to matter amongst 
more-democratic countries. As countries already in the more-democratic half of the sample increase 
their level of democracy, they tended to decrease their level of Minority Restrictions, but increase their 
level of both types of favoritism. 
 More religiously-diverse countries are less likely to involve themselves in the religious market. 
As expected, the only GIR dimension not significantly predicted by religious diversity is Majority 
Restrictions. Each other dimension is something that would aid the dominant position of a religious 
majority, so it is unsurprising that more religiously-homogeneous countries will do more of these. This is 
not to say that all religious majorities behave similarly. Net of other factors, majority-Catholic counties 
engage in less GIR, while majority-Muslim countries have significantly more restrictions on proselytizing 
and conversion, and significantly more Legislative Favoritism. 
 The most surprising result of these analyses was the relationship between GDP and Government 
Involvement in Religion. GDP is a significant positive predictor of each GIR dimension except Majority 
Restrictions. This may seem counterintuitive, as we expect more-developed countries to have more 
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freedoms. And in bivariate terms, this may be true. GDP is significantly negatively correlated with 
Majority Restrictions, and is not significantly correlated with other GIR dimensions. As a result, this 
finding does not necessarily undercut expectations about either development as freedom, or secular 
modernity. 
 However, net of other factors included in these models, GDP predicts more GIR. This positive 
association is largely driven by less-democratic countries. Amongst these countries, more GDP is a highly 
significant predictor of more GIR. Amongst more-democratic countries, GDP is a significant positive 
predictor only of Legislative Favoritism, while it is a significant negative predictor of Majority 
Restrictions. These cancel each other out in the full sample of countries, where GDP has very weak 
association (not close to significant with Majority Restrictions. This is exactly the opposite of what we 
would expect if GDP were a proxy for secular modernity – in that case, GDP should be most strongly 
positively associated with Majority Restrictions. 
 These results – particularly with regard to GDP affecting religious restrictions – are borne out in 
the Fixed-Effect Models as well. Countries with increasing GDP were more likely to also increase their 
level of restrictions on both Minority and Majority religions. However, increases in GDP were associated 
with decreases Legislative Favoritism amongst more-democratic countries, and were associated with 
decreases in Financial Favoritism across the full sample of countries. This pattern for Favoritism differs 
from the consistent positive association found in the panel regression models. It may be that while 
states have historically used more resources to engage in more religious favoritism (accounting for the 
existing cross-sectional pattern), the more recent reasons for countries to increase religious favoritism 
are not connected to state resources. 
 The relationship observed between GDP and GIR is unlikely to be the result of population 
ideologies that change with wealth. Other variables in these models – Democracy, Communist, and 
majority-religion – measure some form of state or population ideology. If secularization were driving the 
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relationship between GDP and GIR, we would expect GDP to lead to less favoritism, but instead GDP is 
associated with increased favoritism policies. However, these results to oppose secularization theory, 
which does not strongly predict government policies. The most likely mechanism represented by GDP is 
that less-democratic countries with more resources available to the government, have more capacity to 
implement and enforce policy in the religious market. More-democratic countries, however, are not 
necessarily resigned to an iron cage of increased regulation toward religion. 
 There are multiple directions for future research on this topic. While analysis of over-time 
changes is limited by coverage of available data, new datasets will allow examination of these patterns 
over longer periods of time. The relationship between time-invariant country characteristics and over-
time changes in GIR should also be assessed. And as always with cross-national analysis, case studies 
remain important because they can carefully examine causal mechanisms happening an in individual 
country, which helps to build theory, judge which relationships are spurious, and understand causal 
direction. 
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CHAPTER 3 – GOVERNMENT POLICY AND RELIGIOSITY 
 
 Religion is increasingly recognized as important to understanding national and international 
politics. Mobilization of religious groups can have significant effect on national politics, such as the 
Christian Right in the United States, Catholic-led resistance to the Communist regime in Poland during 
the Cold War, and the recent attempts to develop democratic rule in Middle Eastern countries after the 
Arab Spring. The religious landscape of a country can also play a large role in the governmental 
transitions, from the Iranian Revolution to potential democratization processes following the recent 
Arab Spring. Political tensions are often driven by conflict or competition between religious groups, such 
as Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, Buddhists and 
Muslims in Myanmar, or Muslims and Hindus in India. 
 Both the relationship between religion and the state and the vitality of religion are key factors to 
understanding the role of religion in society. Beginning with research on Religious Economies, social 
scientists have examined the relationship between governmental policies toward religion and their 
impact on religious activity. This question is not easily answered, because there are a variety of ways 
that governments may involve themselves in the religious market, as well as different ways to 
conceptualize and measure religiosity or religious activity. Much prior research has used limited or 
problematic measures of governmental policy, while frequently failing to distinguish between different 
dimensions of governmental policy towards religion. These past operationalizations have limited the 
development and testing of theory. I improve on prior research by using high quality data to 
differentiate between multiple dimensions of government policy towards religion, and their effects on 
institutional religious activity. 
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 There are a variety of types of policies by which governments can impact religion, with 
restrictive policies as well as policies that favor a given religion. Following Fox (2008), I use Government 
Involvement in Religion (hereafter abbreviated GIR) to denote multiple dimensions by which 
governmental policies may affect the religious market. Below, I define and describe specific dimensions 
of GIR used in this research. 
 This paper (1) reviews the "Religious Economies" theory that has driven interest in this area of 
research, (2) reviews measures of religiosity, (3) reviews measures of GIR and associated findings from 
prior studies, (4) defines multiple dimensions of GIR and describes measures for those dimensions, (5) 
describes theoretical mechanisms by which GIR may impact institutional religiosity, linking each 
mechanism to particular dimensions of GIR and stating subsequent hypotheses, and (6) analyzes panel 
data from 4 waves of the World Values Survey to examine relationships between GIR and religious 
service attendance across a sample of 89 countries, considering variation between countries as well as 
over-time changes. These will help to assess if some types of GIR play a more important role than others 
in driving the previously-observed negative relationship with religiosity. 
 
Theoretical Background: Religious Economies 
 The relationship between GIR and religiosity became a focal point of social-scientific research 
with the advent of the Religious Economies approach to religion. Sometimes referred to as the Supply 
Side perspective or the New Paradigm (Warner 1993), this perspective views religion as a market where 
religious consumers choose between a range of religious and ideological options offered by various 
suppliers (Iannaccone 1991, 1992; Stark and Finke 2000). An open religious market – analogous to an 
open or free economic market – allows the conditions for competition between religions. Competition 
increases incentive to recruit members, which is expected to result in higher overall rates of religious 
practice. While the Religious Economies perspective developed in attempt to explain religious activity in 
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the United States (Finke and Stark 1988, 1989, 1992; Finke 1990), it has been applied in cross-national 
research on religion, as well as numerous country and regional case studies (Froese 2001, 2004; Gill 
1998; Iannaccone et al. 1997; Moaddel 2006; Stark and Finke 2000; Yang 2006). 
 Most early work on religious economies focused on religious diversity, or pluralism, as a proxy 
for competition within the religious market. Social theory had traditionally viewed religious diversity 
within a society as corrosive to the plausibility of taken-for-granted religious belief, and therefore 
detrimental to the overall religiosity of a society (Berger 1967). However, more recent theories see 
religious diversity as beneficial to the overall strength of religious groups. Smith (1998) argues that 
religious diversity can strengthen the identities of religious groups, because there are more available 
out-groups against which to define and reinforce one’s own identity as a member of a particular 
religious group. Religious economies theory, beginning with Finke and Stark (1988), sees religious 
diversity as both cause and effect of an open religious market, indicating the conditions for competition 
between religious providers. Finke (1990) describes how a deregulated religious market allows freedom 
to all religious groups, leading to greater religious diversity as various religious providers compete for 
adherents. Finke also notes that the open religious market in the United States is partially a result of 
existing pluralism – none of the major Protestant denominations – at the time the largest religious 
groups were Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians – wanted another denomination to 
receive preferential treatment, and since they could not guarantee preferential status for themselves, 
each advocated for no established church.33 
 Unfortunately, research on pluralism and religiosity at various levels of analysis has yielded 
mixed results and may not be useful at all. Chaves and Gorski (2001) reviewed 193 studies relating 
                                                          
33 Both sides of this observation are stated more generally by Gill (2008), who observes that religious 
organizations, like businesses, are usually willing to accept privileged position for themselves, but if not in position 
to receive preferential treatment themselves, will oppose preferential treatment of another religion. In addition, 
governments have less incentive to regulate minority religions if there is substantial religious diversity within the 
population, since they don’t want to alienate larger blocs of the population. 
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pluralism to religious participation (typically attendance at religious services), but found no consistent 
pattern. Voas, Olson and Crockett (2002) issued a more fundamental critique, contending that all 
previous statistical analysis on religious pluralism and religious participation was invalid, because 
measures of pluralism and religious-service attendance were constructed from the same fractions of 
national populations. This results in a mechanical relationship between religious pluralism and religious 
attendance rates. Therefore findings of statistical relationship may not be valid as measures of an actual 
relationship. Since the publication of the Chaves and Gorski paper and the Voas et al. paper, GIR has 
received more attention as a predictor of religiosity while religious pluralism has received less. 
 Finke and Stark (1989, 1992; also see Finke 1990) first discussed the effects of regulation on the 
religious market. Their historical-sociological study of the U.S. case details how the lack of an 
established, state- supported religion and resulting less-regulated religious market allowed for 
entrepreneurial-driven religious activity and growth, as well as religious toleration and religious 
freedom. While social pressures on individuals still existed, the state did not actively limit the religious 
market, either by restricting individual choice of religious affiliation or by restricting the operation of 
some religious brands. This allowed space for many different religious groups to operate and flourish, 
and for new religious groups to develop. 
 Scholars have documented a number of similar cases, where government policies help to 
explain growth or contraction of religion. Iannaccone, Finke and Stark (1997) link the lifting of religious 
regulation with increased religious supply and religious activity in post-WWII Japan. Gill (1999) details 
how (predominantly Catholic) Latin American countries with lower levels of GIR experienced greater 
growth of Evangelical Protestantism. Froese (2001) examines the increasing religiosity following the fall 
of communism (and its restrictions on religion) in Hungary, and subsequent decrease in religious activity 
as new government regulations were passed. 
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 Cross-national studies show that countries with higher GIR tend to have lower rates of 
religiosity. Chaves and Cann (1992) found that Western countries with higher levels of GIR tend to have 
lower rates of religious service attendance. Aggregated religious service attendance mostly captures 
Christianity (the majority religion in each country in the study), but Chaves et al. (1994) later studied the 
rates of Muslims from those same countries majority-Christian countries making the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. They found that in countries with higher levels of GIR, Muslims were less likely to travel to 
Mecca. Comparing Muslim-majority Middle-Eastern countries, Moaddel (2006) found that Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, which have specifically Islamic governments that maintain a high degree of involvement in 
religion, have less religious populations (in terms of self-described religiosity and mosque attendance) 
than Egypt and Jordan, which have more secular governments. 
 
Defining Religiosity 
 Religion is a multifaceted phenomenon, and it is possible for people or countries to be more or 
less religious in a number of ways. Surveys gather information about people’s religious identity (whether 
they consider themselves to be religious, and what religion they identify with), specific religious beliefs, 
frequency of personal or private religious practices, the importance of religion to the respondent, and 
the frequency of attendance at religious services. Individual-level measures may be aggregated to create 
nation-level statistics. The various measures of religiosity may vary independently, both at the individual 
and aggregate level. For example, in her seminally-titled work, Believing but Not Belonging (1990), Grace 
Davie argues that a majority of people in the U.K. hold religious beliefs despite low levels of attendance 
at religious services.34 
                                                          
34 Voas and Crockett (2005) posed a counter, arguing that levels of both belief and attendance are low in the U.K. 
Regardless, my point here is that various dimensions of religiosity can vary independently, and Voas and Crockett 
do not argue that beliefs and institutional participation need go hand-in-hand. 
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 Research examining the relationship between GIR and religiosity has largely focused on 
attendance at religious services as an outcome. There are three main reasons for this. First, religious 
service attendance is more comparable across religions and cultures than other indicators which might 
be used in cross-national analysis. Second, governmental actions and policies primarily affect religious 
institutions, and usually affect individual beliefs and practices only indirectly. Third, research on the 
relationship between GIR and religiosity has largely grown out of the Religious Economies paradigm, 
which focuses on the supply-side of religious organizations and churches. 
 Some more recent studies (Barro and McCleary 2003; McCleary and Barro 2006; Fox and Tabory 
2008) have estimated models for a variety of outcomes, including self-identified status as a religious 
person, as well as belief in God, Heaven, and Hell. These more “internal” measures of religiosity have 
rarely showed significant relationship with GIR, which is unsurprising because governmental actions can 
impact the content of individuals’ minds (i.e., beliefs and identity) much less directly. 
 Regional studies examining countries with religiously similar populations (e.g., Gill 1999) or 
religious sub-populations such as Western Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca (Chaves et al. 1994) 
are valuable to test theories with more religiously-particular outcomes, or to be confident that 
measures have comparable meaning across the countries surveyed. Multilevel modeling of religious 
subgroups within similar countries is promising in this regard. More focused studies also allow 
distinguishing between the vitality of different religions in a given country, since minority religions – 
from Catholics in Britain to Copts in Egypt – often face a different set of ecosystem pressures than the 
majority religion. 
 However, cross-national analysis remains the best test for predictions about the overall vitality 
of countries’ religious economies, and cross-national analysis using full populations should be limited to 
outcome measures that are reasonably comparable across cultures and religions. Measures of private 
religious practices such as personal prayer do not meet this criterion and are thus mainly useful only for 
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studies within a given religious group. The meaning of and expectations for prayer differ between 
religious groups; for example, Islam has greater and more specific expectations for frequency and time 
of daily prayer than Christianity. Particular beliefs (e.g., existence of Heaven and Hell) are also 
sufficiently variable across religions and cultures as to be problematic for cross-national analysis. 
 
Prior Measures of GIR and Associated Findings 
 While Religious Economies theory makes significant links between GIR and religious activity, 
conceptualization and measurement of GIR have been inconsistent, and has rarely attempted to 
examine the effects of different types of policies toward religion. Here, I review operationalizations of 
GIR in cross-national research, and the respective findings. 
 Many prior studies (and subsequent findings and related theory) have treated GIR as a single 
dimension. Chaves and Cann (1992) coded 6 dichotomous items measuring various aspects of 
governmental policies toward religion in 18 Western countries.35 The items were coded from the World 
Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett 1982), and were chosen to reflect "a direct financial subsidy or benefit to 
a religious institution, exactly the kind of ‘public’ support that should produce monopolistic laziness, 
according to the economic theory” (Chaves and Cann 1992:280), but the range of measured behaviors 
include state control of religion (appointing or approving church leaders) as well as preferential 
treatment and subsidies. Chaves and Cann combine these items into a simple index, which was 
negatively related to weekly religious-service attendance for a sample of 18 European countries. Chaves 
et al. (1994) use the same scale to test the relationship with the religiosity of Muslims from the same 18 
Christian-majority European countries. Controlling for social class (and therefore financial ability to 
travel) of Muslims on a per-country basis, they found that Muslims in countries with less GIR were more 
likely to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
                                                          
35 These items, and the items for other measures of GIR discussed here, are presented in the Appendix. 
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 This GIR index was later expanded to 20 items in Gill’s (1999) study of Protestant Growth in 20 
(predominantly Catholic) Latin American countries. This wider range of items was again used in a single 
index instead of singling out multiple dimensions of GIR, and some of the individual items are 
themselves multidimensional (e.g., “The state appoints or approves church leaders, church leaders 
appoint or approve government officials, and/or church leaders have specific positions in the 
government” is coded based on both directions of influence and control between religion and state). 
Moreover, each coded item is dichotomous, and so do not capture variation degree of specific practices. 
Gill finds this GIR index to be inversely related to the growth of Protestantism. As predicted by Religious 
Economies theory, more-open religious markets allow for more diversification and growth of minority 
religious groups. 
 Some studies have separated multiple dimensions or components of GIR in the same analysis, 
but findings have been inconsistent or limited by the quality of measures. Barro and McCleary (2003), 
using GIR data coded from the World Christian Encyclopedia, found that the existence of a state religion 
has a positive effect on attendance, albeit net of pluralism, government appointment of religious 
leaders, and measures for proportion of religious market share by different religions, which were 
included in their statistical model. McCleary and Barro (2006) replicated this finding, again showing a 
positive relationship between the presence of a state religion and rates of religious-service attendance 
when controlling for both pluralism and government appointment of church leaders. 
 Barro and McCleary’s finding of positive impact of state religion was questioned by North and 
Gwin (2004), who used the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports to code 9 
dichotomous items measuring different aspects of GIR. They use two of these items (existence of a state 
or official religion, and requirement that religious groups register with the government) as independent 
variables, as well as building an index of all 9 items and a measure for any restriction on religious 
freedom (coded as 1 if any of the 9 items is 1). They found that establishment of an official religion 
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significantly decreases religious attendance, opposite Barro and McCleary (but in line with prior research 
in this area). However, they do not distinguish net-effects (by including multiple GIR measures in the 
same model) except for a separate measure of de jure GIR: how long countries had constitutional 
protection for religious freedom. They found that each decade of constitutional protection was worth a 
1.2% increase in rates of attendance at religious services, and the statistic was robust to the inclusion of 
various GIR measures in the model. North and Gwin attempted to replicate Barro and McCleary’s finding 
of a positive effect of state religion, but were unable to do so using either Barro and McCleary’s measure 
(from the World Christian Encyclopedia) or their own measure (coded from the U.S. State Department 
reports), and using various measures of religious pluralism and majority-religion measures as controls. 
But Barro and McCleary’s finding is unlikely to be an artifact from controls for religious pluralism or 
majority-religion. 
 The main difference in Barro and McCleary’s analysis, and likely reason for their finding a 
strongly positive effect of state religion on religious attendance, is that they also included multiple GIR 
items in their statistical models. In addition to the indicator of state religion, they also included in 
indicator for government appointment of religious leaders. Therefore, the positive effect of state 
religion is net of the effect of government appointment of religious leaders.36 But governmental 
appointment of church leaders is a common component of having a state religion, and it is less clear 
what these items represent when included as separate variables in the same model. Chaves and Cann 
(1992) had used both measures as part of their 6-item index measuring GIR. Nevertheless, there is 
sufficient variation between the two items to justify including them in the same statistical model.37 
                                                          
36 Barro and McCleary (2003) report that the coefficient on state religion is still positive, but much smaller (and 
barely significant) when the indicator for government appointment of religious leaders is removed from the model. 
 
37 In the data presented in Table 1 of Barro and McCleary (2003),  the indicator variables for state religion and 
government appointment of religious leaders have a polychoric correlation of 0.41, so there is sufficient variation 
to justify their use as separate items. Of the 60 countries in their sample, 28 countries are coded as 0 for both 
items, 11 are coded as 1 for both items, and there are 10 countries in both the 1/0 and the 0/1 cells. 
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 The use of a dichotomous measure of state religion is problematic in and of itself, because the 
underlying concept has gradation and multiple dimensions. Dichotomous measures fail to capture any 
gradation. For example, the World Christian Encyclopedia (as used by Barro and McCleary) codes an 
indicator of whether a state has a “religious philosophy,” while North and Gwin code for the “existence 
of a state or official religion.” Neither item clearly distinguishes between de jure and de facto state 
religion (official designation vs. empirically-measurable practices). And even among empirically-
measurable practices, there are multiple dimensions of GIR that could be considered part of having a 
state religion. A state could simultaneously restrict minority religions and give preferential treatment to 
the majority religion, but there is significant independent variation between these practices. 
 Unless there is a specific practice that is theorized to be very important and can be easily 
measured, it is preferable to measure clearly defined dimensions of GIR, each assembled from multiple 
indicators. Fox and Tabory (2008) used indices from Fox’s Religion and State dataset to improve on prior 
research in this area, measuring multiple, reasonably-coherent dimensions of GIR for a larger sample of 
countries worldwide. They estimated separate regression models each using a different GIR variable 
plus controls, and found that multiple dimensions of GIR are significant predictors of lower rates of 
attendance at religious services.38 However, Fox and Tabory do not attempt to distinguish whether some 
dimensions of GIR are more important to this relationship than others. In fact, they use an aggregated 
index of General GIR, which they also find negatively related to religious attendance.39 Additionally, their 
OLS models pool multiple waves of data and treat each country-year as an independent observation. 
This allows smaller standard errors (and thus greater chance to achieve statistical significance) than if 
standard errors are properly clustered on each country, although they argue that that there is sufficient 
                                                          
38 Fox and Tabory also estimated models using measures of specific religious beliefs or identity as a religious 
person, but found that GIR variables had little relationship with these outcomes. 
 
39 This effectively operationalizes GIR as a single dimension, following Chaves and Cann (1992) and other prior 
studies. Recent work (e.g., Solt, Habel, and Grant 2011) use Fox’s General GIR as a control for religious-economies 
hypotheses. 
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over-time variation in their data to treat each country-year observation as an independent data point 
(Fox and Tabory 2008:257–258). 
 While studies have most commonly found GIR negatively related to religiosity, it is unclear 
which dimensions of GIR have the most relevance to predicting religiosity. Prior quantitative work has 
treated GIR as a single dimension, poorly measured multiple dimensions, or simply not attempted to 
differentiate which dimensions of GIR are most important to this relationship. As a result, theory has 
failed to differentiate between types of GIR. 
 
Defining Dimensions of GIR 
 There are multiple important distinctions to be made between types of GIR.40 Stark and Finke 
(2000) distinguish between suppression and subsidies, noting that suppression represses innovation in 
the religious market, whereas subsidies simply remove some incentive for the majority religion to be 
attuned to religious preferences of the public by making majority religious institutions less dependent 
on their adherents. Gill (2008) similarly distinguishes between negative restrictions and positive support. 
Restrictions can be applied to all religions or specifically against minority religions (the latter may also be 
thought of as negative favoritism). Positive support or favoritism includes not only subsidies, but 
legislative control for or by a favored religion. I define Governmental Involvement in Religion as actions 
of the state which limit choice of religion or the free practice of some or all religions, or give funding and 
subsidies or legislative advantage to some religions over others. From this definition I distinguish five 
sub-dimensions: 
                                                          
40 Note that I am distinguishing between dimensions of governmental behavior, not philosophies of religion-state 
relations or de jure constitutional statements. While these are worthy topics for analysis, prior research has shown 
them to be relatively less important and largely independent of actual government policies and behavior. Fox 
(2011b, 2011c) notes that constitutional statements about separation or other philosophies toward religion-state 
relations are correlated but not strongly predictive of government behaviors and policies toward religion. With 
regard to predicting religiosity, North and Gwin’s (2004) analysis showed that while length-of-constitutional-
protection of religious freedom is a significant predictor of religious attendance rates, its inclusion or exclusion 
from a statistical model did not affect the coefficients of various GIR measures predicting religious attendance. 
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 Proselytizing Restrictions: restrictions on conversion or proselytizing, including restrictions on 
missionaries 
 Minority Restrictions: restrictions applied specifically to minority religions, including restrictions 
against worship, organization, assembly, and teaching, or holding property for these purposes 
 Majority Restrictions: restrictions on the majority religion or all religions, including restrictions 
against worship, organization, assembly, teaching, and holding property for these purposes 
 Financial Favoritism, where the state gives preferential treatment (via special tax breaks, 
funding or other subsidies) to one or some religions that are not given to others 
 Legislative Favoritism, where the religious laws of a specific religion are legislated as the 
national-civic laws, or the favored religion is given specific forms of governmental control 
 
Four of these five dimensions are measured using items from Jonathan Fox’s Religion and State project. 
As detailed in my chapter on Measurement, Minority Restrictions and Majority Restrictions are basically 
optimized versions of Fox’s variables. Legislative Favoritism is measured using a subset of the items in 
Fox’s Religious Legislation index, which is intended as a measure of favoritism but actually covers 
multiple dimensions of GIR. Fox’s data does not include any items specifically measuring financial 
favoritism or inequitable subsidies, so to measure Financial Favoritism I use Grim and Finke’s 
Government Favoritism Index (Grim and Finke 2006), which is also intended as a general measure of 
government favoritism but is composed of items measuring financial or other subsidies to religion. 
 
Causal Mechanisms and Hypotheses 
 There are multiple mechanisms by which GIR is theorized to (mostly negatively) impact religious 
activity. While prior research has rarely focused on differential effects of various dimensions of GIR, 
some mechanisms correspond better with certain dimensions of GIR. Here, I describe mechanisms on a 
per-dimension basis for restrictions on religion, Financial Favoritism and Legislative Favoritism. The 
mechanisms as theorized do not lend themselves to distinguishing between types of restrictions (as I 
describe Minority Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, and Proselytizing Restrictions above), although 
differences in predictive importance may still be determined empirically. 
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41 All work and no play makes Tim a dull boy. All work and no play makes Tim a dull boy. All work and no play 
makes Tim a dull boy. All work and no play makes Tim a dull boy. 
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 Restrictions on religious institutions or religious practice limit the religious choices available to 
individuals, through higher costs to religious institutions or potential costs to individuals who might join 
a less-favored religion. Restrictions limit the ability of religious groups to provide a "product,” both 
directly as a result of restrictions, and indirectly by limiting competition between religious groups, 
thereby limiting the religious choices available to individuals. Iannaccone et al. (1997) describe the 
explosion of new religions in post-WWII Japan after the country moved from restrictive policies toward 
an open religious market. 
 Prior research does not distinguish between the impacts of different targets of restrictions. 
Majority Restrictions suppress the religious market as a whole, while Minority Restrictions limit the 
ability of non-favored religious groups to compete with the favored (typically majority) religion. These 
policies are positively correlated but can vary independently. In protection of its secular-communist 
state, North Korea has low minority restrictions, but very high restrictions applied to all religions. 
Conversely, Iran has very high restrictions on minority religions, but fewer restrictions apply to the 
majority religion (Shia Islam). Proselytizing Restrictions may be particularly important here, as they 
specifically restrict recruitment and religious choice and switching – exactly the sorts of “market” 
activity. While favoritism privileges one religious group over others, restrictions place greater limits on 
religious competition, so I expect the negative impact of restrictions to be stronger than the impact of 
favoritism. 
 There are two mechanisms which are particularly applicable to Financial Favoritism. First, 
Governmental policies that give preferential status to a given religion or establish an official state 
religion allow for "lazy monopoly" favored religions with less incentive to be responsive to the demands 
and preferences of the population. Scandinavian countries with their government-subsidized state 
churches and correspondingly low levels of religious service attendance are commonly cited to illustrate 
this pattern (Iannaccone et al. 1997). Secondly, government activity in the religious market can crowd 
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out religious civic engagement, leading to a decline in religious activity. This can refer to government 
doing work that might otherwise be done by religious organizations, such as social welfare programs 
(Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004) or direct support of religion (Traunmüller and Freitag 2011). While the 
former case does not necessarily constitute GIR, the latter implies that Financial Favoritism and/or 
subsidies would cause decline in religious social capital and religious activity. 
 Finally, a state-favored religion may be viewed in a negative light because of received 
preferential treatment or enforced status as the state religion. Government enforcement of religious 
laws and norms can lead to resentment against state religion (Iannaccone 1995), and state-supported 
religion may become identified with elites so membership in a different religious group or identifying as 
secular can be a form of symbolic opposition (Chaves and Cann 1992; Tabory 1991). This mechanism is 
particularly applicable to Legislative Favoritism, as legislating particular religious laws is more intrusive 
and likely to elicit resentment than are subsidies to a favored religion. 
 Alternatively, there are two reasons why we might expect a positive relationship between 
government favoritism and religious activity. From a simple economic perspective (not to be confused 
with religious economies theory), government support or subsidies could help religious providers offer a 
better product, even if they are “lazier” because of facing fewer competitive pressures (Barro and 
McCleary 2003). In this way, Financial Favoritism may cause increased religiosity. Secondly, countries 
with a strong and active religious majority may have greater political incentive for state-supported 
religion (both Financial Favoritism and Legislative Favoritism) in the first place. This is most likely to be 
true for Legislative Favoritism, because countries with dominant religious majorities (composing a large 
proportion of the population) are more likely to have electoral support for legislating religious laws as 
civic laws. In this way, it is possible that countries with higher levels of Legislative Favoritism may have 
higher levels of religiosity as well. Therefore, on-average effects of favoritism may be muted by multiple 
mechanisms working in opposite directions. 
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 These causal mechanisms generate the following hypotheses relating GIR and institutional 
religiosity: 
1. Restrictions on religion place greater limits on religious competition to a greater degree than 
favoritism policies, so I expect the strongest negative relationships between GIR and religious 
restrictions. 
2. Financial Favoritism and subsidies should predict lower levels of religiosity, whether because a 
state-supported religion is less responsive to the demands and preferences of the population or 
because government support of religion leaves less space for religious civic engagement. These 
mechanisms do not imply as strong of an effect on religiosity as would be expected from 
restrictions. It is possible that subsidies could cause increased religious activity by giving 
religious groups more resources to offer their “product,” although no studies have found such a 
relationship resulting from subsidies. 
3. Legislative Favoritism may also depress the religious market, but the causal mechanisms linking 
it to lower religious activity are weaker than for other dimensions of GIR. Moreover, Legislative 
Favoritism poses the greatest potential for a reverse causal relationship, because it is the 
dimension of GIR that is most likely to take place in countries where a large portion of the 
population belongs to one religion. 
 
Research Design 
 I test the relationship between GIR and religious service attendance in terms of both between-
country variation and over-time changes. I use panel regression models with standard errors clustered 
on country to examine whether countries with higher levels of GIR tend to have lower religiosity. Fixed-
effect models are used to test whether over-time changes in GIR are associated with changes in 
religiosity. While showing relationship in terms of over-time changes does not establish a causal 
relationship, it sets a higher bar with regard to causality. 
 Prior cross-national studies have largely examined the between-country relationship of GIR and 
religiosity. While studies of specific countries (e.g., Finke and Stark 1989 on religious history of the 
United States, Froese 2001 on Hungary) have examined changes in religious vitality in response to policy 
changes, only one study examines changes in religiosity in a sample of multiple countries. Gill (1999) 
found that growth of evangelical Protestantism was greater in countries with lower GIR, in a sample of 
20 Latin American countries. 
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 To assess differences between countries in the relationship of GIR and institutional religiosity, I 
estimated a series of Ordinary Least Squares panel regression models. While these models use panel 
data, country characteristics are fairly stable over time, and most of the statistical variation comes from 
differences between countries. The coefficients may thus be interpreted similarly to cross-sectional 
regression models. These models allow the use of time-invariant predictor variables. Since I am pooling 
data from four waves of the World Values survey, it is not accurate to count each country-year as an 
independent observation, which would result in underestimated standard errors and overestimated 
statistical significance. To correct for this, I cluster standard errors on country. 
 I use Fixed-Effect models to analyze over-time changes in GIR and institutional religiosity. Fixed-
Effect models include a term that accounts for all stable characteristics within each country, and thus 
time-invariant variables cannot be used in these models. Only time-varying variables can be included as 
predictors in the model, and coefficients express the relationship between the changes in these 
variables and changes in the outcome variable. 
  
Measuring Religiosity 
 The outcome variable in these models is the proportion of a country’s population that attends 
religious services weekly or more. These data are aggregated from waves 2-5 of World Values Survey 
(WVS) responses. The surveys were completed in the following years: 
 Wave 2: 1990-1993 (mostly 1990) 
 Wave 3: 1995-199842 (centered on 1996) 
 Wave 4: 1999-200343 (mostly 1999-2001) 
 Wave 5: 2004-2006 (mostly 2005-2006) 
                                                          
42 El Salvador was surveyed for wave 2 in 1999, which is irrelevant for this study because it was not surveyed in any 
other waves. 
 
43 Iraq was surveyed for wave 4 in 2004, and again for wave 5 in 2006. 
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I exclude the first wave (mostly collected in 1981) because Fox’s Religion and State data, which I use to 
measure GIR, is only coded back to 1990.  
 This 4-wave sample includes 89 countries with data on religious service attendance, but each 
country was not surveyed in each wave of data collection. Of these 89 countries, 
 17 countries appear 4 times 
 15 countries appear 3 times (so, 32 countries at least 3 times) 
 31 countries appear 2 times (so, 63 countries at least 2 times) 
 26 countries appear 1 time 
The unbalanced nature of these data means that the sample size, for purposes of assessing over-time 
changes, is not particularly large. Moreover, the time window from 1990-2006 is fairly short. Given the 
limitations of these data, finding statistically significant relationships between over-time changes in GIR 
and religious service attendance is not easy. 
 Unlike some recent studies, I use outcome measures from the World Values Survey but not from 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Barro and McCleary (2003; 2006) and Fox and Tabory 
(2008) combined country-level aggregated results from both surveys. I refrain from this for two reasons. 
First, using ISSP in addition to WVS data is a sketchy way to inflate the number of country-year pairs in 
the data. ISSP data adds very few unique countries to the analysis beyond what is already covered in the 
WVS. Counting countries with a WVS survey within two years of each ISSP survey (here, for 1991 and 
1998), the only unique cases in the ISSP data are Australia (1991 and 1998), Cyprus (1998), New Zealand 
(1991), and the Philippines (1991). Secondly, while the WVS (especially earlier iterations) already 
oversamples developed countries, the ISSP does so to a greater degree, and combining ISSP with WVS 
thereby increases this bias in the data sample.44 In order to check whether variation in sample 
                                                          
44 Barro and McCleary make their religious adherence data (with country-level aggregated statistics from the WVS 
and ISSP, as well as religious demography statistics from the World Christian Encyclopedia) available online, but 
the dataset contains many errors. For example, Argentina is listed as having a weekly religious-service-attendance 
rate of 1.8% from the 1990 WVS. This is an order of magnitude below the actual statistic from the 1990 WVS. 
Belize is listed as having a weekly attendance rate of 0.5% from the 1990 WVS, but the WVS did not even survey 
Belize in 1990 (or any other year, for that matter). The number of errors was sufficient that I rebuilt the dataset 
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composition accounts for divergent results, I ran additional statistical models including the ISSP data, 
and results were not meaningfully different from those that I obtained with just WVS data. 
 
Measuring GIR 
 As described above, I use indicators from Fox’s Religion and State data to build indices for 
Proselytizing Restrictions, Minority Restrictions, Majority Restrictions, and Legislative Favoritism. These 
data are available from 1990-2002. Values from 2002 were copied forward to fill 2003-2006. Since Fox’s 
data does not include measures of inequitable religious subsidies, I use Grim and Finke’s Government 
Favoritism Index to measure Financial Favoritism. Grim and Finke’s data are coded for 2001, 2003, and 
2005, so I copied the 2001 values back to 1990, averaged 2001 and 2003 values for 2002, averaged 2003 
and 2005 for 2004, and copied 2005 forward to 2006. GIR variables are all positively correlated with 
each other. 
 
Minority Proselytizing Majority Legislative Financial 
Minority Restrictions 1 
    Proselytizing Restrictions 0.78 1 
   Majority Restrictions 0.55 0.70 1 
  Legislative Favoritism 0.58 0.72 0.50 1 
 Financial Favoritism 0.28 0.28 0.07 0.29 1 
 
 
Control Variables 
 Where possible, I control for GDP, majority-religion, and status as a post-Communist country. 
GDP is measured in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and is scaled per-capita and logged, and as 
with GIR data is matched to each country based on the year the WVS data was collected. Majority-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
directly from the World Values Survey. I do not think that this erroneous data is responsible for the apparently 
anomalous results of Barro and McCleary’s papers, because statistics for country-level averages reported in Table 4 
of McCleary and Barro (2006) are correct, unlike the online data. Based on this, it is likely that only the dataset 
posted online is in error. Fox and Tabory (2008) describe their religiosity data as “an updated version of the data 
used by Barro and McCleary,” but it is not clear if they used the dataset on Barro’s website or reconstructed data 
from the same sources as Barro and McCleary had used. 
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religion indicator variables were taken from the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barret et al., 2001). I 
control for status as a former Communist country instead of controlling for Communist and post-
Communist. Decades of formal state opposition and repression of religion have resulted in lower levels 
of religiosity, independent from current levels of GIR. Each of the 22 formerly-communist countries in 
the WVS data was under Russian communism. On the other hand, there are only two currently 
communist countries (China and Vietnam) in the WVS data. 
 While GDP varies year-by-year, majority-religion and post-Communist are time-invariant. These 
variables are all included in the panel regression models, but the time-invariant measures cannot be 
included in fixed-effect models, since the fixed-effect term accounts for all stable-over-time factors 
within each country. It would not make sense to talk about over-time changes in time-invariant 
variables, which do not vary over time in these data. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 I present estimates of 17 different statistical models for both Fixed-Effect and Ordinary Least 
Squares regressions. Model 0 contains only the control variables, which are included in all subsequent 
models. As noted above, the Fixed-Effect models do not include measured controls for post-communist 
or majority religion, since stable-over-time characteristics are controlled for by the structure of the 
model. The OLS models also include time-invariant controls for majority-religion, and status as a post-
communist country. Models 1-5 have one GIR variable in addition to control variables. Since GIR 
variables are all positively correlated, and one goal of this analysis is to discern which dimensions of GIR 
drive the statistical relationship with religious service attendance, models 6-15 contain each possible 
pairing of two GIR variables. Model 16 contains all five GIR variables.  
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Table 1: OLS panel regression models predicting country-level weekly-or-more attendance at religious services
VARIABLES 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Minority Restrictions -0.00898** -0.00413 -0.00693* -0.0132*** -0.00871**
[-3.017] [-0.817] [-2.231] [-4.893] [-2.781]
Proselytizing Restrictions -0.0429* -0.0293
[-2.612] [-1.157]
Majority Restrictions -0.0201* -0.0131
[-2.288] [-1.516]
Legislative Favoritism 0.00942 0.0247**
[1.201] [3.288]
Financial Favoritism -0.00605 -0.00176
[-0.895] [-0.253]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.137*** -0.128*** -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.124***
[-7.111] [-7.608] [-8.239] [-8.288] [-7.219] [-7.048] [-8.032] [-8.164] [-8.084] [-7.498]
post-Communist -0.205*** -0.187*** -0.195*** -0.205*** -0.195*** -0.200*** -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.151** -0.186***
[-4.370] [-3.876] [-4.154] [-4.480] [-4.001] [-4.255] [-4.081] [-4.077] [-3.121] [-3.841]
Majority Catholic 0.148** 0.135** 0.131** 0.139** 0.153** 0.149** 0.130** 0.132** 0.143** 0.136**
[3.198] [2.852] [2.921] [2.990] [3.199] [3.322] [2.859] [2.803] [2.943] [2.915]
Majority Muslim 0.108* 0.171** 0.210** 0.166** 0.0525 0.116* 0.207** 0.194** 0.0542 0.171**
[2.064] [2.919] [2.992] [2.647] [0.807] [2.161] [2.961] [3.113] [0.896] [2.878]
Majority other -0.0954 -0.0672 -0.0673 -0.067 -0.0965 -0.0977 -0.0632 -0.0551 -0.0565 -0.0687
[-1.436] [-1.316] [-1.219] [-1.185] [-1.461] [-1.478] [-1.223] [-1.121] [-1.172] [-1.317]
Constant 1.441*** 1.453*** 1.492*** 1.568*** 1.454*** 1.461*** 1.481*** 1.534*** 1.493*** 1.459***
[8.312] [9.024] [9.867] [9.639] [8.402] [8.646] [9.642] [9.664] [9.510] [9.065]
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
R-squared 0.525 0.557 0.561 0.550 0.530 0.530 0.564 0.566 0.585 0.557
Robust t-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for World Values Survey waves 2-5 (1990-2006)
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Table 1 (continued): OLS panel regression models predicting country-level weekly-or-more attendance at religious services
VARIABLES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Minority Restrictions -0.00421
[-1.155]
Proselytizing Restrictions -0.0337+ -0.0772*** -0.0420* -0.0547**
[-1.883] [-5.192] [-2.479] [-2.642]
Majority Restrictions -0.0107 -0.0225* -0.0198* -0.00701
[-1.214] [-2.514] [-2.261] [-1.044]
Legislative Favoritism 0.0350*** 0.0136+ 0.0142+ 0.0370***
[3.704] [1.750] [1.672] [3.831]
Financial Favoritism -0.00119 -0.00566 -0.00951 -0.00652
[-0.169] [-0.821] [-1.335] [-0.936]
ln GDP (PPP) -0.134*** -0.141*** -0.128*** -0.142*** -0.136*** -0.127*** -0.142***
[-8.450] [-9.259] [-8.009] [-8.413] [-8.164] [-7.330] [-9.119]
post-Communist -0.197*** -0.149** -0.194*** -0.190*** -0.201*** -0.182*** -0.138**
[-4.229] [-3.208] [-4.116] [-4.030] [-4.349] [-3.797] [-3.056]
Majority Catholic 0.130** 0.138** 0.132** 0.146** 0.141** 0.159*** 0.141**
[2.872] [3.011] [2.999] [3.030] [3.111] [3.442] [3.125]
Majority Muslim 0.219** 0.0841 0.210** 0.0922 0.172** 0.0356 0.0762
[3.096] [1.327] [2.948] [1.419] [2.663] [0.501] [1.067]
Majority other -0.0582 -0.0487 -0.0683 -0.0651 -0.0694 -0.101 -0.0429
[-1.103] [-0.968] [-1.213] [-1.185] [-1.229] [-1.541] [-0.891]
Constant 1.548*** 1.580*** 1.495*** 1.602*** 1.586*** 1.493*** 1.629***
[10.04] [11.21] [9.937] [9.806] [10.03] [8.976] [11.29]
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
R-squared 0.567 0.610 0.562 0.560 0.554 0.540 0.620
Robust t-statistics in brackets
Panel-corrected standard errors clustered on country for World Values Survey waves 2-5 (1990-2006)
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
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 The panel regression models show results consistent with the earlier hypotheses. All types of 
religious restrictions are associated with lower levels of religious service attendance, while the 
coefficients on the measures of favoritism are weaker. Countries with more restrictions of any kind tend 
to have lower rates of religious service attendance. The coefficients on Minority Restrictions, 
Proselytizing Restrictions, and Majority Restrictions (in Models 1-3, respectively) are all negative and 
statistically significant. This relationship is strongest for Minority Restrictions and Proselytizing 
Restrictions than for Majority Restrictions, both in models 1-3 (with a single GIR variable) or in models 6, 
7 and 10 (with two GIR variables). Majority Restrictions is no longer significant when included in the 
same model with Minority Restrictions or Proselytizing Restrictions (Models 7 and 10). 
 Legislative Favoritism has a positive coefficient in each model, but is only statistically significant 
(and strongly so) when combined in the same model with either Minority Restrictions or Proselytizing 
Restriction. This result is similar to Barro and McCleary’s (2003; 2006) finding that state religion’s 
positive effect on religiosity when included in the same model with government appointment of 
religious leaders. The indices used here are much clearer dimensions than the variables used by Barro 
and McCleary, so it is noteworthy that a similar finding was replicated. 
 Nevertheless, this association does not mean that Legislative Favoritism or the existence of a 
state religion has a positive causal impact on religious activity. Rather, net of restrictions on minority 
religions (model 8) or restrictions on proselytizing and conversion (model 11), countries with more 
Legislative Favoritism tend to have higher rates of religious service attendance. To the extent that this 
relationship is causal, it is most likely that countries with a dominant and active religious majority – who 
are more likely to restrict the religious market for the sake of that majority – also have the political will 
to legislate more religious laws. Notably, this jump in statistical significance does not occur when 
Majority Restrictions (which are less likely to occur in countries with a dominant and active religious 
majority) is included in the model. 
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 Financial Favoritism is never significantly associated with religious service attendance, although 
its coefficient is negative in each model. It appears that subsidies, at least, have little association with 
religious service attendance. 
 Even though some GIR variables are significantly associated with religious service attendance in 
the panel regression models, they are not the most important explanatory factors. The R-Squared 
statistic shows that 52% of cross-national variation in religious service attendance is explained by the 
control variables. This value increases by 10% when GIR variables are added to the model, reaching 62% 
of variation explained in model 16 with all five GIR variables added to the model. So while some types of 
GIR are significant predictors of between-country differences in religious service attendance, they are 
not among the most-important factors. 
 GDP and post-communist each show robust and strongly negative associations with religious 
service attendance throughout the models. GDP exhibits a very strong negative association with 
religious service attendance, which is consistent with prior findings relating development and religiosity 
(Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Post-communist countries have notably lower 
religious service attendance than would be predicted by other variables in the model. Decades of 
Communist governance left a long-term impact on the religious market. Net of GDP, GIR policies and 
majority religion, former communist countries have, on average, 20% lower rates of weekly religious 
service attendance than other countries. 
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Table 2: Fixed-Effects regression models predicting country-level weekly-or-more attendance at religious services
VARIABLES 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Minority Restrictions 0.00507 0.00783 0.00604 0.00387 0.00509
[1.011] [1.325] [1.205] [0.736] [1.012]
Proselytizing Restrictions -0.00468 -0.0226
[-0.215] [-0.884]
Majority Restrictions -0.0289 -0.0317
[-1.471] [-1.609]
Legislative Favoritism 0.0217 0.0167
[1.020] [0.748]
Financial Favoritism 0.00103 0.00117
[0.196] [0.222]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.00254 -0.00624 0.00238 0.00909 -0.00081 0.00199 -0.0118 -0.000714 -0.00675 -0.0069
[0.0864] [-0.204] [0.0808] [0.308] [-0.0274] [0.0673] [-0.376] [-0.0233] [-0.220] [-0.223]
Constant 0.273 0.336 0.278 0.254 0.27 0.272 0.396 0.328 0.319 0.335
[1.016] [1.219] [1.028] [0.951] [1.007] [1.008] [1.395] [1.197] [1.152] [1.211]
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.032 0.014 0.010
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
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Table 2 (continued): Fixed-Effects regression models predicting country-level weekly-or-more attendance at religious services
VARIABLES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Minority Restrictions 0.00649
[1.080]
Proselytizing Restrictions 0.000359 -0.0116 -0.00477 -0.0223
[0.0164] [-0.514] [-0.218] [-0.867]
Majority Restrictions -0.0289 -0.0406+ -0.0288 -0.0400+
[-1.449] [-1.957] [-1.463] [-1.898]
Legislative Favoritism 0.0248 0.0367 0.022 0.0351
[1.119] [1.643] [0.998] [1.426]
Financial Favoritism 0.00106 0.000968 -0.000312 -0.000924
[0.200] [0.185] [-0.0574] [-0.170]
ln GDP (PPP) 0.00912 -0.00167 0.00183 0.00609 0.00858 -0.000695 -0.00529
[0.307] [-0.0562] [0.0613] [0.207] [0.288] [-0.0233] [-0.168]
Constant 0.254 0.283 0.277 0.243 0.253 0.271 0.351
[0.940] [1.048] [1.019] [0.914] [0.943] [1.004] [1.238]
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
R-squared 0.019 0.012 0.001 0.043 0.020 0.009 0.055
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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 The most notable finding of the Fixed-Effect Models is that no variables reach statistical 
significance at the p=0.05 level. In this panel, changes in GIR are not significantly associated with 
changes in religious service attendance. Majority Restrictions has a marginally significant (t=1.93 or 1.94) 
negative association when also controlling for Legislative Favoritism in models 13 and 16. 
 Given the limitations of these data and the nature of the factors being modeled, this null finding 
is not necessarily surprising. Most of the time, GIR policies and practices change gradually and are, in a 
sense, “crystallized history” and the result of political negotiations and compromises that have taken 
place over a long period of time. Similarly, national rates of religious-service attendance do not usually 
change quickly, and people’s religious habits are typically stabilized by their late 20’s. With only 63 
countries occurring multiple times in this panel, and a maximum time interval of only 16 years (and only 
12 years for GIR data45), it would be surprising to find a strong over-time relationship between factors 
that change slowly. Case studies of countries which underwent substantial changes in GIR (whether at 
the founding of a new nation or some other dramatic shift in governmental structure or policy such as 
after the fall of Communism) are probably the most promising avenue for examining the over-time 
relationship between GIR and Religiosity. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study used two forms of data analysis to examine the relationship between GIR and 
institutional religiosity. Fixed-effect models isolating over-time changes found no statistically significant 
relationships, while examination of between-country variation in the same panel data showed that 
countries with greater restrictions on religion tend to have lower rates of religious service attendance. 
                                                          
45 The Religion and State data from which GIR measures are constructed are currently available for 1990-2002. An 
expanded dataset covering 1990-2008, and including subsidy measures as well as more measures of restrictions on 
proselytizing and conversion, will soon be released. Nevertheless, the new data will not dramatically increase data 
coverage for these analyses, so findings are unlikely to differ. 
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However, favoritism policies and practices do not appear to have any significant negative relationship – 
causal or otherwise – with religiosity. 
 The Fixed-Effect Models found no significant relationship between over-time changes in GIR and 
over-time changes in religious service attendance. This finding is not a death knell for Religious 
Economies theory, because these data cover a fairly short time period relative to the typical pace of 
change in both GIR policies and institutional religiosity. In the absence of cross-national GIR and 
religiosity data going back much earlier than 1990, the best available test for the impact of GIR on 
religiosity is case studies of countries or regions which have experienced large changes in GIR. 
 Results of the panel regression models are clearly consistent with the Hypothesis 1, as countries 
with more religious restrictions tended to have significantly lower rates of religious service attendance. 
This study measured three such dimensions: restrictions on proselytizing or conversion, restrictions 
particularly targeting minority religions, and restrictions that apply to all religions including the majority 
religion. Each of these indices showed a significant negative relationship with religious service 
attendance, but restrictions on proselytizing and restrictions on minority religions were particularly 
strong. This finding is consistent with the understanding that restrictions limit the ability of religious 
groups to “provide” religion to potential adherents, and therefore limit the overall level of institutional 
religious activity. 
 However, these data show no evidence that favoritism policies – whether in the form of 
subsidies or civic legislation of religious laws – have detrimental impact on religiosity. There is near-zero 
relationship (nowhere near statistical significance) between Financial Favoritism and a country’s rate of 
institutional religiosity. It is possible that concurrent positive and negative effects may cancel each other 
out in cross-national aggregate data, but more likely that there is simply little relationship when 
subsidies are measured as their own dimension of GIR rather than combined into a general index of GIR. 
Subsidies give one religious group an advantage and therefore may incentivize the lazy part of “lazy 
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monopolies,” but by themselves do not limit other religious groups from being actively engaged in the 
religious market and therefore do not create a monopolistic system. Restricting other religious groups is 
required to enforce an actual religious monopoly, and these analyses imply that any negative effects of 
GIR on religiosity are driven by restrictions, not favoritism. 
 Similarly, the measure of Legislative Favoritism, while more-correlated with measures of 
religious restrictions, does not include any limits placed on the non-favored religions. Legislative 
Favoritism positively associated, and significantly so when controlling for religious restrictions. This does 
not necessarily mean that Legislative Favoritism causes higher religiosity. Legislative Favoritism is most 
common in more-religiously-homogenous countries which have the popular will to legislate religious 
laws, so it is quite possible that any causal relationship is in the opposite direction. Legislative Favoritism 
only has a significant positive relationship with religious service attendance net of Minority Restrictions 
or Proselytizing Restrictions. So at the very least, legislation of religious laws – particularly when not 
accompanied by significant restrictions on minority religions or conversion – does little to limit the 
religious market. 
 The literature on Religious Economies posits that countries with more Government Involvement 
in Religion will tend to have lower country-level religiosity. This negative relationship seems to be driven 
entirely by religious restrictions, and particularly by restrictions that single out minority religions, 
including restrictions on proselytizing and conversion. In contrast, governmental policies and practices 
of favoritism toward a particular religion do not seem to have any limiting effect on the religious market. 
This is somewhat similar to Driessen’s (2010) finding that favoritism policies are more compatible with 
democratic governance than are religious restrictions. However, it is worth noting that Government 
Involvement in Religion explains only a small portion of the cross-national variation in institutional 
religiosity. 
 110 
 
 Any cross-national relationship in over-time changes between GIR and institutional religiosity is 
too small to be confidently detected using available data. Future testing of Religious Economies theory, 
particularly in establishing causal links, should focus on case studies of countries which have 
experienced large changes in GIR. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation is focused on defining and understanding governmental policies toward 
religion. I build on the concept of religious economies, which views the world of religion as a 
marketplace akin to economic markets. There are a variety of ways that governments can involve 
themselves in the religious market. While these may all diverge from the ideal concept of an open 
religious market, different types of policies may be engaged in for different reasons, and with different 
effects. The three chapters of this dissertation cover measurement, effects, and predictors of 
Government Involvement in Religion (GIR).  
 The first chapter carefully distinguishes multiple dimensions of GIR, constructs measures for 
each dimension, and tests the fit of each dimension and differentiability from other dimensions. The 
second chapter focuses on country-level predictors of GIR policies, analyzing what countries are most 
likely to be involved in the religious market. This chapter particularly focuses on disentangling the 
potentially endogenous relationship of GIR with democracy. The third chapter examines the impact of 
GIR on country-level religious activity, distinguishing between different dimensions of GIR and assessing 
their impact net of the impacts of other dimensions. 
 These studies rely on secondary country-level data from a variety of sources. Of particular 
importance are measures of a various government policies toward religion, using data assembled by 
Jonathan Fox, and Brian Grim and Roger Finke. Confirmatory Factor Analysis shows that the dimensions 
measured in the first chapter fit well, and difference testing shows that the dimensions are 
differentiable as defined and measured. The second and third chapters use Panel Analysis – both OLS 
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and Poisson panel regression models and Fixed-Effect Models – to answer their respective cross-
national questions. 
 The second chapter shows an unsurprising strong inverse relationship between Liberal 
Democracy and GIR, and vetted this relationship against concerns of endogeneity. While there does 
appear to be some overlap between indicators of Liberal Democracy and religious restrictions, this is not 
responsible for the bulk of the observed relationship. As a result, prior studies relating democracy to 
religious restrictions are not likely to be substantially biased. Nevertheless, I built indices of religious 
restrictions excluding those indicators with the highest risk of also measuring Liberal Democracy, so the 
findings of this chapter with regard to democracy are not subject to worries about endogeneity. Over 
the panel of data changes in democracy did not predict changes in the level of any GIR dimension. 
However, analysis of between-country differences shows that lower democracy predicts more GIR, 
except for Financial Favoritism. In contrast, Legislative Favoritism was strongly negatively predicted by 
Liberal Democracy. This qualifies Driessen’s (2010) finding that favoritism policies appear to be 
compatible with democracy. In my analysis, subsidies and Financial Favoritism appear to be fairly 
compatible with Democracy, but the legislation of religious laws does not. 
 The second chapter also shows an interesting positive relationship between GDP and GIR, in 
both between-country differences and over-time changes. While simple correlations show that more-
developed countries tend to have less GIR, when controlling for other factors – particularly democracy – 
GDP tends to predict more government involvement in the religious market. While GDP can be a proxy 
for a wide variety of factors, I argue that the most likely mechanism here is that wealthier countries 
have governments with more resources, more capable of regulating and implementing policy. The 
positive association between GDP and GIR is particularly strong among less-democractic countries, 
which appear more willing to use increased resources to regulate religion or legislate religious laws. 
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 The third chapter does not find large enough effects, relative to sample size, to significantly 
predict any over-time changes in institutional religiosity. Still, cross-sectional analysis of the same panel 
data showed that countries with greater restrictions on religion tend to have lower rates of religious 
service attendance. However, favoritism policies and practices do not appear to have any significant 
negative relationship - causal or otherwise - with religiosity. This is important because it undercuts the 
"lazy monopoly" hypothesis that drove much of the early Religious Economies research. Case studies are 
probably most useful to future tests of Religious Economies theory, as they can focus on countries with 
substantial changes in policy with more fine-grained understanding of the causal mechanisms involved. 
 Taken together, these three chapters improve scholarly understanding of government policies 
toward religion. Building and statistically defending measures of distinct GIR dimensions will help to give 
a common vocabulary to this area of research. The second chapter, evaluating state-level characteristics 
as predictors of GIR, gives context to understanding government policies and practices toward religion, 
and helps to quantify the degree of endogenous overlap between measures of Liberal Democracy and 
religious restrictions. The third chapter shows that religious restrictions drive the oft-observed negative 
relationship between GIR and religiosity and does so using better data than prior studies, adding 
confidence to the findings.
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APPENDIX – MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGION 
 
Definitions and Indicators 
 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948): 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." 
 
Gill (2008) defines religious liberty as: freedom of worship and conscience (and raising of children), 
freedom to preach, educate and proselytize, freedom to organize, and to acquire and hold property for 
these purposes. This includes governmental policies concerning property rights, education, media 
ownership, and public speech. 
 Negative Restrictions on Religious Liberty 
o barriers to the entrance of missionaries 
o religious groups must officially register, and barriers can be placed in the way here 
o ability of a religious organization to purchase or rent property for meeting-space 
o limitations on specific practices (peyote, headscarves) 
 Positive Endorsement of Specific Religious Groups – monopolistic and preferential treatment 
o non-preferred groups suffer relatively higher costs to entry and practice 
o preferred ideologies too: in the U.S., secularism gets special treatment as “neutral” 
o when there is a state-supported religion, other religions that are supported by voluntary 
contributions necessarily must extract more donations from their adherents 
 
Measures 
 
Chaves and Cann (1992) coded 6 dichotomous items from the World Christian Encyclopedia 
(supplemented with other sources). These same measures were later used by Chaves et al. (1994). 
Items were chosen to reflect "a direct financial subsidy or benefit to a religious institution, exactly the 
kind of ‘public’ support that should produce monopolistic laziness, according to the economic theory” 
(Chaves and Cann 1992:280): 
 existence of a single, officially designated state church 
 official state recognition of some denominations but not others 
 state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders 
 state directly pays church personnel salaries 
 system of ecclesiastical tax collection 
 state directly subsidizes operating, maintenance and capital expenses for churches, beyond 
mere tax breaks 
Cronbach’s alpha for summed scale (from Chaves and Cann, 1992) = 0.82 
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Similar coding with 20 items was done for a wider range of countries by Gill (1999) and later Norris and 
Inglehart (2004), again coded using the WCE and other sources: 
 The constitution limits freedom of religion 
 The constitution does not recognize freedom of religion 
 A single official (established) state church exists 
 The state favors one religion 
 Religious organizations must register with the state or be designated by it to operate legally, or 
the government imposes restrictions on those organizations not registered or recognized 
 The state issues legal permits for religious buildings 
 The state appoints or approves church leaders, church leaders appoint or approve government 
officials, and/or church leaders have specific positions in the government 
 The state pays church salaries directly 
 The state subsidizes some/all churches 
 The state provides tax exceptions for some/all churches 
 The state bans clergy from all or some specified religions from holding public office 
 The state owns some church property and buildings 
 The state mandates some religious education in state schools, even though students can be 
exempted from this requirement with a parent's request 
 There are reports of forced religious conversions 
 The state restricts some denominations, cults, or sects 
 The state restricts/bans some missionaries from entering the country for proselytizing purposes 
 The state restricts/censors some religious literature entering the country or being distributed 
 The state imprisons or detains some religious groups or individuals 
 The state fails to deter serious incidents of ethno-religious conflict and violence directed against 
some minority groups 
 The state is designated a country of particular concern for freedom of religion by the U.S. 
Department of State 
 
North and Gwin (2004) coded 9 dichotomous items using the U.S. State Department’s International 
Religious Freedom Reports: 
 existence of a state or official religion 
 requirement that religious groups register with the government 
 censoring of religious beliefs or gatherings 
 censoring of religious media 
 government influence on religious schools 
 mandatory religious teaching in state schools 
 forced religious conversion or prohibition of voluntary conversion 
 restriction of missionary groups 
 government funding of certain religious groups 
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Grim and Finke (2006) build indexes for two dimensions of GIR, on the basis of measures coded from the 
U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports. 
 Government Regulation Index (GRI): restrictions placed on practice, profession, or selection of 
religion by official laws, policies, or state administrative actions – includes subtle and blatant 
laws against religion, not just what constitutions say. 6 items, scaled and coded as follows: 
o mssnry (gri_a): Missionary work restricted or prohibited – does the report mention 
whether foreign missionaries are allowed to operate? 
0. missionaries allowed and/or no limits reported 
1. missionaries allowed, but within restricted limits 
2. missionaries prohibited 
o prosel (gri_b): Proselytizing, preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted 
0. no restrictions 
1. restrictions, but equal for all religions 
2. restrictions, but only for some religions 
o gvintf (gri_c): Government interferes with individual's ability to worship 
0. no interference 
1. some interference 
2. severe interference 
o freerl (gri_d): No legal or practical protection for religious freedom – how is freedom of 
religion described in the report? 
0. law/constitution provides for freedom of religion, and government “generally 
respects” this right in practice 
1. law/constitution provides for freedom of religion, and government “generally 
respects” this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g., in certain localities 
2. freedom of religion is limited and/or rights are not protected or are restricted 
3. freedom of religion does not exist 
o gvresp (gri_e): Government does not generally respect religious freedom – does this 
section of the report mention government “generally respects” this right in practice? 
0. yes 
1. yes, but exceptions and/or restrictions are mentioned 
2. the phrase “generally respects” is not used 
o gpolic (gri_f): Government policy does not contribute to religious freedom – does this 
section of the report specifically mention that government policy contributes to the 
generally free practice of religion? 
0. yes 
1. yes, but exceptions are mentioned 
2. no 
 
 Government Favoritism Index (GFI): subsidies, privileges, support, or favorable sanctions 
provided by the state to a select religion or small group of religions. 5 items scaled and coded as: 
o fundrl (gfi_a): imbalanced government funding of religion – according to the report, 
what is the nature of funding (including “in kind” such as funding buildings) to the 
religious sector? 
0. no funding 
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1. funding has proportional balance between religions 
2. funding has imbalance between religions 
3. funding goes only to one religion 
o estrel (gfi_b): degree to which a religion is favored – to what extent is there a favored 
(or established) religious brand?46 
0. none, or all religious brands are treated the same 
1. cultural or historical legacies only (e.g., formerly established religious brand 
inherits buildings or properties) 
2. some religious brands have privileges or government access unavailable to 
other religions 
3. one religious brand has privileges or governmental access unavailable to other 
religions 
4. one single state religion or official established religious brand 
o subsdy (gfi_c): inequitable level of government favors or subsidizing – how does the 
government subsidize (including “in kind” subsidies) religion?47 
0. no subsidies, or equal to all (e.g., all religions are tax-exempt) 
1. Subsidies not mentioned, but subsidies are implied by level of government 
support for a particular religion 
2. cultural or historical legacies only (e.g., religion inherits cathedrals from 
previous government spending) 
3. only some religions are excluded from available subsidies 
4. only an approved set of religions receive government subsidies 
5. only one religion is subsidized 
o gvfund (gfi_d): inequitable government funding of things related to religion – does the 
report mention that government funds some things related to religion? 
0. no 
1. yes, but equal funding for each religion 
2. yes, but funding is not equal for all religions 
o fundex (gfi_e): government funding index – does the report say that the following things 
are funded by the government? (0-12 index formed by adding the following six 0-2 
items: education, buildings, clergy, media, charity, religious activities) 
0. no 
1. yes, but equal funding for each religion 
2. yes, but funding is not equal for all religions 
 
  
                                                          
46 Originally, as detailed in Grim and Finke (2006), this item was coded 0-4 as shown here. Later editions of the 
data collapsed categories 3 and 4 together, resulting in a variable ranging from 0-3. 
 
47 Originally, as detailed in Grim and Finke (2006) this item was coded 0-4. When the 2001, 2003 and 2008 editions 
of the data were coded, a new category was inserted between the original 0 and 1 categories, and categories 1-4 
were bumped to 2-5. Newer versions of the 2003 data have this item scaled 0-5, with an empty “1” category. 
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Fox (2008) builds indexes for three dimensions of GIR, coded from a variety of sources: 
 Religious Discrimination: extent of restrictions placed on minority religious practices 
16 items, each coded 0-3 
0. no significant restriction for any 
1. slight restrictions for some minorities 
2. slight restrictions for most or all minorities, OR sharp restrictions for some 
3. sharp restrictions or prohibition for most or all minorities 
Note: italics denotes items shared with Religious Regulation (of majority and/or all religions) 
ma 
Restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays, 
including the Sabbath 
mbb Restrictions on access to places of worship48 
md Restrictions on formal religious organizations 
mee 
Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, 
officials, and/or members of religious parties49 
mg Restrictions on the ability to write, publish, or disseminate religious publications 
mb Restrictions on building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship 
mc Forced observance of religious laws of other group 
me 
Restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in 
general 
mf 
Restrictions on the ability to make and/or obtain materials necessary for religious 
rites, customs, and/or ceremonies 
mh 
Restrictions on the of observance religious laws concerning personal status, 
including marriage, divorce, and burial 
mi Restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy 
mll 
Requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all religions) to register in order 
to be legal or receive special tax status50 
mm Restrictions on other types of observance of religious law51 
mj Restrictions on conversion to minority religions 
mk Forced conversions 
ml Restrictions on proselytizing 
 
                                                          
48 This does not include former Soviet Republics which are in the process of returning or otherwise making 
restitution for religious properties seized during the Communist era but does include those that have made no 
reasonable effort to do so. 
 
49 The arrest of people who actually commit acts of terrorism is not coded. If the government uses terrorism as an 
excuse to crack down on those who were not likely involved in the terrorism and the crackdown is along religious 
lines, then it is coded. 
 
50 This is only coded if either some religious organization need to register but others do not or all religions must 
register but some or all minority religious organizations have greater difficulty registering than do the 
organizations of the majority religion. 
 
51 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. As a general rule it must be 
some form of restriction that does not fit into any of the above categories. 
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 Religious Regulation: restriction or regulation of the majority religion or all religions 
11 items, each coded 0-3 
0. no restrictions 
1. slight restrictions, or government rarely engages in this, and on a small scale 
2. significant restrictions, or government occasionally engages on a moderate scale 
3. the activity is illegal, or the government engages in this activity often and on a large 
scale 
Note: italics denotes items shared with Religious Discrimination (of minority religions) 
nbb 
Arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, 
officials, and/or members of religious parties52 
ncc Restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties 
ndd 
Restrictions on the public observance of religious practices, including religious 
holidays and the Sabbath 
nff Restrictions on access to places of worship 
ngg Restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material 
naa Restrictions on religious political parties 
nee Restrictions on public religious speech including sermons by clergy 
nhh People are arrested for engaging in religious activities 
nii 
Restrictions on religious public gatherings that are not placed on other types of 
public gathering 
njj 
Restrictions on the public display by private persons or organizations of religious 
symbols, including religious dress, nativity scenes, and icons 
nzz Other religious restrictions (specified by coder, didn't fit into other categories)53 
 
 Religious Legislation: extent to which the state legislates religion 
33 dichotomous items 
L`aa 
Dietary laws (restrictions on the production, import, selling, or consumption of 
specific foods) 
lab Restrictions or prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages 
lac 
Personal status defined by clergy (i.e. marriage, divorce, and/or burial can only 
occur under religious auspices.) 
lad Laws of inheritance defined by religion 
lbf Restrictions on public dress54 
lcg 
Blasphemy laws, or any other restriction on speech about religion or religious 
figures 
lch Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious 
                                                          
52 The arrest of people who actually commit acts of terrorism is not coded. If the government uses terrorism as an 
excuse to crack down on those who were not likely involved in the terrorism and the crackdown is along religious 
lines, then it is coded. 
 
53 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. As a general rule it must be 
some form of restriction that does not fit into any of the above categories. For example, a common reason to code 
this category was for countries that prohibit clergy from participating in politics or holding political office. 
 
54 This variable is only coded if restrictions go beyond making a public state of undress illegal. 
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ldh 
Mandatory closing of some or all businesses during religious holidays including the 
Sabbath or its equivalent 
ldi 
Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its 
equivalent ("blue laws")55 
ljk 
Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious 
position 
ljl 
Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order 
to hold office56 
lkr Presence of religious courts which have jurisdiction over some matters of law 
lks 
Seats in Legislative branch and/or Cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in 
part, along religious lines 
llt Prohibitive restrictions on abortion57 
llu The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag 
lxx 
Restrictions on women other than those listed above. ( i.e. restrictions on 
education, jobs that they can hold, or on appearing in public without a chaperon.)58 
lej Mandatory religious education in public schools59 
lyy Other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory60 
ljj 
Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by 
virtue of their political office (e.g., Queen - Anglican) 
lhp Clergy and/or speeches in places of worship require government approval61 
lhq Some official clerical positions made by government appointment62 
liq 
Presence of an official government ministry or department dealing with religious 
affairs 
                                                          
55 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. As a general rule it must be 
some form of restriction that does not fit into any of the above categories. 
 
56 This excludes positions in religious ministries, head of state church, or the like. 
 
57 This is coded if there is any undue burden placed on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion in the first three 
months of her pregnancy. In essence, if any adult woman wants an abortion and cannot get one due to 
government restrictions this variable is coded. Waiting periods, mandatory counseling, parent approval for minors 
to obtain an abortion, and other similar regulations are not coded. 
 
58 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. As a general rule it must be 
some form of legislation that does not fit into any of the above categories. 
 
59 This includes if all students must have some form of religious education including education in their own religion. 
Non-religious ethics or philosophy courses do not count as religious education. This category is mutually exclusive 
with lei (religious education standard but it is possible to opt out). 
 
60 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. 
 
61 This variable was also coded if the government officially monitors the speech of clergy. 
 
62 This variable is coded if the government participates in any aspect of the appointment process including 
interfering with clergy appointment processes. 
 121 
 
lmv Religion listed on state identity cards63 
lnw 
Religious organizations must register with government in order to obtain official 
status64 
loo Presence of an official government body which monitors 'sects' or minority religions 
lei 
Religious education is standard in public schools but it is possible to opt out of this 
portion of the education 
lfk 
Government funding of religious schools or religious educational programs in 
secular schools65 
lfm Government funding of religious charitable organizations 
lfn Government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes)66 
lgn Official government positions, salaries or other funding for clergy67 
lgo Funding for religious organizations or activities other than those listed above68 
lbd Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion 
lbe Restrictions on interfaith marriages 
 
  
                                                          
63 This is coded even if only some religions are listed but others are not or if such listing is optional. It is also coded 
if a number of government documents other than identity cards require that religion be included. 
 
64 This is coded if the registration for a religious organization is in any way different from the registering of any 
nonprofit organization. 
 
65 If either lei or lej was coded, this category is also coded. It is also coded if the government funds religious 
education in private schools. 
 
66 This is only coded if the government collects a separate tax which is reserved specifically for funding religious 
institutions. Funding for religious institutions from the general government budget was not coded in this variable. 
 
67 This does not include salaries for teachers. 
 
68 The coders specified the specific reason for coding this variable on the codesheet. As a general rule it must be 
some form of funding for religion that does not fit into any of the above categories. 
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